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THE AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS OF EVIDENCE LAW
TENEILLE R. BROWNt
INTRODUCTION
Evidentiary rules and practices reveal a folk psychological view of
emotion, placing it at odds with reason. Specifically, many substantive
and procedural rules of evidence explicitly require jurors to turn off their
emotions in favor of rational, so-called "top-down," executive thinking.
In order to make the point that this dichotomy between emotion and rea-
son is simultaneously reflected in our evidence law and also empirically
wrong, I will address how emotion is treated in (a) the use of limiting
instructions, (b) the exclusion of prejudicial evidence, (c) credibility as-
sessments, (d) sentencing and damages instructions, (e) instructions re-
lated to the "heat of passion" theory of voluntary manslaughter, and (f)
the excited utterance hearsay exception. In each case I will demonstrate
that while the text of the rules may be benign, the way they are interpret-
ed reflects confusion over the role played by both subtle and intense
emotion. Specifically, the rules listed above evince one of five related
errors:
* Emotional and rational processes can neatly be divided, and by
attending to our emotions, we can-and should-use our cognitive facul-
ties to squash them.
* Emotional evidence and emotional processes always render deci-
sions that are less rational, more prejudicial, and therefore less accurate.
* Emotion testimony distracts us and makes it hard for us to pay at-
tention or remember events.
* Credibility assessments do not require empathy.
* Emotion should not and cannot be involved in moral judgment
and reasoning related to sentencing.
Perhaps more strikingly, encouraging jurors to use their reasoning
to quiet their emotions espouses a view of the juror as aspiring toward
psychopathy. Psychopathy is a clinical personality disorder. It is diag-
nosed through an individual's rating on a set of emotional and social
t Teneille R. Brown is an Associate Professor of Law at S.J. Quinney College of Law at the
University of Utah. She is also an adjunct professor of Internal Medicine, teaching for the Division
of Medical Ethics. Earlier versions of this work were presented to the Legal Decision-Making net-
work for the Macarther Law and Neuroscience Project. Special thanks to Owen Jones for encourag-
ing this paper, and to Hank Greely, Emily Murphy, and the students in Stanford Law School's Law
and Biosciences workshop in spring 2011 for their helpful feedback. Finally, this Article benefited
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criteria. As data reveal that not all psychopaths are violent, it appears
that the hallmark traits include the ability to feel little remorse or empa-
thy, and possessing very shallow affect. Psychopaths may be uniquely
able to divorce their reasons from feelings of sadness, shame or guilt. So
they may defy the label of the false dichotomy. Even so, this is surely
not the ideal we aspire to for the modem American juror.
While emotions such as anger might prejudice our judgment, the
failure to differentiate between various emotional (affective) processes
and their impact on decisions reflects a view that is woefully out of step
with our current understanding of emotion and the brain. Emotions may
distract us in some situations and help us focus in others. This may have
to do with the emotion itself and its impact on our perception, attention,
memory or reasoning. Or it may have to do with the emotion's duration
or the social context in which we find ourselves.
Contrary to the skeptical view espoused by some of our greatest ev-
idence scholars, emotion is not universally corrupting, nor is it always at
odds with reason. Emotion is context-specific and non-linear, and it op-
erates at varying levels of consciousness and subtlety.' Further, the cog-
nitive sciences demonstrate that affect and reason are anatomically inter-
connected and functionally interdependent. In this Article, I hope to
demonstrate that, at the neuronal and the social level, the false dichotomy
between emotion and reason falls apart. It has persisted in part because
anatomically incorrect metaphors are deeply embedded in our cultural
history-that we think with our brain and feel with our heart.
This blindness to emotion has deep roots in our common law, and
traces back to the very beginning of jury trials. While civil juries existed
for property disputes and the like, throughout medieval times it was often
the clergy who determined whether an accused was guilty or innocent
through a subjective process known as "the ordeal." As one example, the
"cold water ordeal" involved the defendant being dumped in a large pool
1. See Ben Seymour & Ray Dolan, Emotion, Decision Making, and the Amygdala, 58
NEURON 662, 662 (2008) ("The resulting decision phenotype is typically emotional but arises from
underlying processes that are generally rational and whose effects might often only become apparent
in instances when they cause deviations from rationality.") (emphasis added); Adam L. Darlow &
Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning: Architecture and Relation to Emotion, I WIRES
COGNITIVE SC. 382, 383 (2010); Ap Dijksterhuis, Think Different: The Merits of Unconscious
Thought in Preference Development and Decision Making, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
586, 586 (2004) ("[W]hether what we may call 'unconscious thought' contributes to good decisions
is also not clear."); see generally Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspecting About Reasons Can Re-
duce Post-Choice Satisfaction, 19 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. BULL. 331 (1993) (arguing that a
consumer's introspection about his or her choice will eventually cause dissatisfaction with that
choice). Psychological level embraces many processes (not just two) and at the neural level, these
processes are multiplied by a factor of 10 to the 16th. See Mark Lubell et al., Institutional Design
Capitalizing on the Intuitive Nature of Decision Making, in BETTER THAN CONSCIOUS?: DECISION
MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS 413, 417 (Christoph Engel &
Wolf Singer eds., 2008) ("[I]nstitutional-level approaches that embrace a binary distinction between
rational or conscious cognitive processes and the irrational or unconscious cognitive process will
necessarily miss the mark in terms of their value to accurate fact-finding.").
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with a rope tied around his hips. If he sank, he was saved as innocent,
"for the purity of the water had accepted him," but if he managed to
float, he was condemned as guilty. 2 The priest overseeing the ordeal was
thought to channel the judgment of God, or judicium Dei. In 1215 the
Fourth Lateran Council of the Christian Church prohibited clergy from
3
presiding over the ordeal, thus delegitimizing the once divine process.
When the process lost its ecclesiastical imprimatur, "it drew the ground
from under that method of trial."A
Courts needed a substitute for the clergy. The lay jury answered this
call, with common citizens in some cases rendering final judgments.5 To
make this radical shift, it was felt that rules must be put in place to tem-
per the power of uneducated lay jurors. This "reining in" of the jury was
habitually described in terms of quieting their ignorant emotional pas-
sions. Much of the subsequent development in evidence law continued in
this vein of accepting that it was jurors' emotions that needed silencing.
This Article hopes to shatter this deep-seated but folk psychological view
of emotion as pedestrian or corrupting.
While this Article is not meant to disrupt the preference for reason-
able arguments and outcomes over unreasonable and intuitive ones, it
argues that emotions are often necessary for reasoning. This may be par-
ticularly true in social interactions, where we attend to many stimuli and
digest bundles of non-verbal cues. Of course, in other situations, we give
emotion too much credit to improve our credibility, where emotions ac-
tually obscure our memory or our perception of others. Rather than draw-
ing bright policy lines as to when emotions ought to be relied upon, this
Article will take existing rules and practices and unpack the flimsy folk
2. George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 585 (1997). Another
type of ordeal involved burning the accused's hand with hot coals, and then binding the hand with
cloth. When the cloth was removed three days later, a priest would examine the burned skin and pray
to God before the accused to render his judgment. If the skin had begun to heal, the accused would
be acquitted, if it had worsened, the accused was guilty and punished. Thomas P. Gallanis, Reasona-
ble Doubt and the History of the Criminal Trial, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 945 (2009) [hereinafter
Gallanis, Reasonable Doubt] (citing Thomas P. Gallanis, Ordeal in English Common Law, in THE
OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (Stanley N. Katz, ed., 2009)).
3. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 37 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS IN COMMON LAW, INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF
ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 3073 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1905).
4. Maximus Lesser, The Historical Development of the Jury System, 134, 150 (1894) ("in-
troduced originally as a matter of favor and indulgence, the jury thus gained ground with advancing
civilization, gradually superseding the more ancient and barbarous customs of battle, ordeal, and
wager of law, until at length it became, both in civil and criminal cases the ordinary mode of deter-
mining facts for judicial purposes.").
5. The reason for the decline of the judicial ordeal and the growth of its substitute, the jury
trial, has been the subject of two competing interpretations. One line of interpretation argues that the
judicial ordeal was about factual proof. Its decline came as people demanded that facts be found by
mortals, not by God. The second line claims that factual proof was never the issue, as the facts of
innocence or guilt were generally known prior to an ordeal. Instead, the latter camp posits that what
was at stake was the moral responsibility for judgment. Id. at 145; Gallanis, Reasonable Doubt,
supra note 2, at 945.
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psychological premises on which they rest.6 This Article argues for nu-
ance, and challenges the current lack of nuance in our evidence practices
related to emotion. I conclude by suggesting ecologically valid research
paradigms to determine how best to revise the rules to properly value
emotional processes.
I. STEPPING BACK: How EVIDENCE LAW MAY BENEFIT FROM THE
COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Scholars have been writing on the uneasy marriage between the
brain, behavior, and the law for at least a hundred years.' Enthusiasm for
the relationship has waxed and waned, with an intellectual explosion in
the last few years based on emerging data from cognitive neuroscience.
Despite developing later in time, the cognitive sciences do not replace
the importance of psychology. Instead, they build upon psychological
theories, offering an "expansion of the tools and concepts now available
to psychologists."9
Under the umbrella of "law and the brain," the doctrinal area that
seems most ripe for review is evidence law. Within evidence law, it
seems that neuroscience can help us articulate more precise definitions
for terms to ensure our normative commitments, once set, track the reali-
ty of our physiological constraints. Data from neuroscience can also
guide procedural rules, employing various decision-making models that
6. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF: As GIVEN BY LOGIC,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS 693, 792 (3d ed.
1937) (stating how crude the psychological presumptions under the rules are); see generally
WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985).
7. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Hugo Miinsterberg, then a professor of psy-
chology at Harvard, brazenly announced that the new psychological sciences would supplant the
intuition and common sense of attorneys, judges and juries, especially as related to the "the mind of
the witness." See HUGO MONSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND
CRIME 20 (1908). Some of Miinsterberg's theories have been tested in more sophisticated studies,
and have been borne out. Others, however, have not stood the test of time. One in particular was
Monsterberg's idea that simple word association tests could be used to detect whether a suspect is
lying, based on how much time it takes for the suspect to respond to neutral versus "crime-related"
words. Id. at 73-110. Even John Wigmore, who openly criticized Miinsterburg's book, hoped for an
"energetic alliance of psychology and law, in the noble cause of justice." See Daniel D. Blinka, Why
Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 357, 373 (2010) (citing John H.
Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg [sic] and the Psychology of Testimony: Being a Report of the
Case of Cokestone v. Muensterberg, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 399, 432 (1909)). Wigmore debunked
Mfinsterberg's theory about the ability of psychologists to consistently detect suspects who were
lying using simple word association tests. Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship
Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 958 n.30 (2006) (citing
Wigmore, supra, at 427-31). Interestingly, more complicated versions of these guilty knowledge or
memory tests have been resuscitated by neuroscientists, and perhaps once again, though his data
were lacking at the time, Mfinsterberg's crude theories may be revitalized. See Eben Harrell,
Fighting Crime by Reading Minds, TIME (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
0,8599,2009131,00.html.
8. To be sure, according to the impressively well-researched work of Michael Saks and
Roger Park, this relationship has been "one of bursts of enthusiasm followed by periods of disen-
chantment." Park & Saks, supra note 7, at 957.
9. Greg J. Norman, John T. Cacioppo, and Gary G. Berntson, Social Neuroscience, I WIRES
COGNITIVE SC. 60, 64 (2010).
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might drive our institutional obligations, such as making sure that jurors
encode testimony and can recall it later. Thus in this Article we refer to
emotional evidence as both testimony of witnesses with emotional con-
tent as well as the related emotional processes of jurors when they hear
such evidence.
As the law of evidence is the law of managing inferences and elimi-
nating unwanted biases, the cognitive neuroscience of decision-making
has been, and will continue to be, very instructive in rethinking why the
rules of evidence exist in their present form, and whether they should
change.'o Seventy-five years ago, legal scholar Robert Maynard Hutchins
observed that evidence law harbored a confusing internal psychology
stemming from human experience and our folk intuitions." Hutchins
believed that if lawyers did not allow evidence law to be systematically
reworked by "objective psychologists," we lawyers would "abdicate our
position as specialists in human behavior" and instead "reaffirm the tra-
ditional conservatism of the profession, and permit the rules of evidence
to recede still further from reality."' 2 Wigmore, on the other hand, de-
spite being quite well read in contemporary psychology, felt that the res-
olution of legal principles should not be outsourced to interloping psy-
chologists.13 Rather than exposing the law's principles to a social science
chopping block, Wigmore thought that the proper gatekeepers for revis-
ing evidence rules "would be the lawyers themselves." 4 Even Hutchins
eventually came to rue his commitment to having psychologists answer
evidentiary questions. He offered an apologia later in his career:
We hoped to discover whether an evidence case was "sound" by
finding out whether the decision was in harmony with psychological
doctrine. What we actually discovered was that psychology had dealt
with very few of the points raised by the law of evidence; and that the
basic psychological problem of the law of evidence, what will affect
juries, and in what way, was one psychology had never touched at
all.' 5
Given the psychological methods of Hutchins's day, his skepticism
regarding psychology's ability to inform the law is understandable. But
10. In order to wash us of our subjective bias, some prefer a Bayesian approach, which is a
theory of evidence based on mathematical probabilities. However, as Allen & Leiter pointed out,
Bayesian analysis still requires subjective valuation for the model to be accurate in predicting out-
comes. Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1491, 1508-09 (2001).
11. See Blinka, supra note 7, at 373-74.
12. The work of Wigmore, Morgan, and Hutchins illuminates this relationship. Id at 374
(quoting HARRY ASHMORE, UNSEASONABLE TRUTHS: THE LIFE OF ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS
47 (1989)). Wigmore disagreed with this proposition.
13. See WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 792.
14. Blinka, supra note 7, at 373; see also TWINING, supra note 6, at 136.
15. Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, I U. CHI. L. REV.
511, 513 (1934). "Hutchins closed with 'the hope of some day striking some mutual sparks' between
law and psychology. That day would be far off." Blinka, supra note 7, at 375.
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the world has since changed.' 6 We now know quite a bit more about how
humans make complex social observations and decisions, and we can
observe the neural correlates of these mechanisms through various neu-
roimaging techniques. 7 Studies of individuals with localized brain le-
sions have also helped us understand how brain structures relate to
healthy and abnormal functioning. We can, therefore, take up where oth-
ers in the law and psychology movement left off, adding another layer of
explanatory power, and a framework for linking structures to functions.
Studying the function and mechanisms of the brain allows us to manipu-
late variables and tasks, control others, and thus say more about the
neuroscientific causes, connectedness, effects, and interventions than
could be said with psychological experimentation alone.' 8
Given the relationship of neuroscience to law, it might be time to
revisit normative epistemological questions in light of neuroscientific
developments.' 9 While I expressly adopt an empirical epistemology for
evidence law here, there are alternatives depending on the purposes be-
ing served in a courtroom.20 Surely discovering the truth is an important
function of the jury trial. But so is legitimately resolving disputes, pre-
serving the integrity of the legal profession and law enforcement, pro-
16. Although as early as the 1920s, some psychology and law researchers appreciated the
complementary and bivalent nature of emotion and reason: "[T]he mind is both receptive and active,
receptive in so far as it receives impressions, and is excited by them to emotion; active in so far as it
transforms its impressions and emotions by reasoning and volition." 2 PAUL VINOGRADOFF,
OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 37 (1920).
17. To be fair, much of this research has not been conducted on mock jurors. But some of the
basic principles from social, cognitive, and affective science can definitely be extrapolated to a trial.
Even so, much more mock jury work needs to be conducted before the evidence rules are dramati-
cally changed. Park & Saks, supra note 7, at 957 ("For obvious reasons, psychology is the most
important of the interdisciplinary threads that can be woven into evidence law scholarship. Evidence
law is much concerned with the abilities of witnesses to perceive, to remember, and to report what
they have observed. It is also concerned with the abilities of jurors to comprehend, evaluate, and
draw inferences from the evidence presented to them, including their ability to assess the sincerity of
lay witnesses and to understand and not be overwhelmed by expert witnesses. All of these are psy-
chological issues.").
18. JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF
EMOTIONAL LIFE 12-13 (1996).
19. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 355 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1775,
1778, 1784 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie
Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1197-99 (2010).
20. Empiricism should inform our evidence rules because courts are not philosophical thought
experiments. Courts exist in the real world, and in the real world, human beings have feelings, im-
perfect eyes and ears, wavering memory, and opinions. Even using a Bayesian analysis of evidence
law and procedure, we still need to generate facts and premises on which our probabilities of accura-
cy are based. Thankfully, there is no omnipotent observer that sees and memorizes everything we
humans do. Thus, at trial there can never be complete objectivity in the assessments of our behavior.
And yet, judges still need to resolve the disputes before them. Was there an agreement to burglarize
the victims' house? Did the physician know that he was committing fraud when he submitted the
Medicare claims? Did the gunman deliberately take aim and shoot, or was it an accident? These are
the kinds of factual legal disputes that result from conflicting versions of events. Of course, the
omniscient observer might be able to provide a third-person snapshot of externally-observable be-
havior. See Craig R. Callen, Cognitive Science and the Sufficiency of "Sufficiency of the Evidence"
Tests, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1991).
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moting justice, and encouraging civil obedience. Depending on the way
these oft-competing goals are prioritized, the rules of evidence may or
may not need to comport with empirical data related to cognitive neuro-
science. Indeed, in some cases it might be wise to reject empirical find-
ings in order to achieve larger normative goals.2 1
To the legal purists, let me console you by conceding that scientific
findings cannot and should not by themselves alter the steady drumbeat
of legal rules and traditions; raw data are incapable of answering social-
ly-driven normative questions.22 Specific to legal practice, the discon-
nect, or lack of cross- pollination between data and legal rules is intensi-
fied by the slow speed by which lawyers incorporate knowledge gained
from other fields.23 The normative question of whether science ought to
inform the law was the topic of heated debate between many of our
country's foundational evidence scholars. To be sure, some of our best
philosophers of biology and law still argue that "[e]mpirical questions
are the focus of scientific research, [while] conceptual questions address
how the relevant concepts are articulated" and whether "the degree to
which articulations regarding the brain make sense."24 While I agree that
philosophy should address how concepts are articulated and applied, it is
really the domain of neuroscientists and social psychologists to deter-
mine whether the empirical data are being interpreted in sensible ways.
21. Emotions can and should play differing roles, depending on the environment in which
they are elicited, in whom, and by what. For policy reasons, we may choose to actively discourage
emotional arguments on a ballot initiative, see Advisory Op. to Attorney Gen. re: Fla. Marriage Prot.
Amendment, 926 So. 2d 1229, 1238 (Fla. 2006), but allow them by the police to extract a confes-
sion, see State v. Ardoin, 58 So. 3d 1025, 1037-38 (La. Ct. App. 2011). And we might allow emo-
tion to be expressed overtly during a witness's testimony, but instruct the jurors not to rely on partic-
ular emotions, such as empathy, when they make decisions about how much damages to award in a
tort case.
22. Peter Tillers, What Is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 782
(1998) ("One prominent observer, John Langbein, takes the position that rules of evidence are par-
ticularly hardy weeds that manage to survive even when there is no good reason for their continued
existence."); see also John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209,
1210 (2006) ("[The rules] are so feeble that 'to pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque struc-
ture is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a
rational edifice.' Not many fields of law can thus be described as too irrational to be improved."
(quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,486 (1948))).
23. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 69 (1930) ("[I]nterest shifted on
the one hand to the physical and biological sciences, which were related directly to industry and
economic prosperity, and on the other hand to an empirical political and social science . . . . Such
movements always affect jurisprudence somewhat later than related social sciences because lawyers
respond cautiously to new tendencies through solicitude for the social interest in the general security
and fear of impairing the stability of the legal order.").
24. Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neurosci-
ence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2010). To get a sense of the legs on this debate, see Hermann
Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240, 1248-49 (1933) (defending
rationalism in the face of growing legal realism scholarship, and discussing why realists are internal-
ly confused as they fail to see that legal and moral norms are different, as the law only cares about
behavior regardless of motive, while ethics and morality care about intention; stating that legal
science is empirical, the method of which is observation, the purpose of which is foretelling effect,
the model of which is natural science.). "[T]he realists confuse natural and cultural science ....
[They also] confuse explanation and justification . . . [and] law and ethics." Id. This appears to be
contradicted by such doctrines as mens rea and the torts of battery.
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Crucially, there still must be some translation by lawyers to decide
whether these neuroscience findings fit into the relevant legal molds. But
when drafters of the evidentiary rules explicitly and naively employ folk
psychological ideas to inform their rule-making, we must return to these
scientific assumptions to make certain our existing normative commit-
ments are being realized.
Here, identifying my small piece of the puzzle, I will merely expli-
cate whether our evidence principles, as currently justified and practiced,
track reality.2 5 Put differently, when we ask jurors to put their emotions
and feelings aside in order to make a purely rational decision, are we
asking them to do something that is often impossible? 26 This is a differ-
ent question all together from whether the rules ought to be supported by
empirical data. Once our policy commitments are determined, we must
make sure evidence rules rest on valid presumptions about how humans
actually process information.
As you may have guessed, the specific lens-or field of science-I
will draw upon to answer this question is cognitive, affective, and social
neuroscience, or "cognitive sciences" for short.27 Drawing on both new
and established work in cognitive science concerning the relationship
between emotion, or affect, and reason, I revive various challenges to
evidence law. I argue that we ought to rethink the value of emotion in the
formal decision-making process that is our modem jury trial, as reflected
in the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and their state counterparts.
I am not the first one to recognize the valuable contribution of
scholarship on emotion to law. Other scholars before me have acknowl-
edged its value in our regulatory rulemaking, 28 legislative process,29 con-
25. In addition to ensuring that the rules themselves reflect how humans actually behave,
neuroscience can contribute in other important ways. Revealing the fuzziness of our behavioral
definitions is just one important function. Neuroscience might also provide structural improvements
to the way evidence is presented throughout a trial, enhancing juror comprehension and memory and
reducing unwanted bias. Neuroscience techniques can also be used to determine whether witnesses
are truly competent, and whether certain people, due to cognitive and affective deficits from autism
or psychopathy may be discouraged from serving on a jury.
26. One review posited that the interface between cognition and emotion encompasses the
"processing of emotionally salient information in contexts requiring cognitive evaluation to generate
an appropriate response." This is precisely what is expected of legal decision makers at trial. Rebec-
ca Elliott et al., Affective Cognition and Its Disruption in Mood Disorders, 36
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY REVIEWS 153, 153 (2011).
27. 1 recognize that cognitive theorists are often positioned as separate from the subgroup of
affective or social neuroscientists. Here, I use the term "cognitive science" to include all of these
other disciplines and methods of investigating the human brain and its relation to the mind and
society.
28. Recent scholarship by Dan Kahan yields a more respected role of emotion in decision-
making and "rational" risk assessment, as he writes that emotion can serve as a tool for incorporating
cultural worldviews that may not be as capable of overcoming the collective action problem. Dan M.
Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 746 (2008) ("The
irrational weigher theory asserts that individuals lack the capacity to process information that max-
imizes their expected utility. Because of constraints on information, time, and computational power,
ordinary individuals must resort to heuristic substitutes for considered analysis . . . . Like the irra-
54 [Vol. 89:1
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stitutional interpretation,3 0 judicial decisions, ' jury instructions, 32 and
criminal sentencing.33 The specific issue I am addressing here is evidence
law's embodiment of the false dichotomy between emotion and reason.
In all fairness to the dedicated and capable drafters of our evidence rules
and the careful judges who interpret them, they were not alone in view-
ing emotion as antagonistic to reason. Deep within our Western culture is
a tradition of treating emotion as a monolithic fog, an "untrustworthy
force that cripples judgment." 34 While the dichotomy between emotion
tional weigher theory, the cultural evaluator theory treats emotions as entering into the cognition of
risk. But it offers a very different account of how-one firmly aligned with the position that sees
emotions as constituents of reason."); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of
Disgust, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 63, 73 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) ("[W]hen we force decision
makers to be open about the normative commitments that underlie their disgust sensibilities, mem-
bers of the public are fully apprised of what those commitments are."); Rachel F. Moran, Fear
Unbound: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 8-9 (2002) (responding to how Cass
Sunstein characterizes the emotion of "fear" in the regulatory process); Molly J. Walker Wilson,
Adaptive Responses to Risk and the Irrationally Emotional Public, 54 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1297, 1307
(2010).
29. See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 66 (1992).
In the policy-making context, Don Welch has investigated the history of our love-hate relationship
with emotion, calling upon various theoretical arguments and practical examples. Welch cites An-
drew Jay McClurg's writing on the emotional rhetoric of the gun control debate, which argues:
Appeals to emotion are fallacious because emotions are irrelevant as a basis for deciding
an issue. While emotions have psychological relevance in that they have a persuasive im-
pact on the human mind, they have no logical relevance because they are incapable of es-
tablishing the truth of conclusions. Proving truth requires the mustering of convincing ev-
idence and not simply the exploitation of emotional sensitivities. Emotions may move us
to act, but reason should control the course of that action.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
30. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV.
851, 872 (2009) (."[A]nti-sympathy' instructions [are instructions] in which capital sentencing juries
are admonished to set aside all 'passion' and 'sentiment,' including emotions ranging from 'preju-
dice' to 'sympathy.' Such instructions are considered justifiable-perhaps even required-because
of the Court's evaluation that a capital sentencing jury's decision must be a 'reasoned moral re-
sponse' rather than 'an emotional one."' (footnotes omitted)).
31. Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script ofJudicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 629, 630-31 (2011) ("Thomas Hobbes declared in the mid-1600s that the ideal judge is divest-
ed 'of all fear[], anger, hatred, love, and compassion.' In 2009, more than three centuries later, then-
Judge Sonia Sotomayor testified at her Supreme Court confirmation hearing that judges 'apply law
to facts. We don't apply feelings to facts.' The idea that emotion might influence judging has been
characterized as 'radioactive."' (alteration in original)).
32. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 2 (Susan A. Bandes ed.,
1999) ("We take it for granted that jurors sometimes bring compassion and mercy, or anger and a
desire for vengeance, to their deliberations, but we may think of jurors' tendency toward such feel-
ings as illegitimate-steps on the path to jury nullification.").
33. Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis ofPopular
Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 32, at 168, 169-70 ("[R]emorse, unlike some other
emotions, does not challenge reason but seems instead to be a reasonable/rational response to trans-
gression. Indeed we worry more about the wrongdoer who feels nothing or who responds through a
careful cost/benefit calculus.").
34. The skepticism of emotional evidence and processes in the common law has very deep
roots. More recently, Christian beliefs equate emotions and passions with various sins, which good
Christians must resist in order to attain eternal salvation. See LEDOUX, supra note 18, at 24. Plato
famously argued that our emotions cloud reason and hinder thought. To him, "emotions were like
wild horses that have to be reined in by the intellect." Id; see also David J. Arkush, Situating Emo-
tion: A Critical Realist View of Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for Law and Legal
Theory, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2008). When the process lost its ecclesiastical imprimatur, it
"drew the ground from under that mode of trial." LESSER, supra note 4, at 145.
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and reason is often wrong, it does make intuitive sense, as "[w]e all
mak[e] mistakes because of pride, anger, or other emotions."3
To be sure, bigots, anti-Semites, and anti-Muslims can manipulate
our fears to cloud our judgment and falsely accuse vulnerable people of
things for which they were not culpable. Today, we merely need to turn
on the television and view the public discourse surrounding health care
reform, climate change, or banking regulations to see that emotions can
be very powerful in obscuring our concern that the facts may be wrong.
Surely any good politician or trial attorney knows this. But it is not the
reliance on emotion itself that is immoral or destructive. Rather, it is the
use of emotion to confuse people into not appreciating that the speaker is
lying about crucial facts. Emotions themselves are not the enemy, and
they can be manipulated by all sides. To best take advantage of emotion-
al processes when we vote or sit on a jury, we need superior fact-
checking by critical journalists, and aggressive cross-examination by
well-matched attorneys. Even still, if we suspect emotion to cloud our
judgment, as it may with rage or anger, it is not universally antagonistic
to reason. As I will demonstrate, the cognitive sciences model of emotion
is far less monolithic than the folk psychological model that is embodied
in our evidence rules and practice. But for better or worse, and perhaps
due to history more so than data, we continue to lump the kaleidoscope
of emotions together, collapsing various shades and brightness into a hue
of complete darkness. This condensed hue is then more easily contrasted
with the bright light of reason.3 6 I am referring to this phenomenon as
"affective blindness."3 7 We are blind to the contribution that emotion
makes to rational thoughts and behavior. Just as with color blindness, we
fail to distinguish between various emotions and their important role in
decision-making.
Just as we appreciate that emotions such as rage can impair our rea-
soning, we also intuitively know how helpful they can be. Emotions are
the ultimate communication tool. No matter where you go in the world,
six facial expressions-happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, or sur-
prise-can be instantly understood. This supports the idea, as Alan
Sanfey suggests, that certain brain structures, many of which are related
to emotion and value, have evolved across disparate cultures to assist
with communication.
35. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in The PASSIONS OF LAW supra
note 32, at 309, 310; see also Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 569 (2004).
36. In fact, the dichotomy may be inadvertently furthered by this Article, as I will continue to
refer to emotions and cognition (or reasoning) by their traditional terms, rather than creating a new
language that reflects their complicated relationship.
37. Affective blindness in neuroscience refers to a specific trait when performing a specific
task (namely, being unable to be aware of the emotional valence of a masked image). I am using the
term differently here.
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Emotions can serve as decision-making aids and are vital for com-
munication. 38 Particularly with regard to social decisions, emotional per-
ception and sensitivity predicts faster and more appropriate social rea-
soning. 39 Deficits in emotional processing can lead to isolation and a lack
of trusting relationships. Emotional processes "foster mutual reciprocity .
. . make reputation important, and . . . encourage punishment of those
seeking to take advantage of others." 40 These are decidedly pro-social
attributes. Clearly, the picture of emotion is a diverse one, with many
different effects depending on the social and personal context. It can con-
fuse us, or make us do things we regret later, but it can also help us learn
whom to trust in our community, what painful mistakes should not be
repeated, and who might make a good partner.
What Is Emotion?
There are multiple definitions of emotion, and no philosophical or
scientific consensus.4 1 Emotion is a catch-all word that likely means
many different things depending on one's frame of reference. Is it a brief
feeling of lust or anger, a long-term mood of sadness, or a character trait
of melodrama? Indeed, the neurobiology behind emotions differs as
well-anger engages different brain circuits from empathy. Patients with
localized brain damage have taught us that one can still feel happy at
appropriate times even if he can never feel fittingly embarrassed or com-
passionate. This is because "different brain systems control[] different
feelings."42
Presently, many evidentiary theories deal with emotion as if it were
like a water faucet, either on or off, emitting only scalding hot water. The
volume of the water could be likened to how aroused we are. Arousal is
the term used to signal the intensity of an emotion, which can definitely
affect how we respond to it. Obviously water can also be varying degrees
38. Bhismadev Chakrabarti & Simon Baron-Cohen , In the Eyes of the Beholder: How Empa-
thy Influences Emotion Perception, in THE SCIENCE OF SOCIAL VISION 216, 216 (Reginald B. Ad-
ams, Jr., Nalini Ambady, Ken Nakayama & Shinsuke Shimojo eds., 2010).
39. See Deidre L. Reis et al., Emotional Intelligence Predicts Individual Differences in Social
Exchange Reasoning, 35 NEUROIMAGE 1385, 1385 (2007) (higher emotional intelligence predicted
faster social exchange reasoning and finding that emotional intelligence is mediated in part by brain
mechanisms supporting social reasoning). Reasoning about social interactions engages the brain
differently than reasoning about other non-social events. See Valerie E. Stone et al., Selective Im-
pairment of Reasoning About Social Exchange in a Patient with Bilateral Limbic System Damage,
17 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 11531, 11531 (2002).
40. Alan G. Sanfey, Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience,
318 SCI. 598, 600 (2007).
41. Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors' Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 999 (2001) ("The
roles of emotions in decision-making processes have been neglected throughout the history of scien-
tific research on judgment and decision-making. Emotions have always been a puzzling phenome-
non to scientists. There is still no clear scientific consensus on definitions of basic terms, and emo-
tional reactions are one of the most mysterious aspects of everyday life."); Kevin N. Ochsner &
James J. Gross, The Cognitive Control ofEmotion, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 242, 242 (2005).




of hot and cold. This captures the idea of valence, which is the term used
to describe whether an emotion is pleasant or unpleasant.43 While this
simple analogy allows us to characterize emotion more fully than the
rules of evidence do, it still is lacking. On this two-dimensional scale of
valence and arousal, how would we differentiate between stress, anger
fear, disgust, disappointment and shame? Or surprise, joy, love, pride or
sympathy?
In addition to valence and arousal, emotions can be characterized by
the actions and goals that they motivate. When we experience an emotion
such as fear, stress, or disgust, it can move us to withdraw from a situa-
tion, while happiness and surprise may motivate us to approach. This in
turn can affect how our brain perceives, responds to, and learns from
emotionally powerful events. Further, we might classify emotions based
upon whether they are socially-dependent, such as shame, or whether
they can be experienced outside of a socially interactive setting. We
might also classify emotions as being evolutionarily preserved, such as
the fight-or-flight fear we may feel in response to being chased, or the
modem empathy triggered at the sight of a suffering dog.
Despite this complex taxonomy, the law often uses the word "emo-
tion" without clarifying precisely what this captures. Even neuroscien-
tists have conflicting definitions when it comes down to how emotions
are generated and whether they are responsive to, or driving, our ac-
tions." With so many things being called emotion, "fear, guilt, shame,
melancholy, and so on ... it is dubious that they share anything but a
family resemblance."45
Even if we isolate one emotion, stress for example, we can see that
our emotional vocabulary is deplorably over-simplified. Complex emo-
43. Michael Platt et al., Neuronal Correlates of Decision Making, in BETTER THAN
CONSCIOUS? DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS, supra
note I at 125, 136. Functional imaging has demonstrated that unpleasant emotional stimuli is associ-
ated with increased BOLD intensities in the supplementary motor, anterior midcingulate, right
dIPFC, occipito-temporal, inferior parietal and cerebellar cortices, with highly arousing emotions
associated with increased BOLD intensities in the left thalamus, globus pallidus, caudate,
parahippocampal gyrus, amygdala, premorot cortex, and cerebellar vermis. Pleasant emotions, on the
other hand, resulted in relative increases in the BOLD response in the midbrain, ventral striatum, and
caudate nucleus, all connected to a reward circuit. See Tiziano Colibazzi et al., Neural Systems
Subserving Valence and Arousal During the Experience of Induced Emotions, 10 EMOTION 377, 377
(2010). See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, RICHARD B. IVRY, & GEORGE R. MANGUN, COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND, at 366-67 (2009).
44. Many argue that emotions help us learn the value of events, either by triggering physio-
logical responses, or being the responses themselves. Others view emotions as too complicated to be
purely visceral. See LEDOUX, supra note 18, at 23; EDMUND T. ROLLS, EMOTION EXPLAINED 11
(2005); Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609, 1615 16 (2007) ("[Aln
emotion is accompanied by physiological changes, such as an increased heartbeat, a jittery feeling in
one's stomach, tightness in certain muscles, or changes in one's hormonal levels. It is these physio-
logical changes that often alert us to an emotion's arrival, signaling that we have rapidly appraised
something in our environment in a particular way.").
45. CRAIG DELANCEY, PASSIONATE ENGINES: WHAT EMOTIONS REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND
AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 3 (2002).
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tions, such as disgust or anxiety, play a different role on our decision-
making depending on how long they manifest. 46 Short-term exposure to
anxiety may assist in perception and memory, but after lengthy bouts,
anxiety can make these same processes break down. Disgust is also quite
complex. Despite its ostensible role in both helping us avoid harms and
moderate social mores, "the fact that subjects across a variety of experi-
ments report feelings of disgust when considering both feces and a hei-
nous crime does not necessarily indicate that the same mechanisms me-
diate these reactions."4 7 When we peel back a layer and look just at indi-
vidual emotions such as anxiety or disgust, we see that their biological
processes and behavioral effects vary.
Relegating emotion to a unitary fog-like state is made possible by
ignoring such nuances and treating emotions as monolithic. 48 But emo-
tion actually refers to a wide range of states that might be unrelated men-
tally, socially, and biologically. Despite this complexity, case law and
annotations to the rules of evidence often uses the word "emotion" with-
out justifying what it means in any given scenario and, more importantly,
why it is legally relevant. We need a new vocabulary to reflect the differ-
ent impacts and values of emotional processes on decision-making. But,
for now, we are stuck with what we have.
On account of this, I use the common understanding of these words
here. Affect and emotion are used interchangeably, even though in prin-
ciple, affect is much broader than emotion as it includes things like pref-
erences, desires, and moods.49 When I use the term reasoning or cogni-
tion, I am calling upon the traditional definition of these, meaning such
functions as attention, perception, memory, and analysis. This Article
does not need to espouse particularly rigid definitions of emotion and
reason. Rather, by contrasting the many possible cognitive science defi-
nitions with the fairly unitary construct of emotion in our legal system,
we can reveal a way for our interpretations to become more nuanced.
46. Anxiety has thus been described as an emotion operating on a "U" shaped curve, where in
controlled doses it can increase our vigilance, but over time it clouds our perspective.
47. Jana Schaich Borg, Debra Lieberman & Kent A. Kiehl, Infection, Incest, and Iniquity:
Investigating the Neural Correlates ofDisgust and Morality, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1529,
1529, (2008). The authors went on to state:
[T]he data presented here show that although incest acts and pathogen acts are rated as
equally disgusting, incest acts are rated as more immoral and elicit dramatically more
hemodynamic activity than pathogen acts. These data, combined with data from other re-
cent multimodal disgust studies, suggest that disgust is likely best conceived of as a set of
heterogeneous responses overlaying a unified psychological and neurological response
Id. at 1543.
48. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272 (1996) ("[Tlhe law has treated emotions in several different and conflict-
ing ways.").
49. Aaron Sloman, Ron Chrisley & Matthias Scheutz, The Architectural Basis of Affective
States and Processes, in WHO NEEDS EMOTIONS? THE BRAIN MEETS THE ROBOT 203, 208 (Jean-
Marc Fellous & Michael A. Arbib eds., 2005).
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Even so, by referring to the processes as separate in order to explain how
they are overlapping, I am in some ways furthering the false dichotomy
here. However, this appears to be a less confusing framework than com-
ing up with new names to trace old words and concepts.
Our present understanding of human decision-making, drawn from
the cognitive sciences, imparts a powerful critique of much of our basic
evidence law. This indeed could be the subject of an entire book. It is my
hope that through a patchwork of related articles, each pushing for new
consideration of evidence law in light of modem cognitive science rather
than invalid folk psychology, we can collectively engage rulemaking
bodies in the effort to improve our rules and practices.50 And if im-
provement is too ambitious, at the very least we can push rulemaking
bodies, such as the advisory committee to the FRE or the evidence sec-
tion of the Practicing Law Institute, to clarify the motives for adopting
particular rules. If nothing revolutionary is to happen yet, it would even
be fruitful to inspire researchers to develop models of social decision-
making and tasks that are more ecologically valid for mock jurors and
real judges. In the conclusion, I will suggest a few ways this could hap-
pen.
II. WHERE IN THE LAW Do WE SEE AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS?
Simplifying and denigrating emotion, and placing it at odds with
reason, is particularly apparent in legal rules related to trial. Here it is
said, "Emotion is unalterably opposed to Reason and thus to Justice it-
self."5' As Terry Maroney has chronicled in her spot-on work question-
ing judicial dispassion, "[I]nsistence on emotionless judging-that is, on
judicial dispassion-is a cultural script of unusual longevity and poten-
cy." 52 Maroney argues that the desire for judicial dispassion has stayed
on in our legal analysis despite being obviously incorrect because it
50. For a discussion on the bleak prospects for reform, see Park & Saks, supra note 7, at 954
("The mildly radical reform attempted in Edmund Morgan's Model Code of Evidence failed com-
pletely, and today's judges and lawyers seem generally satisfied with the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which were largely a codification of common-law rules extant in the mid-twentieth century. Finally,
the confusion that existed in Wigmore's time and before has been largely tamed by the Federal
Rules, so there is no enthusiasm for ground-breaking reclassifications." (footnotes omitted)).
51. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 655, 655 (1989) ("[Clourts have urged that the more a legal issue might pro-
voke popular rage, that hallmark of the lynch mob, the harder courts must work to insulate the legal
decision from emotive influence.").
52. Maroney, supra note 31, at 630-31 ("Thomas Hobbes declared in the mid-1600s that the
ideal judge is 'divested of all fear[], anger, hatred, love, and compassion.' in 2009, more than three
centuries later, then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor testified at her Supreme Court confirmation hearing that
judges 'apply law to facts. We don't apply feelings to facts.' The idea that emotion might influence
judging has been characterized as 'radioactive."' (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
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adopts an attractive, yet coherent view of emotion as "irrational, undisci-
plined, and idiosyncratic."53
Most modem evidentiary principles reflect the concern that jurors
will make illogical or biased inferences.54 Reining in the biased jury is
one of the chief historical and modem justifications for evidence law.
As far back as the eighteenth century, English courts began establishing
formal rules of evidence to limit the admissibility of information that
might trigger irrational inferences by the malleable jury. This continued
into the late twentieth century, when the FRE were adopted. Reid Has-
tie points out our conflicted view of the juror, as embodied in the FRE:
"There is an apparent contradiction between the conception of the ideal
juror as a logical reasoning machine and also as a source of community
attitudes, sentiments, and moral precepts."57 We see this as the rules de-
sire both an unfettered common voice of the people and a highly steered
and controlled decision-making process.
Before extrapolating this too far, however, it is important to observe
that we are not as committed to this false dichotomy as we might think.
In certain corners of our legal tapestry we actively encourage emotional
processes and evidence, such as when defendants present mitigation evi-
58dence or when attorneys present their opening arguments. In mitigation
hearings, this may be because we call upon emotional processes when we
think our status quo may not be fair, particularly for people deemed to be
marginalized or vulnerable. Perhaps emotions are encouraged to "rock
our cognitive boats" in furtherance of justice. But even in this situation,
53. Id at 632 (citing Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional Foundations of
Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1151, 1151 (2005) ("A long tradition, stretching from classical
philosophy to the present, views passion as the enemy of reason.")).
54. The three most commonly cited justifications for any evidence rules are (1) distrust of the
jury, (2) practical considerations of time and efficiency, and (3) the promotion of certain social
norms by controlling what juries may rely upon. See DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD,
EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 2-3 (2d ed. 2008).
55. Joseph Sanders, Expert Admissibility Symposium: Reliability Standards-Too High, Too
Low, or Just Right?: The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibil-
ity of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 881, 883-84 (2003); see generally Richard D.
Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 955 (2003).
56. Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules of Evidence
as a Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539, 1570 (1999) ("By modeling
the text of the Federal Rules after the Model Code and the Uniform Rules, the Advisory Committee
embraced what can be placed in historical context as a codification of existing principles and not a
statutory displacement of preexisting evidentiary doctrines.").
57. Hastie, supra note 41, at 991-92 ("Robert Solomon noted this discrepancy when he com-
mented that 'the idea that justice requires emotional detachment, a kind of purity suited ultimately to
angels, ideal observers, and the original founders of society, has blinded us to the fact that justice
arises from and requires such feelings as resentment."' (quoting ROBERT D. SOLOMON, A PASSION
FOR JUSTICE 34 (1990))).
58. "[A]ppeals to the sympathy or passions of the jury are misconduct at the guilt phase of a
trial," but may be invoked for mitigation. People v. Pensinger, 805 P.2d 899, 918 (Cal. 1991).
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our implicit biases that seem rational might actually be deeply engrained
and reinforced by unobvious emotion.5 9
One final caveat about the treatment of emotion in litigation: re-
gardless of how emotion is formally treated in our rules, to be sure, emo-
tion is the currency of trial.60 Crafty attorneys use emotion to their ad-
vantage to engender empathy for their client, and anger or fear toward
the other side. Indeed, the value of story-telling and emotion was recog-
nized in Old Chief v. United States.6 1 In that case, the Supreme Court
instructed us that probative value is measured in part by its ability "to
influence jurors' hearts as well as their minds, even in ways that are not
strictly logical, and even if the evidence has no rational tendency to
prove any historical fact that is disputed at trial."62 In Old Chief despite
explaining in dicta that litigants may seek to do more than present factual
evidence but also to "tell a colorful story with descriptive richness," the
character evidence at issue was not admitted.63 This dictum would appear
to encourage something like emotional and personal testimony, which is
in contrast to the many rules and instructions that discourage it.64 And
yet, as soon as "colorful" turns into "emotional," courts have and may
continue to abandon this line of thinking. Colorful imagery and story-
telling are bound to awaken the emotions of any healthy juror, and yet
the former is acceptable when the latter is often explicitly not. Imagine
how frustrating it would be to sit on a jury where passionate testimony
and colorful evidence were presented throughout the trial, and then to be
told at the end that they were supposed to set aside any emotions that this
evidence may have generated?
There is thus a practical gulf. Why is there such a gap between the
rhetoric of stated instructions and the common understanding of the thea-
tre of jury trials? Why do we understand that trials run on emotions, but
59. Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts
Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 730 (2000).
60. Though, by recent accounts, the appeals to emotion ought to be subtle. Raymond J. Bras-
sard, What Jurors Say About Lawyers, 47 Bos. B.J. 8, 9 (2003); Valerie P. Hans & Krista Sweigart,
Jurors' Views of Civil Lawyers: Implications for Courtroom Communication, 68 IND. L.J. 1297,
1318 (1993); Donald M. Peters, Basics of Oral Argument, 32 ARIZ. ATT'Y 18, 29 (1995).
61. 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). Many, mostly Southern states, have declined to follow Old
Chief v. United States.
62. James Joseph Duane, "Screw Your Courage to the Sticking-Place": The Roles of Evi-
dence, Stipulations, and Jury Instructions in Criminal Verdicts, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 467-68
(1998).
63. Leubsdorf, supra note 22, at 1226 ("Only such a story will 'sustain the willingness of
jurors to draw the inferences' of guilt or innocence and 'to implicate the law's moral underpinnings
and a juror's obligation to sit in judgment' as well as meeting 'jurors' expectations about what
proper proof should be."' (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187-88)).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that prosecutor's
comments appealing to the jury's passion and emotion were "designed to divert rather than focus the
jury upon the evidence and [did] not belong in summation"); Freeman v. Trombley, 744 F. Supp. 2d
697, 725 (E.D. Mich. 2010) ("Inflammatory remarks are improper because they 'invoke emotions
which may cloud the jury's determination of [the defendant's] guilt."' (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted)).
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certain emotions are to be kept in a locked box, only to be invited in oc-
casionally in the interest of social justice? I posit that we have an inco-
herent view of emotion because we are using a concept and word to sim-
ultaneously refer to many different things, without being more precise
about which aspects of "emotion" are doing the real theoretical work.
When we do this, we are forcing simple boundaries on something quite
complex. We intuitively understand that emotions are not only helpful in
some situations, but they can be impossible to dial down. And of course
some judges, being humans after all, get this as well.65 But the explicit
instructions, and the false dichotomy between reason and emotion on
which they rest, persist in evidence practice.
In order to make the point that this false dichotomy is simultaneous-
ly reflected in our evidence law and also empirically wrong, I will ad-
dress how emotion is treated in (a) the use of limiting instructions, (b) the
exclusion of prejudicial evidence, (c) credibility assessments, (d) sen-
tencing and damages instructions, (e) instructions related to the "heat of
passion" theory of voluntary manslaughter, and (f) the excited utterance
hearsay exception. I will demonstrate that while the text of the rules may
be benign, the way they are interpreted reflects confusion over the role
played by both subtle and intense emotion. 66 The affective blindness of
evidence law is woefully out of step with our current understanding of
the way affect and reason are anatomically and functionally intercon-
nected in the brain.67 Specifically, through reliance on cognitive science,
I will demonstrate that the following evidentiary principles are incorrect
in related ways:
* Emotional and rational processes can neatly be divided, and by
attending to our emotions, we can-and should-use our cognitive facul-
ties to squash them.
* Emotional evidence and emotional processes always render deci-
sions that are less rational, more prejudicial, and therefore less accurate.
* Emotion testimony distracts us and makes it hard for us to pay at-
tention or remember events.
65. See People v. Dykes, 209 P.3d 1, 50 (Cal. 2009) ("Although emotion 'must not reign over
reason,' it 'need not, indeed, cannot, be entirely excluded from the jury's moral assessment."' (quot-
ing People v. Leonard, 157 P.3d 973, 1009 (Cal. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. It is worth noting the obvious, which is that not all of our folk assumptions have been
incorrect. But many of them have been, including the ability of the oath to cure mendacity along
with the idea that someone who is dying would not "meet their maker with a lie on their lips." These
present examples of evidence practices that few believe to be true, illustrating the many fictions we
comfortably endorse in evidence practice.
67. Ralph Adolphs, Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behaviour, 4 NATURE REVIEWS
NEUROSCIENCE 165, 166 (2003). Interestingly, when it comes to the "self," some researchers have
seen anatomical uncoupling between emotion and reason. See J.M. Moran et al., Neuroanatomical
Evidence for Distinct Cognitive and Affective Components of Self, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
1586, 1586 (2006).
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* Credibility assessments do not require empathy.
* Emotion should not and cannot be involved in moral judgment
and reasoning related to sentencing.
III. AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS OF EVIDENTIARY PRACTICES
This next section will walk through each of the evidentiary practices
identified above, and explain why the folk psychology on which they rest
is invalidated by modem cognitive sciences. We will begin with the use
of limiting instructions, and the difficulty jurors face when attempting to
use evidence only for its non-emotional content. Then, I will discuss how
FRE 403 reflects the false dichotomy between emotion and reason. Next,
I will reveal how most damages and sentencing instructions both assume
emotion may be subjugated by reason, but also that good moral judg-
ments can arise in an emotional vacuum. Subsequently, I will discuss the
"heat of passion" jury instruction, describing how it also embodies a
view of all emotion as corrupting of both reason and, without extending
it to its logical conclusion, intent. I will then discuss a counter-example
of when we imbue emotion with too much power (albeit still the power
to corrupt our cognitive faculties). That is, when the excited utterance
hearsay rule is used to deem testimony more trustworthy when uttered
during stress or excitement. Finally, I will discuss the more general cate-
gory of jurors' credibility assessments, and why we might be blind to the
role of emotion this process.
A. The Use ofLimiting Instructions: Using Evidence for Rational, but
Not for Emotional, Purposes
We see the false dichotomy rear its head in the application of many
evidentiary rules. We will first address FRE 105, which appears to have
nothing to do with emotion on its face. The rule demurely says: "If the
court admits evidence that is admissible . . . for a purpose-but not ...
for another purpose-the court, on timely request must restrict the evi-
dence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."68 This is a
very practical rule. Judges could not possibly order a new trial every time
evidence had the potential to be used for an improper purpose. Given the
way the probative/prejudicial balancing test favors admission, we can use
FRE 105 to restrict jurors' use of evidence to its non-prejudicial use.
This non-prejudicial use is often impeachment.
Reliance on FRE 105 and its state-law counterparts is ubiquitous.
The rule is commonly employed to cabin off emotional uses of evidence,
68. FED. R. EvID. 105. Most states have a similar rule to this.
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such as crime scene photographs or victim impact statements, and guard
against a mistrial. Consider the following representative examples:
* In a tax evasion case, the defendant argued that the prosecution
improperly appealed to the jury's emotions by reminding them that the
date of their deliberation was April 15th, the deadline for paying taxes.
The court stated:
[A]sk[ing] the jury ... to consider emotions rather than evidence-
"can be cured with proper instructions, and 'juries are presumed to
follow their instructions."' . . . [E]ven if the comment played to the
emotions of the jurors as taxpayers, the Court issued a curative in-
struction as to the comment as well as other instructions-including
after the Government's rebuttal-summation-which focused the ju-
rors generally to their task and responsibility. 70
* Where gruesome photos were introduced, jurors were given a
limiting instruction to rely on them "dispassionately."
* "[A]fter defendant's vulgar outburst, the judge gave an immediate
curative instruction, telling the jurors that sometimes emotions run high
and that their verdict must be based on the [non-emotional] evidence
alone."7 2
* Defendant was convicted of "risk of injury to a child." During his
rebuttal argument, the prosecutor displayed and briefly referred to a me-
dium sized McDonald's cup and a teddy bear. The child's father worked
at McDonalds, so this prop was employed to support the prosecution's
argument that the parents of the injured child were simple and hardwork-
ing. The teddy bear was to remind the jury that the victim was eight
years old (the victim held the teddy bear while testifying as well). De-
fendant moved for a mistrial. The court denied the defendant's motion,
stating that "irreparable damage had not been done" because the court
properly issued a curative instruction, stating that:
[P]rops[] were displayed to you. They are not evidence . . . and,
therefore, are not to be considered by you in any way in your consid-
eration of the facts or in your deliberations. You must base your ver-
69. Allen v. State, 923 P.2d 613, 619 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) ("As evidenced by the ac-
ceptance of victim impact evidence at sentencing, it is not sympathy for the victim per se, but sym-
pathy that overcomes reason which is constitutionally unacceptable."), vacated, Allen v. Oklahoma,
520 U.S. 1195 (1997).
70. United States v. Holland, No. 3:09crl39 (JBA), 2010 WL 2976934, at *5 (D. Conn. July
22, 2010) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1993)).
71. United States v. Treas-Wilson, 3 F.3d 1406, 1410 (10th Cir. 1993); see also People v.
Kimble, 289 A.D.2d 1062, 1063 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) ("[H]e was [not] deprived of a fair trial
based on the jury's viewing of the autopsy videotape.. . . [It] was inadvertent, and the videotape was
not presented by the People for the purpose of arousing the emotions of the jury." (citation omitted)).
72. State v. Rodriguez, No. 99-01-0102, 2010 WL 4226170, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Oct. 27, 2010) (not deciding issue of curative instruction on the merits, as procedurally barred).
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dict on the evidence presented and the law as instructed, and not on
the basis of any emotions or sympathy. 73
There is well-documented doubt that jurors can follow curative lim-
iting instructions to remove prejudice.74 Judge Learned Hand called lim-
iting instructions a legal "placebo" as they require "a mental gymnastic
which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else."7 5 But these
are general problems with the ability to ignore evidence more broadly.
Here, I am interested in the more specific problem of cabining off emo-
tion-evoking evidence, or the jurors own emotional responses to them.
As an initial matter, we may not want to instruct jurors to dial down their
emotional processes, but what's more, in some cases we may not be able
to even if we tried.
There are instances when something other than emotion may be
moderating the jury's decision-making, even though the "bias" is pinned
on the emotional tenor of the evidence. Many of us are not aware of our
73. State v. Tricarico, 994 A.2d 323, 325, 328 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); see also United States
v. Gomez, 617 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.
1956); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Johnson, 713 F.
Supp. 2d 595, 638 (E.D. La 2010); State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359, 398 (Wash. 2007); Nancy Steblay
et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A
Meta-Analysis, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 469 (2006) ("The effect on juror verdicts of judicial
instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence was evaluated using meta-analysis. One hundred
seventy-five hypothesis tests from 48 studies with a combined 8,474 participants were examined.
Results revealed that inadmissible evidence (lE) has a reliable effect on verdicts consistent with the
content of the IE. Judicial instruction to ignore the inadmissible evidence does not effectively elimi-
nate IE impact. However, ifjudges provide a rationale for a ruling of inadmissibility, juror compli-
ance may be increased. Contested evidence ruled admissible accentuates that information, resulting
in a significant impact on verdicts."); J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology ofJury In-
structions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 97 (1990).
74. Lisa Eichhorn, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Evidence
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 345 (1989); Roselle L. Wis-
sler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Convic-
tion Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37 (1985) ("Conviction rates did vary by
prior record, however, with the highest conviction rate occurring when the prior conviction was the
same as the present charge and the lowest conviction rate occurring in the no-prior-conviction condi-
tion. Defendants with a previous conviction for perjury or a dissimilar crime were convicted at an
intermediate rate. We concluded that the risk of prejudice to the defense under existing policy is
greater than the unrealized potential benefit to the prosecution."); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 384 (2001) ("Empirical evidence as well as common sense suggests
that courts greatly exaggerate the efficacy of limiting instructions."); Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie
Arndt, Understanding the Limits of the Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for
the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6
PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 677, 677 (2000); Deidre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited
Plaintiff Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 819 (2010) (discussing
how distinctions between appropriate and non-appropriate uses of evidence are likely to be "utterly
meaningless in the minds of jurors" and emotionally arousing testimony may be particularly "im-
mune to such limiting instructions"); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment
Evidence and Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 477, 477 (1988). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking
the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1358-59 (2009) (citing a study by British researchers A.P. Scaly and
W.R. Cornish in which mock jurors were able to take account of an instruction to disregard similar
convictions as evidence of criminal propensity).
75. Nash, 54 F.2d at 1007.
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complex emotional processes. Thus, we sometimes have difficulty de-
scribing the what, why, and how of our emotions, even as we are physio-
logically experiencing them. This is likely exacerbated with more subtle
emotions such as shame, pride, or jealousy. Empirically speaking, there-
fore, limiting instructions related to emotion-evoking evidence are either
misguided or a waste of time.76 Because emotions are so salient, and yet
are sometimes subconscious, it might be more difficult to suppress emo-
tion-evoking evidence than other types of data.
The scant mock jury literature on emotional evidence and curative
instructions is unsatisfactory as it fails to appreciate these points. Some
of it further fails to acknowledge the relationship of probative value to
prejudicial effect. These studies assume that evidence is either prejudicial
or probative, when it can be degrees of both. Put another way, evidence
can help make a fact more likely true or false, while simultaneously prej-
udicing the jury against the defendant. Further, this research often fails to
recognize that the "affective" evidence may have different probative
value.77 Perhaps an example of this will help.
One study compared the effect of the emotional testimony of a cop
describing how the defendant had been accused of "hacking up a wom-
an" with the neutral control testimony that the defendant had been ac-
cused of "assault with a deadly weapon." The two statements have dif-
ferent probative value, and thus if they produce different results, it can-
not be said to be due to the emotional nature of the testimony. In one
case, the testimony may render the assault more heinous and, therefore,
more aggravating. The descriptive content of the emotional evidence
actually says something different about the facts of the crime. With the
latter stimulus, the mock juror may conjure up an image of someone get-
ting hit once on the head with the handle of a gun. Further, when subjects
heightened the verdict after hearing a victim impact statement, this was
equated with prejudice, even though it was not clear from the methodol-
ogy that something else may have been moderating the change. Sub-
jects may have intensified the verdict because they heard more aggravat-
ing information or the aggravating information was given more weight
because it was heard more recently.
The papers on the use of limiting instructions for emotionally-
evocative evidence unfortunately use emotions as shorthand for bias and
76. Of course, as mentioned, if the goal is merely to prevent waste and a mistrial, the instruc-
tions are doing their job swimmingly.
77. Jessica M. Salerno & Bette L. Bottoms, Emotional Evidence and Jurors' Judgments: The
Promise of Neuroscience for Informing Psychology and Law, 27 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 273, 283 (2009)
("Taken together, the literature on the effect of gruesome photographs and victim impact statements
demonstrates that, generally, mock jurors' judgments are more punitive when they consider highly
emotional evidence . . . ."). This is true except for when it is defense information that may be miti-
gating--only example given of child abuse and increased attributed and hypothesized increased
anger. Id at 285.
78. Id. at 279.
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inherent prejudice. One research team argued against an instruction "that
cautions against emotional arousal in the face of highly inflammatory
evidence" because it "raises the concern that jurors will perceive their
emotional responses to the evidence as a valid source of information." 9
Thus, while nobly attempt to improve the way jurors respond to instruc-
tions, they still presume that recognizing their emotions as a valid source
of data would be bad. In the same study, when the emotion-evoking evi-
dence was not found to always bias, researchers went to lengths to pre-
serve the theory of emotions as biasing, even when their own findings
suggest its nuanced role in decision-making:
[G]ruesome photographs increased victim compassion . . . but ...
gruesome photographs did not significantly increase defendant nega-
tivity or decrease defendant compassion compared to neutral evi-
dence. The likely reason is that the emotions aroused by gruesome
evidence were more readily associated with the victim and the crime
but were less clearly associated with a defendant whose culpability
was in doubt.s0
Of course, to be charitable to the researchers, some of these studies
were performed when we knew much less about affective neuroscience.
Another problem with much of the research on the use of limiting
instructions for emotional evidence is that the studies rely purely on self-
reports of the mock jurors' emotions.81 This is despite the fact that we do
not have conscious access to many effects of emotion on cognition or our
82 bi
physiological response. Better research into the subconscious role of
emotion requires measuring physiological correlates of emotion, such as
heart rate, skin temperature, sweating, and the like.
Much of the practical and scholarly writing on the use of limiting
instructions to suppress emotional processes reveals a dual process mod-
79. Rachel K. Cush & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, The Influence of Limiting Instructions on
Processing and Judgments of Emotionally Evocative Evidence, 13 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 110,
113 (2006) (citing Gerald L. Clore, Cognitive Phenomenology: Feelings and the Construction of
Judgment, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 133 (Leonard L. Martin & Abraham
Tesser eds., 1992); R.B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 151 (1980)).
80. Cush & Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 79, at 117-119 (finding that mock jurors receiv-
ing limiting instructions pre-closing were actually more likely to view the evidence as less incrimi-
nating when they saw a gruesome photograph than if they viewed a neutral photograph, thus refuting
their premise that emotion is always biasing in one direction).
81. Id. at 118 (relying on self-monitoring of emotional bias, with 86% of respondents saying
that they "did not rely on emotion when making a culpability decision"); Salerno & Bottoms, supra
note 77, at 277-78 (acknowledging that emotion can have the greatest effect when we are unaware
of it, but then relies almost exclusively on self-reports of reliance on emotions).
82. Kari Edwards & Tamara S. Bryan, Judgmental Biases Produced by Instructions to Disre-
gard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
849, 850-51 (1997).
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el of the brain where emotion is wholly separate from cognitive process-
es:83
The concern that emotion is adversary to the reasoning process is
voiced in many contemporary social psychological models of emo-
tion and decision-making. . . . [S]trong negative emotion biases the
information-processing and decision-making processes by (a) initiat-
ing a biased information search and skewed interpretation of evi-
dence to be consistent with blaming a target, (b) influencing judg-
ments in a mood-congruent manner directly . . . and indirectly ...
and/or (c) leading to visceral intuitive judgments....
According to the dual process model, emotion depletes attention
and processing capacity and increases heuristic processing (i.e., deciding
with your gut). Some proponents of this model posit that anger specifi-
cally results in shallower processing due to the feeling of certainty that it
engenders. In order to remove this "mental contamination" of emotion,
some psychologists argue that we need to simultaneously do the follow-
ing: (a) be aware of the unwanted processing and the magnitude and di-
rection of the bias, (b) be motivated to correct it, and (c) possess the abil-
ity to exert mental control to adjust our responses.85 No surprise-
psychologists are pessimistic about our ability to do these things. This is
especially true when our emotional reactions are implicit and subcon-
scious. However, not all emotional processes are so subversive, and a
growing literature suggests that emotions are not always "fast" and "au-
tomatic" but rather can be the result of modulation, attentional control,
and reappraisal. This means that there may be opportunities for
thoughtful instructions reducing the effects of implicit, and unwanted,
juror biases.
The complexity of emotional processes may be why some research-
ers do not find differences in our ability to suppress emotional evidence
compared to non-emotional evidence, while others find the opposite. The
emotion being elicited, and the ostensible probative value of the two
statements, may not be similar enough to draw conclusions about their
effect on our decision-making. 7 But even if we assume for a moment
that an individual were cognizant of the biasing influence of emotion on
83. Salerno & Bottoms, supra note 77, at 283 ("In other words, does emotional evidence
influence jurors' judgments through an effortful, rational deliberative process, or does emotional
evidence cause emotion-driven reactions and processes that bypass effortful, deliberative, cognitive
processing?").
84. Id. at 284 (citations omitted).
85. See generally Thomas D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994).
86. K.S. Blair et al., Modulation of Emotion by Cognition and Cognition by Emotion, 35
NEUROIMAGE 430, 437-38 (2007).
87. Anita E. Kelly & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Effects of Suppression of Personal Intrusive Thoughts,
66 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 998, 999 (1994); see generally Lizabeth Roemer & Thomas
D. Borkovec, Effects of Suppressing Thoughts About Emotional Material, 103 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 467 (1994).
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his or her reasoning processes, there may still be a lack of motivation to
correct for it.8" Edwards and Bryan posit that because of the unique prop-
erties of emotionally charged material, observing a limiting instruction
regarding it is particularly difficult and may lead to perverse outcomes-
more attention paid to emotionally charged material rather than less.89
Ironically, because of this, emotion could be "an even more powerful
influence on judgments when it is forbidden than when it is allowed."90
B. Federal Rule ofEvidence 403: Emotion= Undue Prejudice
The FRE simultaneously distrust jurors' ability to ignore prejudicial
information and then expect them to be quite capable of ignoring this
evidence when given an explicit instruction to do so.91 The last section
reviewing FRE 105 focused on the latter view. We will now investigate
the former through FRE 403.
FRE 403 states that relevant evidence may be excluded if the proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice.92
FRE 403 is sometimes referred to as the "general override," and it ap-
plies to all types of unduly prejudicial evidence. Rule 403 is a balancing
test: the evidence may be excluded only if such danger of unfair preju-
dice substantially outweighs its probative value. It is meant to remove
wasteful, emotional, biasing, or confusing evidence from the court's
plate, and to focus on central, material matters. As all effective evidence
is prejudicial to the party against whom it is offered, undue prejudice is
given a more specific meaning by courts.93
Once again, the actual text of the rule is agnostic to emotion. How-
ever, in practice, undue prejudice is said to occur when "the proffered
evidence has a tendency to influence the outcome by improper means or
if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, pro-
vokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision
on something other than the established propositions in the case." 94 This
statement illustrates how "prejudice" has been defined by courts to refer
to evidence that appeals too much to the jurors' emotion rather than rea-
88. Cush & Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 79, at 112.
89. Edwards & Bryan, supra note 82, at 850.
90. For a discussion of how emotional information makes it harder to suppress our thoughts,
see id. at 856-858.
91. For example, "the state may introduce evidence of a defendant's prior convictions for the
purpose of sentencing enhancement, or statements elicited from a defendant in violation of Miranda
v. Arizona, for the purpose of impeachment, so long as the jury is instructed that such evidence may
not be considered for the purpose of determining guilt." Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 200 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554 (1967)).
92. FED. R. EvID. 403.
93. State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) ("[Undue prejudice is] an undue tendency
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as
bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror.").
94. State v. Franklin, 677 N.W.2d 276, 294 (Wis. 2004) (quoting State v. Davidson, 613
N.W.2d 606, 623 (Wis. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 89:170
2011] THE AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS OF EVIDENCE LAW
son, and situates emotional responses as peripheral, somehow not at all
relevant to the case. Importantly, this sentiment is echoed in the Adviso-
ry Committee notes accompanying the proposed Rule 403, where the
committee defined prejudice as an "undue tendency to suggest decision
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one."95 Many courts recite this mantra from the Advisory Committee
notes without explaining meaningfully how it applies to a particular case.
Because the rules of evidence are only reviewed for abuse of discre-
tion, and Rule 403 is itself a flexible rule, it comes as no surprise that
there is a great degree of variety in the way the rule is applied. This dis-
cretion has been advocated as it promotes rationalism and efficiency.96
Even so, one judge acknowledged how the rule is habitually misapplied,
even on its own discretionary terms:
Although the exigencies of a trial will always limit the time for a
careful analysis of evidentiary issues, both counsel and the court
should try to avoid shorthand references to Rule 403 or to "unfair
prejudice" in lieu of a brief but more complete explanation of the ba-
sis for exclusion pursuant to Rule 403.97
In some ways, this problem generates the nucleus of this paper. The
rule on its face may be appropriate and flexible. But in practice, it be-
comes shorthand to justify anything or nothing, with very thin legal rea-
soning. Thus, in practice, discretionary rules like 403 often work to ex-
clude so-called "emotional" evidence and processes across-the-board.
Without interpretive assistance, the mantra of emotion being equat-
ed with prejudice is cut and pasted everywhere, expansively covering an
95. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note (1972).
96. Michael H. Graham, Relevance, Fed. R. Evid. 401, and the Exclusion of Relevant Evi-
dence, Fed. R. Evid. 403: "Many Prayers Are Heard, Few Are Answered", 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1080,
1084 (2009) ("[Discretionary power of FRE 4031 is necessary to facilitate the ascertainment of truth
and to keep the conduct of the trial within bounds.").
97. State v. Thurlow, 712 A.2d 518, 522 (Me. 1998) (Lipez, J., concurring). To be sure, 403
analyses do tend to involve logical short-cuts and lack of engagement with the facts at hand. For an
egregious example of this consider the redundant passage from the California federal case, Green v.
Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 634 (C.D. Cal. 2005):
The court excludes evidence under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, or if it would lead to jury confusion. FED. R.
EVID. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tends to suggest decision on an improper
basis, particularly an emotional one. See United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 886 (9th
Cir.2003) ("Unfair prejudice' . . . means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."); Steger v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1079 (1lth Cir.2003) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 advi-
sory committee's notes) ("Evidence is ... excludable if its probative value is substantial-
ly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury .... "Unfair prejudice" . . . means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."); Stump v. Gates,
211 F.3d 527, 534 (10th Cir.2000) (same).
While the evidence of other acts offered by plaintiff may be prejudicial to defendant inso-
far as it tends to suggest that he has maintained an unconstitutional policy, it will not be
unfairly prejudicial.
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infinite number of definitions for either term. Of course not all courts
shirk their interpretive duties when it comes to FRE 403. Many try to
provide assistance in elucidating when and why emotional evidence is
unduly prejudicial, as when it is so inflammatory that it diverts "the ju-
ry's attention from the material issues in the trial."99 However, even this
gloss represents a type of prejudice that is not unique to emotional evi-
dence. Any evidence may be prejudicial if it distracts the jury from its
charge or confuses relevant issues with irrelevant ones.
Texas has a different standard that considers whether the evidence
"has the potential to impress the jury in some irrational but indelible
way."100 This is initially more attractive than the emphasis on emotion.
But in Texas, the switch to rationality is just another guise for the anti-
emotion bias in evidence law. For example, one court recalled:
Counsel argues the photographs of the tattoos were of such graphic
subject matter they would sway the jury in some irrational and emo-
tional fashion....
... The trial court must consider the "host of factors affecting
probativeness . .. and balance those factors against the tendency, if
any, that the photographs have to encourage resolution of material is-
sues on an inappropriate emotional basis." 10
Here, emotion is categorized as "inappropriate" and "irrational."
Another Texas court justified the admission of photographs, stating that
"there were valid reasons for each of the photographs to be admitted, and
98. Thin analysis of FRE 403 is not uncommon. See United States v. Gamble, 290 Fed. Appx.
592, 595 (4th Cir. 2008) ("We conclude that the videotape [of the defendant's capture] did not pose
a legitimate risk of arousing the emotions of the jurors to the point of creating a genuine danger that
the case would be decided based upon their emotional reaction to it. Although the jury exhibited an
interest in the footage, this interest, contrary to Gamble's argument, does not indicate that the video's
probative value was outweighed by any prejudicial effect."). There is no analysis of why the court
decided that interest did not equal prejudice, other than the ipse dixit statement by the judge. See also
Kesterson v. Jarrett, 704 S.E.2d 878, 885-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) ("The [DVD] recording depicted,
most significantly, the effort and cost associated with maintaining Kyla's day-to-day existence and
the emotional bond between mother and child. Because the record supports a finding that the proba-
tive value of the recording on the issues of liability and causation was slight and was substantially
outweighed by the risk of prejudicing the jury with the emotional nature of the scenes depicted, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it."); People v. Raymond, 938 N.E.2d 131, 162-
64 (111. App. Ct. 2010); State v. Francis, 145 P.3d 48, 63-64 (Kan. 2006).
99. United States v. Koebele, No. CR 07-2015-MWB, 2008 WL 63293, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Jan.
3, 2008) ("It is not unrealistic to assume that some jurors will have such a negative view of anyone
who views pornography that evidence that the defendant possessed pornography might be 'so in-
flammatory on [its] face that it diverts the jury's attention from the material issues in the trial."'
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 900 (8th Cir. 2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
100. In this case, a motorist appeared drunk and had run through a red light. The state intro-
duced results of his breathalizer test that the cop obtained, which indicated he had been drinking.
This was found not to encourage an irrational decision. See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440-
41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
101. Hart v. State, 173 S.W.3d 131, 148-49 (Tex. App. 2005) (quoting Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d
547, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)); see also Parson v. State, 193 S.W.3d 116, 128 (Tex. App. 2006).
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none were offered simply to appeal to the jury's emotion to render an
irrational verdict." 102 Thus, as applied in Texas, we see that the touch-
stone for prejudice is irrationality, which is triggered by an appeal to the
jury's emotions."'
FRE 403's attempt to direct reasoned rather than irrational and emo-
tional decisions has been championed by social justice scholars as a tool
for keeping racially or religiously discriminatory evidence out of court.'04
This is a laudable goal. But the emotional nature of the evidence is prob-
ably less fatal for exclusion than its frequent irrelevance or lack of proba-
tive value. Put differently, discriminatory evidence with marginal proba-
tive value can often be excluded without referring to its emotional con-
tent. In fact, there is something powerful about excluding such evidence
on other grounds that are less forgiving to the bias (i.e., it is not emotion-
al, it is wrong). But the concern is not unfounded.
Emotion-evoking evidence may lead jurors to convict someone they
find to be morally repugnant for this reason alone and not because of the
facts of the instant case.'0o Alternatively, parties in civil matters could be
unfairly influenced by moral approbation when determining damages.
Consider the case where a woman was suing for sexual harassment under
Title VII, and the defendant's counsel attempted to introduce evidence
that she had an abortion that same year. The testimony was supposed to
suggest that her emotional pain and suffering was due to the abortion,
and not to the workplace sexual harassment. The court properly excluded
the evidence under FRE 403 as marginally relevant and likely inflamma-
tory, stating that the evidence "increased the likelihood that the jury
would view her as immoral and not worthy of trust and reach its verdict
on such basis."l 0 6 To be sure, there are cases when marginally probative
evidence ought to be excluded if it only appeals to some peripheral issue
that triggers a retributive or sympathetic impulse. But it is not the case
that appeals to emotion uniformly render decisions that are less fair or
less accurate. Rather, what matters is precisely why the evidence is being
offered, and whether it encourages a decision on something peripheral
and not in dispute, like the morality of the plaintiff's additive and unre-
lated suffering in a Title VII case.' 07 But there are many other examples
102. Kilgore v. State, No. 12-08-00450-CR, 2009 WL 2707175, at *4 (Tex. App. 2009) (citing
Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 494-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
103. See Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Kilgore, 2009
WL 2707175, at *4; Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 494-95 (error to admit photograph that was not related to
a disputed fact of consequence).
104. State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163, 189 (W. Va. 1995).
105. United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993).
106. Nichols v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 885 (8th Cir. 1998).
107. See People v. Rivera, 661 N.E.2d 429, 436 (lll. App. Ct. 1996) ("The out of court identifi-
cation testimony .. .caused grave harm because it served as a substitute for courtroom identification.
The prosecutor's argument concerning a gang death warrant ... was highly prejudicial and inflam-
matory. These errors, when considered together, undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial.
These errors, then, are plain and warrant reversal." (citations omitted)).
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where courts shun emotional evidence, equating it with undue prejudice
even when it might be appropriately admitted.os
Cases dealing with gruesome crime scene photographs' 09 and victim
memorial videos reveal how differently FRE 403 can be applied depend-
ing on whether invoking sympathy is considered a good thing or a bad
thing."o They also reveal how courts fail "to scrutinize the emotional
appeal of this kind of evidence very carefully.""' In some cases, victim
impact videos are excluded because they were unduly prejudicial and
"created a danger of provoking undue sympathy and a verdict based on
passion as opposed to reason."I12 In others, the video is admitted because
it evokes sympathy; namely, that the "victims are individuals whose
deaths represent a unique loss to society and to their family and that the
victims are not simply 'faceless strangers."" 13 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has cautioned that individualizing the victim through memorial
108. For examples of fairly thin explanations of the emotional bias, see People v. Alexander,
235 P.3d 873, 925 (Cal. 2010) ("[D]efendant has not shown that the evidence's probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice .. . [where] the lineup refusal evidence
was not especially emotional, the possible reasons why defendant chose not to participate were fully
developed, and the issue was not especially time consuming. . . ."). See also Gattis v. State, No. 03-
04-00268-CR, 2006 WL 1788207, at *5 (Tex. App. June 26, 2006) ("[T]here was nothing particular-
ly emotion-inducing about the evidence concerning the motorcycle wreck that would unfairly im-
press the jury.").
109. See generally David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and
Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006).
110. People v. Sampson, 67 A.D.3d 1031, 1032 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). Often emotional pic-
tures, such as those of a victim's body at a crime scene, can be excluded if their "sole purpose" is to
"arouse the emotions of the jury." Id. (quoting People v. Pobliner, 298 N.E.2d 637, 645 (N.Y.
1973)). For scholarship promoting the role of sympathy in legal decision-making, see Irving R.
Kaufman, The Anatomy of Decisionmaking, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 16 (1984) ("[O]ur intuition,
emotion and conscience are appropriate factors in the jurisprudential calculus."). For an inarticulate
version of the opposition, recall Michael Steele's comments about why he is opposed to empathetic
judges: "Crazy nonsense empathetic. I'll give you empathy. Empathize right on your behind. Crazi-
ness." Rachel Weiner, Michael Steele: "Empathize Right on Your Behind", HUFFINGTON POST (May
8, 2009, 3:46 PM), http://www.hufmingtonpost.com/2009/05/08/michael-steele-
empathize n 200324.html.
Ill. Christine M. Kennedy, Victim Impact Videos: The New-Wave of Evidence in Capital
Sentencing Hearings, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1069, 1078 (2008) ("[C]ourts have largely failed to
address the central question raised by victim impact evidence: when does it become so irrelevant
and/or emotion-provoking that the defendant becomes subject to unfair prejudice which substantially
outweighs probative value of the evidence, resulting in fundamental unfairness? The admittance of
material like the letters to the murdered mother and photographs of a dressed-up stillborn child sets a
high threshold for evidence courts may consider too inflammatory and prejudicial. The courts do not
seem to scrutinize the emotional appeal of this kind of evidence very carefully, nor do they appropri-
ately take into consideration the emotional effect of this evidence." (footnote omitted)).
112. United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 191 (D. Mass. 2004) ("The video, made
for a memorial service, was about twenty-seven minutes in length and featured over 200 still photo-
graphs of the victim, in roughly chronological order, from the time he was born until the time just
before his death. The pictures were set to evocative contemporary music, including that of the Beat-
les and James Taylor."). Perhaps this video should have been excluded, as it was too long to convey
its message; but the emotional content of the video could not be avoided. See also State v. Anthony,
776 So. 2d 376, 394 (La. 2000); State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 751 (N.M. 1999).
113. State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. 1994) ("The evidence complained of included
testimony that the victims held liberal political views, were caring, community involved, excellent
students, advocates of social change, and 'without a hateful bone in her body.' In addition, during
the penalty phase the prosecution presented a video of the Kerry family Christmas.").
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videos is not meant to be a proxy for the loss to the community from her
death.1 14 Because sympathy is encouraged in some cases and discouraged
in others, these videos provide a Rorschach test for emotionally-laden
evidence under FRE 403. The irony may be that the rule aimed textually
at limiting bias is in fact encouraging the exact opposite in practice: bias
stemming from discretion and institutional norms.
The anti-emotions bias in FRE 403 is lamentable for at least three
reasons. First, it ignores the wide range of cases where emotion might be
said to render decisions more, rather than less, accurate. It is quite possi-
ble that empathy, rage, or sadness may be entirely appropriate emotions
to be conjured up at the guilt phase of trial, to better understand prima
facie mental states of the parties (mens rea, honesty, etc.). As was men-
tioned in the previous section on FRE 105, emotional testimony, and our
emotional reaction, may also help us focus, attend, and remember. Se-
cond, the focus on eliminating emotional bases for decisions does not
require, but does suggest, that emotion and cognition are two completely
separate processes. And third, it distracts from the fact that bad logic,
memory, or perception or marginally related facts, can also contribute to
prejudice.n 5
In their helpful treatise on the laws of evidence, Wright and Miller
suggest that the phrase "undue prejudice" ought not to focus on emotion.
Instead, we should ask whether the evidence fosters an "illegitimate
method of persuasion" that either appeals "to an inappropriate logic" not
based on the evidence or "to an undesirable emotion" such as hatred.
This gets us a bit closer, as only certain emotions that are thought of as
improper are excluded. At its core, this refashioning of FRE 403 asks us
to consider the effect our emotions have on our logical reasoning. Only
when our logical reasoning is impaired by emotion, or when we are re-
acting merely to improper emotions, should this type of evidence be ex-
cluded. This seems entirely reasonable and an improvement on the gloss
provided by the Advisory Committee. It does, however, beg the question
of when our emotions are improper, and when we are relying solely on
emotion rather than in tandem with other facts.
Given the flexibility judges have in balancing FRE 403, and the
standards for reviewing evidentiary decisions, potentially relevant infor-
mation may be excluded based on the fact that it also happens to stir up
emotion. But when is evidence ever limited to one potential purpose? We
are perfectly capable of constructing reasons post hoc to justify our emo-
114. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1991) ("The facts of Gathers are an excellent
illustration of this: The evidence showed that the victim was an out of work, mentally handicapped
individual, perhaps not, in the eyes of most, a significant contributor to society, but nonetheless a
murdered human being.").
115. Jody Lyne6 Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understanding Judicial Constraints on
Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 137, 149 (2006).
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tional impulses.' 16 Judges can use pretext, or not, depending on whether
they consider the evidence important enough for the jury to hear. This
rigid intolerance to emotional evidence under FRE 403 is particularly
disingenuous as so much emotional testimony and evidence is channeled
in jury trials-through the prosody of attorney's speech, from the wit-
nesses' eye contact, physical movements, and tone.l17
C. Sentencing and Damages Instructions-Imposing Legal and Moral
Judgment Without Sympathy or Empathy
1. The Anti-Golden-Rule Rule
The two illustrations above globally labeled emotions as problemat-
ic. Here, we deal with a rule that has a particular emotion in its cross-
hairs: empathy and its sister, sympathy." 8 "Golden Rule" instructions in
personal injury cases ask jurors to put themselves in the shoes of one of
the parties, usually the plaintiff, when calculating civil damages.11 9 Such
rules are generally thought to be impermissible because they encourage
jurors to decide cases based on what they would hypothetically want
rather than something more objective.12 0 Courts further consider them to
be inappropriate because they involve a "blatant appeal to the jury's nat-
ural sympathy for the victim."l21
Below are examples of Golden Rule arguments:
* "Mr. Herring has had something that God has given to him taken
away: a healthy, completely accident-free body. That is what he had.
Something we all want. Something we all cherish."1 2 2
116. See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Ap-
proach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814, 822-23 (2001).
117. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 168 ("Audition provides important social signals in addition to
language. The intonation of speech-prosody-can signal various emotions, and is recognized using
some of the same structures that we use for recognizing facial expressions. Music is an especially
intriguing stimulus, as it might serve a social function that is not found in other animals, and it has
been shown to elicit intense emotional responses that activate the orbitofrontal cortex, the insula and
the amygdala." (footnotes omitted)).
118. Empathy involves experiencing the emotions of others (because you have been in that
situation), while sympathy involves being able to appreciate or feel sorry for someone's feelings
(even though you have never been there). Tania Singer & Claus Hamm, The Social Neuroscience of
Empathy, in THE YEAR IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 2009, at 81, 82 (Michael B. Miller & Alan
Kingstone eds., 2009) ("Despite the word's linguistic roots in ancient Greek-from empatheia
(passion), which is composed of 'en' (in) and 'pathos' (feeling)-the scientific scrutiny of empathy
has a relatively short history that can be dated back to its use in philosophical aesthetics. From there
the English term originated as a direct translation of the German Einfaihlung ('feeling into' some-
thing), a term that was originally proposed as a tool for analyzing works of art and nature, but later
developed into a more general mechanism for recognizing each other as 'minded creatures."' (cita-
tion omitted)).
119. See Hall v. State, 16 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Mo. 2000).
120. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 547 (2011).
121. People v. Vance, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 102 (Ct. App. 2010).
122. Klein v. Herring, 347 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (leading to a new trial).
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* "The prosecutor improperly argued, 'How embarrassing, first, to
have to go through these acts, to have your father figure doing these
things to you. Imagine how just dirty [sic] it makes you feel.' [However,]
we conclude that the error did not affect Draw's substantial rights be-
cause the record indicates that the jury reached its verdicts based on a
review of the evidence presented at trial rather than on any empathy or
sympathy it may have had for the victims.',1
23
Ironically, Golden Rule arguments engender much vitriolic emo-
tion, with one judge declaring:
It is hard to conceive of anything that would more quickly destroy the
structure of rules and principles ... than for the juries to award dam-
ages in accordance with the standard of what they themselves would
want if they or a loved one had received the injuries suffered by a
plaintiff. In some cases, indeed, many a juror would feel that all the
money in the world could not compensate him for such an injury to
himself or his wife or children.1
24
If juries are not to be relying on their emotions such as empathy
when awarding damages, how are they deciding how much money to
award the plaintiff?
Typically, jurors are told very little about how to calculate damag-
es. 125 And what they are told is often just a very cursory definition of
what the damages are for (i.e., compensating for medical expenses, pain
and suffering, change of lifestyle, or punishing willful conduct) without
providing any metric by which they are supposed to calculate these val-
ues. The result is often a "common sense" decision about what seems
fair.
In all likelihood, jurors are doing precisely what they are told not to
do with the anti-Golden-Rule rules. For how else could they perform this
function if not evaluating what they think would be a fair amount based
on their personal sense of justice and what they would want if they were
the plaintiff? Some research shows that the best predictor of a jury's
damages award is their emotional reaction or feelings towards the par-
123. Draw v. State, No. 50560, 2010 WL 3270976, at *2 (Nev. July 22, 2010) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted).
124. Klein, 347 So. 2d at 682 (quoting Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1961)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
125. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance About
Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1361, 1399-1400 (2005)
("As courts, practitioners, and academics have noted, jurors generally get precious little instruction
on how to calculate compensatory and punitive damages... . Even if an instruction counsels the jury
to avoid 'passion or prejudice,' such an instruction on its own does little to provide structure to the
jury's contemplation." (footnotes omitted)).
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ties.126 But to some, employing empathy in this way is tearing up our
legal system from its roots.
2. Sentencing Instructions-Punish Without Empathy or Sympathy
Another example of where empathy is discouraged is when jurors
hear evidence about imposing the death penalty in capital cases. It is
worth pausing here to note the irony: perhaps the most emotionally load-
ed action that the state can do-strip someone of their liberty and life-is
somehow supposed to be done coolly and without emotion. What a fic-
tion!
Jurors evaluate the weight of the aggravating factors to decide
whether someone eligible for the death penalty should actually receive it.
The death penalty was reinstated in 1976 through the Gregg v. Georgia
Supreme Court decision. 127 Since then it has become "talismanic" 2 8 for
courts to remind us that "[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
quire a sentence of death to be based on reason, not caprice, emotion, or
other arbitrary factor."1 2 9 One scholar said, "[t]he greatest risk in the
moral-emotive approach is that sentencers will confuse moral outrage
with its amoral emotive cousin, the passion of vengeance."' 30 It is fair to
say that we do not want jurors to become hysterical or sentence based on
false stereotypes. But somewhere in the middle between moral outrage
and vengeance lies the proper ground. As further evidence of the com-
plexity of emotion and its impact on decision-making, research has
demonstrated that "contrary to most people's intuitions, happy moods
promote group stereotyping, whereas sad moods promote a focus on in-
dividuals."l 3 1 Thus, if our goal was to remove sentencing based on racial
126. For a helpful review of the research in this area, see Hastie, supra note 41, at 1005 ("Dan-
iel Kahneman, David A. Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein conclude that outrage is the primary media-
tor of jurors' decisions concerning punitive damages. Brian H. Bornstein hypothesizes that the
impact of the severity of an injury on mock jurors' judgments of liability and compensatory awards
is mediated by jurors' feelings towards the parties involved in the cases. In Bornstein's studies,
injury severity had no effects beyond those predicted via the mock jurors' emotional reactions.
Similarly, Neal Feigenson, Jaihyun Park, and Peter Salovey interpreted the complex findings they
obtained in a study of personal injury judgments as the result of jurors' resolution of feelings of
sympathy and blame for the plaintiffs and feelings of anger or fear evoked by the defendants' ac-
tions.").
127. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
128. Maroney, supra note 30, at 872 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)).
129. Allen v. State, 923 P.2d 613, 619 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S.Ct.
1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989)).
130. Pillsbury, supra note 51, at 690.
131. Gerald L. Clore & Jeffrey R. Huntsinger, How Emotions Inform Judgment and Regulate
Thought, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 393, 396 (2007) ("One relevant study involved a mock trial in
which a Latino student was accused of a stereotype-consistent offense. The results showed that
individuals in happy moods were more likely than those in sad moods to have their verdicts
influenced by the stereotype.. . . [T]he stereotyping seems to reflect a general cognitive style rather
than prejudice as such. Indeed, similar findings come from marketing and political science studies
showing that happy moods promote reliance on brand names as opposed to product attributes among
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stereotyping, attempting to remove saddening emotions, such as sympa-
thy, may not be the way to go.
As Terry Maroney correctly points out, the effort to rid the process
of emotion "was motivated in significant part by a desired move away
from the racial bias that pervaded the capital system, [but] the horse has
long left that barn; the Court now speaks in much more general terms
about the supposed perils of emotion."' 3 2 This is echoed in the statement
of Samuel Pillsbury that "[a]lthough the mob-at-the-jail scene illustrates
that anger can lead to injustice, it does not support the proposition that all
decisions influenced by anger are morally tainted."l33 We have seen this
flawed reasoning elsewhere, when the anti-emotion bias embedded in
FRE 105 and FRE 403 has been expanded to sloppily exclude many oth-
er types of emotional evidence and processes.
An example of this is when judges explicitly instruct jurors not to
rely on their empathic impulses, 13 4 or when they are told to come to a
unanimous verdict by rendering a decision "based on a reasonable, rather
than emotional, evaluation of the evidence."1 3 5 There are too many ex-
amples of this sentencing instruction to cite, but I will attempt to provide
its flavor. Jurors are told that they must not "be swayed by anger, sympa-
thy or prejudice or any type of passion or emotion. [Sentencing] requires
the exercise of sound judgment . . . . It is a matter of calm reflection, not
for the indulgence of emotion."l 3 6 This is the absolute form of anti-
sympathy present mostly in capital instructions, where theoretically no
emotion or sympathy is allowed.
A softer version of this instruction admonishes reliance on "mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling."m3 We can see an example of this sort of instruction after
the prosecutor urged the jury to "get mad" and rely on their emotions,
which was deemed impermissible. 138 While some courts refuse to allow
consumers, and a reliance on political party as opposed to candidate positions among voters." (foot-
notes omitted)).
132. Maroney, supra note 30, at 872 (footnotes omitted).
133. Pillsbury, supra note 51, at 656.
134. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 133 S.E.2d 232, 240 (N.C. 1963) ("[T]hejury should arrive at
their verdict 'without sympathy or without prejudice towards any person."').
135. People v. Bowen, 134 A.D.2d 356, 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
136. Reynolds v. State, CR-07-0443, 2010 WL 3833960, at *79 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 1,
2010); see also United States v. Hammer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 518, 534 (D. Pa. 1998) ("You are to per-
form your duty as jurors without bias or prejudice as to either party. The law does not permit jurors
to be governed by fear, favor, emotion, prejudice, or public opinion.").
137. People v. Alvarez, 926 P.2d 365, 403 (Cal. 1996) (emphasis added).
138. See State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925, 938 (Mo. 1997). Defendant Taylor found guilty of
first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, first-degree assault, and three counts of armed criminal
action, and was sentenced to death on murder charge. "Taylor shot Newton once in the head, killing
him. Taylor then pointed the gun at the child. Taylor pulled the trigger, but the gun jammed and did
not discharge. Frustrated, Taylor locked the child in the back room and returned to the car." Id. at
930. "Urging the jury to 'get mad' and decide the case based on 'emotion' was impermissible.
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"mere sympathy or prejudice to influence [jurors] in reaching their ver-
dict,"i" it is impossible to know when a jury member is moved by
"mere" sympathy, as opposed to sympathy stemming from a serious
analysis of the facts. In all likelihood, the instructions we provide do very
little, as emotional reactions bubble up organically and are difficult to
consciously subdue. Of course in some cases, courts do not discourage
all emotion, but rather stress "that the emphasis throughout the proceed-
ing should be on reason rather than emotion."1 4 0 Even where emotion is
just subordinate, it still sits in a position where it is "rather than" reason.
Rather than ardently embracing empathy as the "cognitive" process that
empowers jurors to find facts, sentence, and determine credibility, courts
routinely grant appeals on cases where jurors were encouraged to be
sympathetic or empathetic.
3. Permitting Emotion: Mitigation
Emotion is affirmatively encouraged during many mitigation hear-
ings. Specifically, the Supreme Court has stated that in this setting the
Constitution requires jurors to rely on emotional arguments.141 An in-
struction that attempts to eliminate emotion from sentencing might mis-
lead jurors into believing that only factual physical evidence about the
crime is relevant and that mitigation based on character should be disre-
garded: "Mitigation does not return a jury to unbridled emotional discre-
tion, but it does require jurors to make a reasoned moral response to de-
fendant's personal background, character and crime." 42
As you might expect, this can lead to confusing instructions. Jurors
are told to simultaneously use emotion to show mercy, but remove emo-
tion for all other sentencing purposes (such as evaluating aggravating
factors). Proposed instructions have been deemed too confusing as one in
particular "discouraged reliance on emotional evidence to support a ver-
dict of death, while encouraging reliance on emotional evidence to show
mercy to the defendant." 4 3 Thus, jurors are asked to silence their emo-
tional processes during aggravation hearings, but later are told to rely on
Moreover, because the court overruled the objection to the criticized language, the appeal to emotion
had the stamp of approval of the trial court." id. at 938 (citations omitted).
139. State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 921 (Tenn. 1994).
140. People v. Innocent, 150 A.D.2d 608, 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
141. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164,
185 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
142. Leona D. Jochnowitz, Missed or Foregone Mitigation: Analyzing Claimed Error in Mis-
souri Capital Clemency Cases, 46 CRIM. L. BULL., 347, 352-53 (2010) ("[T]he Supreme Court held
that jurors' decisions must be rooted in the mitigating and aggravating evidence, and that they could
be instructed to avoid 'solely emotional responses.' By the same token, Justice O'Connor, in a
separate concurrence, required that capital sentencing reflect a 'reasoned, moral response to defend-
ant's background, character and crime, rather than mere sympathy or emotion.' A 'reasoned' re-
sponse meant that jurors had to consider the aggravating and mitigating evidence; and a 'moral'
response meant that juror must also make a moral inquiry into the personal and individual culpability
of the defendant." (footnotes omitted)).
143. People v. Hartsch, 232 P.3d 663, 697 (Cal. 2010).
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them for mitigation, despite the fact that the two are sometimes proxi-
mate in terms of presentation. Other courts perpetuate this confusing
instruction as a compromise, allowing emotion at mitigation but in hard-
ly any other proceedings. Still more remarkable, some courts decide to
define "mercy" as cognitive, so that it can properly be allowed.'" A
more nuanced instruction accounts for the potential problems of relying
on certain subjective emotion (such as homophobia) while encouraging
relevant emotional evidence and argument. It reads like this:
You must make this decision soberly and rationally, and you may not
impose the ultimate punishment of death as a result of an irrational,
purely subjective response to emotional evidence and argument. On
the other hand, evidence and argument on emotional, though relevant
subjects, may provide legitimate reasons to sway you to show mercy
towards the defendant.145
Better. But even this improved instruction perpetuates the myth that
we can consciously suppress our emotional reactions to increase sentenc-
es but allow them when we reduce sentences. The disparity here begs the
question: Is there a meaningful difference between the role of juror in
preliminary sentencing and ultimate sentencing through mitigation? We
are expecting jurors to perform mental gymnastics and are sending con-
fusing signals about the normative value of emotion in the sentencing
process.
D. Instructions Related to the "Heat ofPassion" Theory of Voluntary
Manslaughter
The heat of passion instruction embraces a robust position of our
emotions and reasons as competitors. The heat of passion defense reduc-
es first-degree murder to "voluntary manslaughter" if a criminal defend-
ant intentionally kills someone after adequate provocation. What counts
as adequate provocation is left for the jury to decide, but it should "vary
with the myriad shifting circumstances of men's temper and quarrels."1 46
The theory behind this instruction is that the defendant ought to be con-
sidered less morally blameworthy because they committed the act when
"incapable of that cool reflection."1 4 7 In other formulations, adequate
provocation was defined as what "might render ordinary men, of fair
144. 11 WASH. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIM. 31.07 cmt. (3d ed. 2010) ("The wording
of this instruction, 'in fairness or in mercy,' was upheld in Gentry, citing the committee's Comment
to WPIC 31.03: 'The committee concluded that passion, prejudice and sympathy were "emotional"
considerations, while a finding of "mercy" would be based on "reason."' (quoting State v. Gentry,
888 P.2d 1105, 1151 (Wash. 1995))).
145. Hartsch, 232 P.3d at 696 (internal quotation mark omitted).
146. Commonwealth v. Pease, 69 A. 891, 892 (Pa. 1908).
147. Addington v. United States, 165 U.S. 184, 186 (1897).
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average disposition, liable to act rashly or without due deliberation or
reflection, and from passion rather than judgment." 4 8
Requiring "adequate provocation," the instruction contemplates this
as including emotional impulses that limit or eliminate our ability to act
rationally.149 While this emotion is frequently rage, it does not have to
be. Consider the California pattern instruction below:
Neither fear, revenge, nor the emotion induced by and accompany-
ing or following an intent to commit a felony, nor any or all of these
emotional states, in and of themselves, constitute the heat of passion
referred to in the law of manslaughter. Any or all of these emotions
may be involved in a heat of passion that causes judgment to give
way to impulse and rashness. Also, any one or more of them may ex-
ist in the mind of a person who acts deliberately and from choice,
whether the choice is reasonable or unreasonable.1 50
What is often required for the provocation is merely that it "engaged
an emotional, automatic, or involuntary process that limits or eliminates
the agent's ability to act 'rationally."""' As Blackstone describes it his-
torically, voluntary manslaughter "arises from the sudden heat of pas-
sions; murder from the wickedness of heart."l 52 Here we see the older
metaphors describing mental and emotional processes as visceral. Green-
leaf s nineteenth century treatise on the heat of passion evidence explains
two classic examples. The first is "where a husband caught a man in the
act of adultery with his wife, and instantly killed either or both of them,"
and the second:
[W]here a boy, being beaten by another boy, ran home to his father,
who, seeing him very bloody, and hearing his cries, instantly took a
rod or small stick, and running to the field three-quarters of a mile
distant, struck the aggressor on the head, of which he died, this was
ruled manslaughter only, because it was done upon provocation ...
and in sudden heat and passion.
In a telling summary of the heat of passion doctrine, Greenleaf edu-
cates us that the mortal blow should be given before the passion, aroused
by the provocation, had time to cool; "for it is only to human frailty that
the law allows this indulgence, and not to settled malignity of heart....
[If] there were time for passion to subside, and for reason to resume her
148. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220 (1862) (emphasis omitted).
149. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 171 A. 279, 281 (Pa. 1934) (stating that the mitigating
circumstances to be considered are those "which indicate provocation, impulsion of emotion, or
other satisfactory reasons for lessening the penalty").
150. CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIM. 8.44 (2011).
151. Paul W. Glimcher, The Neurobiology of Individual Decision Making, Dualism, and Legal
Accountability, in BETTER THAN CONSCIOUS?: DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 343, 346.
152. 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 119 (16th ed. 1899).
153. Id § 122 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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empire before the mortal blow was struck, the homicide will be mur-
der."1 54
Below are more recent examples of this antiquated doctrine, which
highlight the confusion and false dichotomy between emotion and rea-
son:
* "Whether or not there was a reasonable opportunity for the pas-
sion to cool depends upon whether, under all the circumstances of the
particular case, there was such a lapse of time between the provocation
and the homicidal act that the mind of a reasonable person would have
cooled sufficiently, so that the homicide was directed by reason, rather
than by passion or emotion." 55
* "The defendant attempted to kill someone because of a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion if, [among other things] ... the attempt-
ed killing was a rash act done under the influence of intense [elmotion
that obscured the defendant's reasoning or judgment." 1
56
* "[D]efendant was overwhelmed with numerous affective states
specifically stemming from his sexual dysfunction and specifically the
volley of expletives that followed such dysfunction from Miss Clark ....
In this emotional state, defendant was incapable of premeditating and
deliberating or of coldly weighing the consequences of killing Clark....
In Dr. Franz's opinion as well, defendant killed Clark in a very emotion-
al, anxious state in which he did not have the skills available to premedi-
tate and deliberate."1 57
* "Heat of passion arises when 'at the time of the killing, the reason
of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as
would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to
act rashly and without deliberation and reflection, and from such passion
rather than from judgment.15 1
* "There is nothing in the instruction that would cause a jury to
consider only physical acts to the exclusion of emotions. . . . [T]he
court's instructions properly focused the jury on appellant's emotional
response to the provocation, as opposed to his physical response."l59
154. Id § 125 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
155. OKLA. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIM. 4-100 (2011).
156. People v. Rodriguez, No. G042583, 2010 WL 4261915, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29,
2010) (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. People v. Rogers, 141 P.3d 135, 150-51 (Cal. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(affirming second and first degree murder charge).
158. People v. Barton, 906 P.2d 531, 540 (Cal. 1995) (quoting CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CRIM. 8.42 (1995)); accord People v. Steele, 47 P.3d 225, 240 (Cal. 2002).
159. Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4261915, at *4.
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* "Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific
emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to
act without due deliberation and reflection. ... 16
As you can see, emotion is placed sharply at odds with reason.
What many of the courts dodge, however, is the question of intent. In
order to be guilty of second-degree homicide, the defendant still must
have intended to kill, even if this intent was not part of a premeditated
plan. And if the effects of emotion are so debilitating, what does this do
for the state's ability to establish the requisite intent? Are the two pro-
cesses completely different? Forming intent requires some form of cog-
nition or reasoning, which is ostensibly shut down by passion or rage.
This is a third-rail issue that is not being properly discussed in criminal
law scholarship.
One way of limiting use of the heat of passion instruction is to place
a reasonableness requirement on it, as seen above. Let us pause to think
about this. Requiring that the provocation be objectively reasonable for
someone with "average disposition" is akin to requiring reasonable un-
reasonableness. This is surely a mechanism for furthering cultural power-
dynamics such as sexism and racism. 16 1 But it may not always be sinister
or hypocritical, as Daniel Kahan and Martha Nussbaum point out.
Kahan and Nussbaum have done terrific work with conceptual de-
velopment in this arena, arguing that the "disparate approaches to emo-
tion at work in the criminal law stem from a long-standing dispute in
Western culture about the nature and educability of the emotions."' 62
According to them, two accounts of emotion compete to explain our be-
havior.16 3 The "mechanistic conception" sees emotions as reflexive and
entrenched influences that do not require cognition.' The "evaluative
conception" conversely holds that emotions convey cognitive apprais-
als.16 5 These appraisals can be evaluated against individual and social
160. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 570 (2011); see also People v.
Moye, 213 P.3d 652, 660 (Cal. 2009) ("To satisfy the subjective element of this form of voluntary
manslaughter, the accused must be shown to have killed while under 'the actual influence ofa strong
passion' induced by such provocation.") (quoting People v. Wickersham, 650 P.2d 311, 321 (Cal.
1982)); State v. Bird, 734 N.W.2d 664, 673 (Minn. 2007) ("[W]hether a person of ordinary self-
control would be provoked under like circumstances requires an objective analysis." (citing State v.
Hannon, 703 N.W.2d 498, 510 (Minn. 2005))); State v. Buntrock, 560 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn.
1997).
161. Antonia Elise Miller, Note, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness of the Concept of Rea-
sonableness in the Context of Manslaughter Committed in the Heat of Passion, 17 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 249, 250 (2010) ("[F]lexible sentencing associated with voluntary manslaughter
emerged in the common law as an alternative to the rigidity of murder sentences in order to afford
leniency to males who have committed violent acts in response to provocation. Today, voluntary
manslaughter continues to accommodate men who kill their wives in the heat of passion, but not
women who kill their husbands for the same reason . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
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morality, and can lead to moral education through emotional evalua-
tion.166 Thus, what is a "reasonable" emotion will change as the social
norms of what constitutes good character changes. To them, it is there-
fore not contradictory to hold people to different standards based on our
emotional reaction to their emotional behavior.
To that end, sometimes our social norms are informed by emotional
contagion, which may be morally wrong. We then must engage cogni-
tively with these reactions for social justice. This makes perfect sense,
but there is a third account of emotions that is largely missing from this
view. Namely, what is missing is a bi-directional top-down and bottom-
up mixture of evaluative and mechanistic, with both operating in tandem.
We also need to recognize the evaluative as sometimes automatic, and
not necessarily learned through updating social mores.'6 7 With regard to
the juror, we need to appreciate that the connection between emotion and
cognition is a two-way street. While emotions convey cognitive apprais-
als, cognitive appraisals also reflect evolutionarily engrained and sub-
conscious emotional information. In these cases our emotions may not
respond to cognitive appraisal through instruction. Certainly this also
suggests that the "heat of passion" must rest on retributive notions of
justice for the criminal defendant, as it is strained to think of an instruc-
tion having a deterrent effect through appraisal of emotion at the time of
the crime.
With regard to the defendant, we should be careful to excuse behav-
ior that has any strong emotional base. It might be that anger and rage
should be singled out as the only bases for the instruction, recognizing
that other emotions would not lead to a true "heat of passion" that stills
the reflective processes. This tracks our folk understanding of what it
means to "snap." It is not obvious, however, that we should punish these
people with shorter sentences. The truly enraged defendant may need
more specific deterrence, even if we might partially forgive their tres-
passes because of the situation. Thus, the instruction is anti-
consequentialist and may be based on folk thinking about impulsivity in
moments of adultery or child bullying.
IV. USING THE FALSE DICHOTOMY TO FAVOR EMOTIONAL
TESTIMONY-RULE 803(2)
The excited utterance hearsay exception was codified into the FRE
and exists in some form in every state's evidentiary rules. It is laid out in
FRE 803(2), and allows hearsay to be admitted when it contains "[a]
166. Id.
167. Blair et al., supra note 86, at 437 (finding that goal-directed processing disrupted the
BOLD response, an indirect measure of brain activity, to emotional pictures); Anett Gyurak et al.,
Do Tests of Executive Functioning Predict Ability to Down-Regulate Emotions Spontaneously and
When Instructed to Suppress?, 9 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 144, 149
(2009) (verbal fluency scores predicted successful regulation of emotion).
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statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declar-
ant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."
Emotions of "stress" or "excitement" are thought to impair reasoning and
to make it impossible to lie. If the rules exhibit affective confusion at a
meta-level with emotions, we also see a micro-version here with the
monolithic view of a particular emotion-stress.
Stress can be absolute or relative. Absolute stress induces an evolu-
tionarily preserved "fight or flight" response, occurring regardless of a
person's history or character. Our individual survival depends on how we
respond to these life or death cues. Relative stress, on the other hand, is
incredibly variable and requires one to perceive the event as unpredicta-
ble, new, or out of our control. These relative stressors can be obvious or
subtle, and can depend on our personality and life experience. 168 The
previously discussed absolute stressors trigger physiological systems
(pulse, adrenaline, blood pressure) because they are threats to our lives.
For relative stress, we must interpret the situation in order to decide how
to respond, and there may not be the same physiological signs of
stress. 169
Whether stress will make it difficult for us to lie depends on what
type of stress we are experiencing, and when.170 Are we being followed
by a suspicious husband? If so, we might have no problem lying when
we are cornered by him. Have we just heard a blood-curdling cry? Have
we been repeatedly sexually abused? Are we starving? Each of these will
elicit different physiological stressors.'71 It is likely that only the absolute
stressors may impair our ability to lie, but the relative stressors may not.
Notwithstanding the many critiques of this hearsay exception, rather
than falling out of practice, this rule is only being invigorated in recent
years. 172 It is also quite broad, as it does not matter whether the statement
includes an opinion or a statement of observed facts. Excited utterance
168. See generally Ahmad R. Hariri et al., Serotonin Transporter Genetic Variation and the
Response of the Human Amygdala, 297 SC. 400 (2002); D.T. Hsu et al., jMRI BOLD Responses to
Negative Stimuli in the Prefrontal Cortex Are Dependent on Levels of Recent Negative Life Stress in
Major Depressive Disorder, 183 PSYCHIATRY RESEARCH 202 (2010); Randy J. Larsen & Timothy
Ketelaar, Personality and Susceptibility to Positive and Negative Emotional States, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 132 (1991) (describing the different emotional responses of extro-
verts and introverts).
169. SJ. Lupien et al., The Effects of Stress and Stress Hormones on Human Cognition: Impli-
cations for the Field ofBrain and Cognition, 65 BRAIN & COGNITION 209, 210-11 (2007).
170. Christian J. Merz, Oliver T. Wolf & Jurgen Hennig, Stress Impairs Retrieval of Socially
Relevant Information, 124 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 288, 291 (2010) ("[T]he cognitive response to
stress might be reduced only at times of high endogenous sex steroid concentrations (e.g., during the
luteal phase of the menstrual cycle)." (citation omitted)).
171. Lupien et al., supra note 169, at 215 (stating that glucocorticoids can have differential
effects-creating both hyper and hypovigilance in response to auditory and visual stimuli).
172. See William C. Thompson & Maithilee K. Pathak, How Do Jurors React to Hearsay
Testimony?: Empirical Study of Hearsay Rules: Bridging the Gap Between Psychology and Law, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 456, 457 (1999) ("This article is designed to help bridge the gap between
psychology and law with respect to hearsay.").
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testimony may also be admitted if the declarant later denies having made
the statement. Courts even admit such out-of-court statements when
much time has passed between the startling event and the purportedly
excited utterance. According to Ed Imwinkelried, "[TJhere is an incipient
trend to admit so-called 're-excited' utterances-statements the declarant
makes upon viewing a movie, television program, or newspaper article-
that reminds the declarant of a much earlier startling event."' 7 ' While
Wigmore himself was of the view that the time component was less criti-
cal than the fact that the declarant was still experiencing some stress, 17 4
some courts still require a close proximity in time between the startling
event and the statement.175
In his somewhat freckled folk view of psychology, Wigmore wrote
that:
[U]nder certain circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous
excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and
removes their control . . . . Since this utterance is made under the
immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the
brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been
brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be
taken as particularly trustworthy ... .176
This was supported by the leading psychologist of the era, William
James. James wrote, "An impression may be so exciting emotionally as
almost to leave a scar upon the cerebral tissues .... It is widely be-
lieved that emotion affects episodic memory (memory for autobiograph-
ical events). And it does, but in complex and non-linear ways.178
Courts have interpreted the excited utterance rule to require three
things: first, an exciting event; second, that the declarant was under stress
from the event when making the utterance; and third, that the utterance
concerns the exciting event.17 9 Many feel that the rule has been expanded
173. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay
Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay Policy, 52 How. L.J. 319, 325; see also Jone Tran, Note, Crying
Wolf or an Excited Utterance? Allowing Reexcited Statements to Qualify Under the Excited Utter-
ance Exception, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 527, 533 (2004) ("There are an assortment of chronic psycho-
logical syndromes that do not fit cleanly within the excited utterance exception and consequently
should toll the 'excited state' requirement or allow for the statement to fall under the exception
because it constitutes 'reexcitement[,]' . . . unremitting physical pain, or where the declarant is a
victim of a psychologically debilitating crime such as rape or brutal physical battery.").
174. Angela Conti & Brian Gitnik, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2): Problems with the Excit-
ed Utterance Exception to the Rule on Hearsay, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 227, 246
(1999).
175. See Harrison v. Baker, 71 So. 2d 284 (Ala. 1954); People v. Gutierrez, 200 P.3d 847 (Cal.
2009); Littlejohn v. State, 219 A.2d 155 (Del. 1966).
176. 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1747 (1976).
177. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 670 (1890) (emphasis omitted).
178. See infra notes 349-354.
179. United States v. Reggio, 40 M.J. 694, 699 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1994); United States v.
Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir.
1986).
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too much, and judges should be stricter about the amount of time that has
passed between the original event and the statement.180
Originally, the emphasis of the rule was on keeping out intentional
lies-the idea being that people do not have time to lie when experienc-
ing stress. However, this misses the typical hearsay problem: memory.
The person testifying as to the declarant's speech is more often than not
giving false testimony accidentally as a result of mistaken recollections.
Ironically, "the emotions that seemingly ensure sincerity distort the accu-
racy of the observer's perception and memory."181 Put differently, emo-
tions can enable us to be very confident in our recollections, but these
flashbulb and vivid memories are often wrong.182 The processes of emo-
tion and memory are so complex and subtle, that in some experiments,
emotion impairs memory and in other situations, it aids it.183 Subjects
initially have better memories of events when simultaneously experienc-
ing a little bit of a particular emotion, but when that same emotion, say
anxiety or stress, is more long-lasting, this yields the opposite results.
Instead of acknowledging the nuanced roles of memory and emo-
tion, the excited utterance rule likewise adopts the false dichotomy be-
tween reason and emotion. Here, deception is considered a process that
requires cognitive faculties, faculties that are paralyzed by emotion. Thus
emotional declarations are more trustworthy as you do not have cognitive
capacity to deceive. To make this point, consider the following examples
from case law regarding this hearsay exception:
* "Testimony 'that [a] declarant appeared nervous and upset, com-
bined with a reasonable basis for emotional upset, will usually suffice for
admission of declarant's hearsay statement under the excited utterance
exception. ",184
* "[S]tress of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator
which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control . . . . Since
this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination
of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief peri-
180. This would look more like the original "res gestae" exception. Conti & Gitnik, supra note
174, at 237-38.
181. lmwinkelried, supra note 173, at 322.
182. Tali Sharot et al., How Personal Experience Modulates the Neural Circuitry of Memories
of September 11, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 389, 391 (2007) ("In other words, participants who
were closer to the WTC on 9/11 showed decreased activation in the posterior parahippocampal
cortex and increased activation in the amygdala during retrieval of 9/11 memories relative to sum-
mer memories."). See generally, John Neil Bohannon Ill, Flashbulb Memories for the Space Shuttle
Disaster: A Tale of Two Theories, 29 COGNITION 179 (1988).
183. Karin Roelofs et al., The Effects of Social Stress and Cortisol Responses on the Precon-
scious Selective Attention to Social Threat, 75 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1, 5 (2007) ("These find-
ings indicate that the effects of the social stress context and the cortisol stress-responsiveness were
specific for context relevant (social threat) cues and not for unspecific emotional cues.").
184. Daniel v. State, 677 S.E.2d 120, 125 (Ga. 2009) (quoting Walthour v. State, 497 S.E.2d
799, 802 n.7 (Ga. 1998)).
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od when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought
to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the
speaker as to the facts just observed by him."' 85
* "[T]he critical factor in determining whether a statement is an ex-
cited utterance is whether the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the
event still dominated the declarant at the time of the statement."18 6
* "[T]he hearsay was admissible .... He was anxious and admitted
that he was scared; therefore the statement was an excited utterance.""
Thus, the excited utterance rule, like many other evidentiary rules,
also espouses a corrupting view of emotion. Specifically, the emotions of
stress and anxiety turn off our cognitive capacities and make it impossi-
ble for us to lie. In this case, emotion works to render the testimony more
trustworthy rather than less, albeit by ignoring the role of memory and
the different types of stress.
A. The Ultimate Role of the Jury: Credibility Determinations
As David Blinka put it, "One expecting to find a comprehensive,
cogent approach to credibility assessments in the FRE will be greatly
disappointed."" 8 While there is no FRE rule that speaks directly to this,
in practice it is clear through other rules related to impeachment that the
judge in bench trials and the jury in jury trials are meant to serve this
function. Jurors assess credibility based on subtle physical cues-
stutters, stares, and fidgets-and on not so subtle cues, like conflicting
stories. 89 Jurors also choose whom to believe based on reported behavior
from witness testimony.190
Emotion, intuition, and common sense perspectives are encouraged
when jurors make credibility assessments.' 9' Only in this function do we
openly accommodate juror frailty, illogical and inaccurate statements,192
185. People v. Dobbey, 957 N.E.2d 142, 153 (lll.App. Ct. 2011) (quoting People v. Damen,
193 N.E.2d 25, 29 (111. 1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Langford v. State, No. 03-08-00456-CR, 2010 WL 323081, at *2 (Tex. App. Jan. 27,
2010) (citing Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
187. Cox v. State, 849 So. 2d 1257, 1269 (Miss. 2003).
188. Blinka, supra note 7, at 365.
189. See Peter David Blanch et al., The Measure of the Judge: An Empirically-Based Frame-
work for Exploring Trial Judges'Behavior, 75 IOWA L. REv. 653, 667-668 (1990) (citing Bert Pryor
& Raymond W. Buchanan, The Effects of a Defendant's Demeanor on Juror Perceptions of Credi-
bility and Guilt, 34 J. COMMC'N 92 (1984)).
190. See Adolphs, supra note 67, at 171 (discussing the "Theory of Mind", which holds that
people attribute mental states to others people when presented with information relating to those
other people).
191. Steven 1. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 166 (1990).
192. See People v. Riel, 998 P.2d 969, 1015 (Cal. 2000) ("Not all comments by all jurors at all
times will be logical, or even rational, or, strictly speaking, correct.").
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and heated emotional processes.193 In fact, we build this faith in the
common juror into the standards of appellate review, preferring the trial
court's assessment as an appellate court "cannot weigh on appeal ... the
intonation and demeanor of the witnesses preceding the testimony in
issue ... nor can we determine the emotional reaction of the jury to other
pieces of evidence . . . ."'94 Reviewing courts often find that the lower
court cross-examiner should be given "wide latitude" to vouch for credi-
bility with emotionally-evocative testimony because "cross-examination
is the means by which to test the truth of the witness's testimony and the
witness's credibility."l 95 Thus, when it comes to credibility determina-
tions, reviewing courts will sometimes go to great lengths to protect the
jury's dominion, including forgiving emotional arguments. But this is an
area where the acceptance of emotion is not universal and in fact may
reflect conflicting sentiments about the jury's historical role and value.
Building on our strong preference for juries to assess credibility, we
also sometimes discourage expert witnesses to testify regarding the like-
lihood of an individual being honest.1 9 6 So why is it the case that we ad-
mittedly allow and encourage jurors to engage in emotional decision-
making when weighing the facts about credibility assessments, but in
very few other places? There is still much to be learned by psychologists
in terms of the unreliability of jurors' credibility assessments. So why
does the law give so much deference to the credibility assessments of
jurors? Blinka points out that in the many "collisions" between psychol-
ogy and law on the topic of credibility, the "law triumphed" because of
"the age and staying power of popular views of credibility."1 9 7 But this
still begs the question-Why?
The answer may lie in the fact that if juries do not perform credibil-
ity assessment, it is not clear whether there is a future for them. We as-
sume that jurors can perform this role well. 198 Whether this belief is well-
founded is a different question, but much judicial ink is spilt on our cul-
193. See People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1121 (Cal. 1988) ("Heated debate is expected of
jurors . . .. ").
194. State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (alterations in original)
(quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Sean T. Carnathan, Re-Assessing the Trial Court's Opportunity to Assess
Credibility, 13 ME. BAR J. 316, 316 (1998).
195. McCoy v. State, No. CRI0-472, 2010 WL 3922687 (Ark. Oct. 7, 2010).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Wertis, 505 F.2d 683, 685 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that the trial
court's refusal to permit an expert witness to opine on the credibility of another witness was proper).
197. Blinka, supra note 7, at 370.
198. See Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 458 n.129 (2008) (citing United
States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ("The most important function served
by a jury is in bringing its accumulated experience to bear upon witnesses testifying before it, in
order to distinguish truth from falsity. Such a process is of enormous complexity, and involves an
almost infinite number of variable factors. It is the basic premise of the jury system that twelve men
and women can harmonize those variables and decide, with the aid of examination and cross-
examination, the truthfulness of a witness."))).
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tural and constitutional commitment to having the jury serve as lie detec-
tor.199
In two fairly recent cases involving the potential use of technologi-
cal lie-detection, the courts in dicta acknowledged that even if a lie de-
tection device were to become highly accurate and reliable, the results
may still not be admissible if they take the lie detection role away from
the jury.2 00 Collectively, as a legal society, we are highly committed to
the jury's ability and role as credibility detector, even if this process may
also be prone to bias. To be sure, the common law so frequently extols
the role of the jury that it is hard to imagine an American institution that
is a better symbol of our commitment to democratic ideals. 20 1 Given this,
one might also be surprised to learn that the fact-finding jury is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. Despite having the appearance of being an
age-old common law practice, the judge served as the exclusive finder-
of-fact until after the American Revolution.202 When our Bill of Rights
was drafted, the Seventh Amendment allowed for jury trials in civil cases
that existed at common law in 1787.203 The Sixth Amendment allows for
"speedy and public" jury trials in all serious criminal prosecutions where
204time could be served in jail.
More recently, some hold "it is essential that the jury have the ex-
clusive prerogative of passing upon the credibility of the evidence and of
determining the facts" 205 in order to safeguard the existence of the jury
199. See generally Fisher, supra note 2. See also Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair
Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REv. 991, 1001 (2007) (discussing the "common-law
maxim" that the assessment of a witness's credibility is firmly within the jury's province).
200. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-314 (1998); Wilson v. Corestaff Servs.
L.P. 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
201. See Seaman, supra note 198, at 488 n. 129 ("The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin,
characterized by Blackstone as 'the glory of the English law' and 'the most transcendent privilege
which any subject can enjoy."' (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1935))).
202. See Edward J. lmwinkelried, Trial Judges-Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial
Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury's Province
to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight ofthe Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) ("[Alfter
the American Revolution . . . [i]t became a virtual 'article of faith' that the trial judge's authority
encompassed the determination of all factual questions conditioning the admissibility of proffered
evidence. This was not only the early common-law conception of the judge's authority; this concep-
tion was likewise codified in Rule 8 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 11 of the Model Code
of Evidence, and state statutes such as California Code of Civil Procedure § 2102 adopted in 1872."
(footnotes omitted)).
203. This is due to the Amendment's phrasing, "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . U.S.
CONST. amend. Vil.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
205. Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Constr. Co., 509 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1973); see also Thompson v.
Janes, 227 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ("Our judicial system, in which the right to trial
by jury is held inviolable, denies the right of a trial judge, in the presence and hearing of the jury, to
comment upon the credibility of a witness or the weight to be given his testimony."). A Kansas court
held on the same lines that the "trial court errs when it instructs the jury that as a matter of law, an
element of the offense charged has been established by the evidence. Such instructions invade the
province of the jury as the factfinder and violate the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
to have the jury determine guilt or innocence." State v. Potts, 118 P.3d 692, 698 (Kan. Ct. App.
2005), rev'don other grounds, 135 P.3d 1054 (Kan. 2006).
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trial. If the jury ceases to serve as lie detector, then its power and value is
seriously diminished-for what else would it do? If juries need to be
protected, then the core functions of the jury, namely credibility assess-
ments, may need to be strengthened and shielded from outside intrusion.
We are sentimental about the value of human jurors, because of the con-
stitutional and emotional desire to keep this institution preserved.2 06 But
in other areas of trial, we are afraid of this contract we have made-
inventing rules like FRE 403 to alleviate the storm that the emotional
juror can brew.207
The outer bounds of accepting emotion in credibility assessments
have been tested in cases regarding possible juror dismissal. In People v.
Varela,208 the appellate court was asked to evaluate whether a juror
should have been dismissed based on her emotional state. 2 09 The court
searched the record and found no facts "assert[ing] that her emotional
state rendered her unable to deliberate." 2 10 They found the case "sharply
distinguishable" from People v. Collins,2 1 1 where a juror requested re-
moval because she was unable to follow the jury instructions, was upset,
and "stated several times that she could not decide the case on the evi-
dence and the law since she was involved emotionally more than intel-
lectually." 2 12 The bar for dismissal appears to be quite high, even though
it is discretionary. And here, too, the justification for the dismissal was
affective blindness or the perceived conflict between emotion and cogni-
tion.
206. See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486 ("Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtail-
ment of the right to jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."); see also United States v.
Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing the jury's role to make credibility assess-
ments as "vital and exclusive"); Ric Simmons, Conquering the Province of the Jury: Expert Testi-
mony and the Professionalization of Fact-Finding, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1013, 1064 (2006) (discussing
society's psychological and emotional desire to keep credibility determinations in the hands of
juries); Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 792-793 (2005)
(arguing that constitutional principles, such as federalism and the separation of powers, call for
restraint ofjudicial actors in favor of preserving the function of the jury).
207. Jody Lyne6 Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understanding Judicial Constraints on
Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 139 (2006) ("[J]urors are ex-
posed to evidence thought likely to lure them into treacherous, irrational waters, necessitating that
legal practice make every effort to lash their judgment to the evidentiary mast. Thus, a number of
constraining principles and rule systems have evolved to escort jurors safely through perilous seas of
sentiment, lest reason be wrecked.").
208. No. H022985, 2003 WL 1950390 (Cal. Ct. App. April 25, 2003).
209. Id. at *8-9.
210. Id. at *1O-1l.
211. 552 P.2d 742 (Cal. 1976).
212. Varela, 2003 WL 1950390, at *10 (quoting People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742, 748 (Cal.
1976)). In Collins:
The juror said she arrived at her state of mind prior to the commencement of delibera-
tions and that her professed inability to follow the court's instructions was not the result
of anything that had occurred since deliberations began. The extensive hearing in which
the juror steadfastly maintained that she could not follow the court's instructions, that she
had been upset throughout the trial and that she wanted to be excused . . . established
good cause for her discharge.
Collins, 552 P.2d at 748.
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What should judges do when attorneys attempt to alter credibility
assessments by appealing to jurors' emotions? The testimony of those in
power could obviously influence lay-jurors, replacing their individual
responses with those of the "legal experts." States have responded differ-
ently to the question of how far counsel can go to appeal to the jurors'
213emotions. Attorneys are often permitted to display some aspects of
emotion during their closing arguments, but they are "not permitted to
appeal to the emotions and prejudices of the jurors."2 14
As an attorney, it would be difficult to know in advance when you
have crossed that line.215 In one case, the prosecutor invited the jurors to
use their emotions when she stated, "[Y]ou can use your experience,
your emotions to evaluate the evidence and the testimony, and decide the
credibility of the witnesses and the evidence that's presented before you.
So, don't do it in a vacuum because that's why you were all chosen."216
This statement was considered improper because it invited jurors to use
217their emotions to guide them. In Connecticut, there are many cases
where prosecutorial statements were deemed improper because they in-
vite juror emotions.218 However, if a witness's credibility is attacked,
rehabilitation may be allowed with more forgiveness to its emotional
content. 219
In some ways the state diversity related to propriety of "emotional"
closing arguments reflects the practical reality that rules cannot control
jury deliberations. Rule 105, Rule 403, the "anti-Golden-Rule," and sen-
tencing instructions each provide a tool for entertaining the fiction that
we can control jurors' ultimate reliance on emotions throughout the
presentation of evidence. We may know these rules rarely work, but they
give the emperor respectable clothing. Yet at the near endpoint of credi-
bility assessments and closing arguments, we are more open in acknowl-
edging the fictions for what they are. The disconnect between the instruc-
213. "If exercise of trial court's discretion to grant or not to grant probation is based upon
reason rather than emotion, it will not be disturbed ..... State v. Cornwall, 518 P.2d 863, 867 (Ida-
ho 1974).
214. J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHICS 385-86 (3d
ed. 2002); see also Neil R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65
TENN. L. REv. 1, 17 (1997) ("By tolerating emotional utterances and emotional displays by lawyers
to the extent that they relate to the evidence, the law forbids not emotion per se, but only emotions
unrelated to the facts of the case-a seeming acknowledgment that emotional judgment, while
generally undesirable, is inevitable." (footnotes omitted)).
215. Daniel Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical Standards that
Guide Summations in Criminal Trials, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 946 (2011) (discussing how
advisory bodies like the American Bar Association Task Force to Revise the Prosecution and De-
fense Standards must provide examples in advance of what counts as inappropriate prosecutorial
appeals to emotion in order for attorneys to know ex ante when lines are about to be crossed).
216. State v. Sells, 844 A.2d 235, 244 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kemah, 957 A.2d 852 (Conn. 2008).
217. Id However, the statement was isolated and not egregious, so it did not result in a mistri-
al. Id.
218. State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092, 1130 (Conn. 2008).
219. See State v. Thomas, 955 A.2d 1222, 1232 33 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
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tions and the jury deliberation process is obvious, as the jurors are about
to leave the courtroom to deliberate. They will be relying on a myriad of
facts, emotions, and memories of the trial, and will be working out whom
to believe largely by themselves. This may be why reviewing courts are
more forgiving toward emotional processes at the final stages of trial-to
preserve the legitimacy and finality of trials when we can no longer pre-
tend that the jurors credibility assessments are under our judicial control.
B. Credibility Assessments Require Theory ofMind, Theory ofMind Re-
quires Empathy
Another, less cynical, reason we might be more forgiving of emo-
tion in credibility assessments is because we are ignorant to the emotion-
al processes required to perform this function. Without explicitly describ-
ing it this way, assessing credibility requires theory of mind (ToM). And
theory of mind, as we will see, requires some form of empathy. ToM, or
mentalizing, is the ability to consider the mental states of others, and
recognize that not only are they different from yours, but in fact they
might be in conflict with the individual's overt speech or behavior (i.e.,
she might be lying). While we may not be familiar with the theory, we
are all familiar with the practice. You know that others cannot get inside
your head and know everything you know and feel everything you feel.
This allows us to hide our true thoughts: to deceive. For if others knew
our thoughts, or we merely thought they did, this would make it much
less likely that we would lie.
ToM has been chiefly studied in the context of false beliefs and in-
tent. According to some it may only be present in higher-order primates,
and likely works through something known as mirror neurons.220 ToM
probably emerges around the age of four, and aspects of it appear to be
impaired in people with severe autism or psychopathy.22 1
220. Norman, Cacioppo & Berntson, supra note 9, at 64 ("Mirror neurons are a network of
cells within the premotor cortex which respond to the sight of particular actions and their associated
motor patterns, whether the individual performed or merely witnessed the actions of others. . . .
[This] may have evolved specifically to facilitate action understanding. . .. [And], within higher
primates, this system may have been elaborated to support social imitation learning through real-
time activation of the motor properties within the mirror neuron system. . . . [T]he putative mirror
neuron system has progressed beyond the mere physical aspects of an action, to the ability to predict
underlying intentions, thoughts, and feelings that motivated the particular action through reciprocal
connections with other limbic and prefrontal structures." (footnotes omitted)). See generally J. A. C.
J. Bastiaansen, M. Thioux & C. Keysers, Evidence for Mirror Systems in Emotions, 364 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'y B 2391, 2391 (2009) ("[O]bserving the actions and tactile sensations
of others activates premotor, posterior parietal and somatosensory regions in the brain of the observ-
er which are also active when performing similar movements and feeling similar sensations. ... [The
article examines] recent experimental evidence suggest[ing] that motor simulation may be a trigger
for the simulation of associated feeling states.").
221. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 171, 174. For research complicating previous findings based
on a more nuanced view of adult theory of mind, see R.A. Richell et al., Theory of Mind and Psy-
chopathy: Can Psychopathic Individuals Read the 'Language of the Eyes'? 41 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA
523, 523-26 (2003).
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Theory of mind is crucial for making all kinds of credibility deter-
minations. Specifically, determining "culpability and liability frequently
require[s] inferences about the motives, goals, intentions, and emotions
of the actors involved." 22 2 These mental determinations are critical to the
legal system and involve complex brain processes that require empathy,
deduction, and common sense.223 When jurors decide whether a criminal
defendant had the requisite mens rea, whether the prosecutor's key wit-
ness is telling the truth, if the white-collar criminal feels remorse, or
whether the custodial parent loves their child, they are engaging ToM.
Empathizing, which is the ability and drive to know someone's
emotions and thoughts, is a key ingredient to ToM.224 Empathizing is
likely a non-unitary construct with several component parts: cognitive
empathy (usually dubbed mentalizing, as described above), emotional
contagion225 (mimicking the facial expressions and emotions of those
around us, and thus converging on a social experience), affective empa-
thy (feeling your pain), and sympathy (understanding your pain).22 6 Em-
pathizing goes further than merely calculating others' feelings (as psy-
chopaths can do this), but rather involves the triggering of an appropriate
emotional response in the observer.
Empathizing is a complex process, contingent on perception, inter-
pretation, and affective responses to other actors. There are considerable
individual and sex differences in empathy, with women performing this
function better than men.2 27 Empathizing may be implicit; that is, "people
seem to represent the emotional states of others quite automatically with-
out having to engage in deliberative thinking."228 Empathizing may also
be sensitive to cognitive appraisal, as we will see below.
Many prominent neuroscientists argue that there is a functional in-
terdependence between cognitive and affective ToM, pointing to a cru-
cial role of the right DLPFC (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) within neural
networks mediating cognitive ToM.2 29 Even so, and interestingly, some
222. Lubell et al., supra note 1, at 418.
223. See Todd F. Heatherton, Neuroscience of Self and Self-Regulation, 62 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 363, 370-71 (2011) ("[L]iving harmoniously in social groups requires that we be able to
interpret the emotional and mental states of others. ... ToM enables individuals to empathize and
cooperate with others . . . ." (citations omitted)).
224. The word "drive" is used, even though empathy can be the result of learned experience
and skill.
225. See generally Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo, Richard L. Rapson, Emotional Conta-
gion, 2 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCi. 96 (1993).
226. Id.
227. Christine Mohr, Angela C. Rowe and Olaf Blanke, The Influence of Sex and Empathy on
Putting Oneself in the Shoes of Others, 101 BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 277, 278 (2010);
Bhismadev Chakrabarti & Simon Baron-Cohen, Empathizing: Neurocognitive Developmental
Mechanisms and Individual Differences, 156 PROGRESS BRAIN RES. 403, 403-405 (2006).
228. Lubell et al., supra note 1, at 418 ("These automatic empathic responses can be modulated
by perceived fairness, similarity, or affective link to the other.").
229. See Elke Kalbe et al., Dissociating Cognitive from Affective Theory of Mind: A TMS
Study, 46 CORTEX 769, 770 (2010) (citing PJ Eslinger, Neurological and Neuropsychological Bases
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researchers have used transcranial magnetic stimulation to find support
for a distinction between affective and cognitive theory of mind. Put an-
other way, there appear to be functional differences between the brain
areas involved in surmising another's emotions and surmising another's
thoughts.2 30 This does not, however, mean that the two processes are
completely distinct in the healthy, unaltered brain. But it does suggest
that in some narrow circumstances, the dichotomy between emotion and
reason may have a neurological base.
To demonstrate that empathy is a component of ToM, Tania Sing-
er's lab generated a thought experiment, where the cognitive and emo-
tional perception of pain interact. When we see a subject experience
231pain, we automatically mirror this pain response in our own brains.
However, when we are told that the subject is a masochist and thus the
pain is pleasurable to her, this response can be attenuated through cogni-
tive regulation.2 32 This suggests that the two can be related but can also
be disassociated. They likely rely on different developmental pathways,
with mentalizing developing much later in life than empathizing. Even
so, the "two developmental pathways also interact" 233 psychologically
and neurologically. Empathy and cognition are intertwined.
Because credibility assessments require ToM, and ToM requires
empathy, transitively, credibility assessments require empathy. Through
the function of ToM, empathizing is revealed as crucial to the trial pro-
cess. Empathizing assists us in making credibility determinations, by
mirroring the witness's testimony, checking it against our own set of
knowledge, beliefs, and feelings, to see if we think it is trustworthy and
sincere. Critically, empathic processes then generate a feeling inside of
us: justice, sadness, frustration, pity, mercy, or anger. This is therefore
where we shift from a discussion of empathy per se, and move into the
ways in which moral reasoning requires theory of mind and empathy.
ofEmpathy, 39 EUR. NEUROLOGY 193 (1998)). Imaging studies consistently show that ToM prefer-
entially activates the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the temporo-parital junction (where the
temporal lobe meets the parietal lobe). Heatherton, supra note 223, at 371.
230. Kalbe et al., supra note 229, at 777.
231. Christian Keysers, Jon H. Kaas & Valeria Gazzola, Somatosensation in Social Perception,
11 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 417, 425 (2010) ("Taken together, these data indicate that we
can share the pain of others in two ways. If all we know is that the observed person is in pain, we
share the affective aspects of their distress through vicarious activity in the anterior insula and rCC.
If, however, we focus on the somatic causes of that pain, we additionally share its somatic conse-
quences by vicariously recruiting [visceral pain areas of the brain].").
232. Kevin McCabe & Tania Singer, Brain Signatures of Social Decision-Making, in BETTER
THAN CONSCIOUS? DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS
supra note 1, at 103, 119.
233. Tania Singer, The Neuronal Basis and Ontogeny of Empathy and Mind Reading: Review
ofLiterature and Implications for Future Research, 30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS
855, 861 (2006).
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C. Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Moral Reasoning
From a very early age, empathy facilitates ToM. It does so by help-
ing us understand where others are coming from, how they feel, and what
they know.234 This in turn allows us to make judgments about what is a
fair way to treat people. Without functioning empathy processes, we
would be unable to infer what is going on inside the heads of others. This
means we also would not be able to engage in informed moral reasoning
based on our assessments of the individual's intent and credibility. Many
studies show that as the intent of a moral violator increases, so does the
moral blameworthiness and severity of punishment levied by subjects.
Research shows that this ToM ability develops over time and is not
innate. When given information about intentional harms versus inten-
tional acts that result in unintentional harms, young children justify their
moral judgments based more on the outcome than the actor's intention.
For example, someone who intends to give a traveler correct directions
but accidentally gets him lost is judged to be "naughtier" than a person
who maliciously wants to give incorrect directions but accidentally di-
rects the traveler to the correct spot.235 The preference for judging based
on intent rather than outcome develops as we age. This reflects not only
the development of ToM, but also our ability to integrate information
about mental states and moral consequences in order to judge behavior as
morally wrong.
Patients who have trouble mentalizing due to frontotemporal de-
mentia also have trouble with moral reasoning, emotion, empathy, and
executive function. They can operate according to social rules, but they
are incapable of rating the seriousness of moral and conventional trans-
gressions appropriately.2 36 This suggests anatomical diversity in the pro-
cess, and an interdependence between empathy, executive function, and
moral judgment.
Deficits of ToM can play out differently, depending on what else is
working in the brain. Because a tumor or functional deficit in a brain area
affecting either classical cognition (memory, face perception) or emotion
(empathy) is likely to affect ToM, many researchers posit that ToM relies
critically on both "emotional" and "cognitive" systems.237
234. Lubell et al., supra note 1, at 418; also Adolphs, supra note 67, at 171, 174.
235. Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of the
Interaction Between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment, 104 PROC. NAT. ACAD. So. 8235, 8235
(2007) (discussing JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932)).
236. Sinclair Lough et al., Social Reasoning, Emotion and Empathy in Fronlotemporal Demen-
tia, 44 NEUROPSYCIHOLOGIA 950, 950 (2006); Christopher M. Kipps & John R. Hodges, Theory of
Mind in Frontotemporal Dementia, I Soc. NEUROSCIENCE 235, 236-237 (2006).
237. Rajendra D. Badgaiyan, Theory of Mind and Schizophrenia, 18 CONSCIOUSNESS &
COGNITION 320, 321 (2009).
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Given how valuable empathizing is to evaluating social scenarios, it
remains a process that is often explicitly discouraged in jurors. Its value
is explicitly rejected in FRE 105, FRE 403, the "anti-Golden-Rule rule,"
and sentencing instructions. This is likely because we have no idea how
often empathizing is reflexive, automatic, and valuable to credibility
assessments and moral reasoning. 238 We have little understanding of how
crucial empathizing is to many aspects of trial.
The complicated processes involved in ToM are only now being
parsed out. Even so, we do know quite a bit about how it works, and how
this process can lead to unfair results. First, in what Kevin McCabe has
labeled the "egocentric" bias, we may judge others as having mental
states similar to ours, based on perceived physical or personality similari-
ties. Thus, the fellow Sikh who looks like me may not have mental states
that are like mine, although I might naturally think so. Jurors could also
engage in a "misattribution" bias, where one incorrectly relies on stereo-
types, ignoring the possible similarities between oneself and others. The-
se two processes appear to be functionally segregated in the brain, with
mentalizing about people we find similar to us engaging one part of the
mPFC (medial prefrontal cortex) and a more dorsal part being active
when we mentalize about people we view as dissimilar. What these data
suggest is that the process of knowing someone's thoughts depends on
different brain regions, may be a result of skill, and likely also overlaps
with our ability to relate to others. Of course, none of this suggests that it
is impossible to soften our empathic urges through deliberate means, but
it might be harder than we think.
Softening our empathic urges can be done through "reappraisal" and
self-regulation, where individuals modulate feedback to relearn associa-
tions and mitigate implicit biases.239 We humans are capable of changing
our perspectives based on updated information, often through taking the
perspective of a victimized other. For example, if an expected guest
misses your dinner party and does not call to let you know she is not
coming, you might feel irritated at her for having a selfish mental state.
After all, she was supposed to bring the dessert! However, once you
238. Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, supra note 235 at 8268 ("The results of the current
study suggest that moral judgments depend on the cognitive processes mediated by the RTPJ ([right
tempoparietal junction], previously associated with belief attribution, and, to a lesser extent, the PC
[precuneus], LTPJ [left tempoparietal junction], and MPFC [medial prefrontal cortex], which
compose a network of brain regions implicated in theory of mind.").
239. See Adolphs, supra note 67, at 167 fig.] ("Reappraisal and self-regulation are particular
modes of feedback modulation whereby evaluation and emotional response to social stimuli can be
volitionally influenced."); see also Sophie Lebrecht et al., Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces
Implicit Racial Bias, 4 PLoS ONE 1, 3-5 (2009); Blair et al., supra note 86, at 438 (discussing emo-
tional regulation through reappraisal); Gyurak et al., supra note 167, at 151 (showing that verbal
fluency scores predicted successful regulation of emotion). The "harder" reappraisal task is associat-
ed with activation of regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC). See Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal
Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y B: BIOLOGICAL
Sci. 1787, 1791 (2004).
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learn that she was in a terrible car accident, the irritation will quickly
transform into sympathy. 240 Another example involves viewing a woman
crying in front of a church. You may feel sad until you are told that her
daughter just got married, at which point your sadness may turn to joy. In
fact, in the lab, researchers can get subjects to be more empathic and
more willing to assist third parties merely by asking them to "try hard to
take another person's perspective." 24 1 The empathy that can result from
perspective-taking may in turn motivate one to examine why he may
have taken the other person's side initially, which can lead to delibera-
tion about important moral principles.
While cross-examination and explicit jury instructions can ferret out
and then mitigate some inappropriate emotions, it remains to be asked
whether they should. Even if the answer to this question is yes, it is nayve
to think that instructions can do the job, particularly if the emotional pro-
cess is unconscious, automatic, deeply engrained, or difficult to extin-
guish. Our naivet6 regarding the power of cross-examination and instruc-
tions to mitigate bias is perhaps enabled by a bit of hubris. Because we
humans can examine some of the contents of our mind, our memories,
and opinions, we sometimes "create the illusion that we control more
about ourselves . . . than we actually do, and that we know what our
preferences are and why we have them." 24 2 This fuels the fiction that we
can put our prejudice aside when told to do so, even while our implicit
attitudes are automatically and unconsciously affecting our behavior.
Even so, more work should be done in realistic mock jury settings to
determine how much impermissible bias (however related or unrelated to
emotion) might be mitigated through explicit instructions.
To conclude this section, I will briefly summarize the rules and
practices that embody the false dichotomy between emotion and reason,
and that are, in some way or other, blind to the role of affect. First, the
ubiquitous practice of instructing jurors to disregard emotional testimo-
ny, or only use it for its unemotional purpose, is a practical fiction. It
assumes that our cognitive faculties can consciously access and then
squash emotional processes, and that we can segregate the emotional
from the unemotional rather handily. Second, it fails to appreciate that
240. See David A. Pizarro & Paul Bloom, The Intelligence of Moral Intuitions: Comment on
Haidt (2001), 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 194 (2003) (explaining how taking the perspective of the
victimized other after new information has come to light can change one's perspective on and ap-
praisal of a given situation); see also Peter Sokol-Hessner et al., Thinking Like a Trader Selectively
Reduces Individuals' Loss Aversion, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCL 5035, 5035 (2009) ("[T]he inten-
tional cognitive regulation strategy, which emphasized 'perspective-taking,' uniquely reduced both
behavioral loss aversion and arousal to losses relative to gains, largely by influencing arousal to
losses.").
241. Pizarro & Bloom, supra note 240, at 194 (citing C. D. Batson et al., Five Studies Testing
Two New Egoistic Alternatives to the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis, 55 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 52 (1988)).
242. Damian Stanley, Elizabeth Phelps & Mahzarin Banaji, The Neural Basis of Implicit Atti-
tudes, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC. 164, 164 (2008).
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when instructing people either to disregard emotional evidence or to not
engage emotional processes themselves, the individual likely cannot
comply, and in fact, the instruction might backfire. Next, I analyzed the
under-theorized practice of equating emotional evidence with bias under
FRE 403. This rule is often used to exclude evidence that is thought to
arouse too much emotion. Typically, in practice, it is accompanied by a
very crude examination of what the emotion is, and why exactly it gener-
ates bias. Third, I reviewed the anti-Golden-Rule rule, where judges dis-
courage jurors from being sympathetic in their assessment of damages. I
argue that this is impossible for jurors to do. Otherwise, how else would
they determine damages? The false dichotomy between reason and emo-
tion runs throughout the sentencing instructions, with sharply different
instructions in aggravation and mitigation hearings. In the former, but not
the latter, sympathy is equated with bias and subjectivity, despite its crit-
ical role in social decision-making. Following this, I turned to the heat of
passion instructions, where it is theorized that emotions can impair rea-
soning to such a degree that an intentional murder can be reduced to vol-
untary manslaughter. Then, I reviewed the psychological understanding
of the excited-utterance hearsay exception, where the false dichotomy
rears its head again to admit emotional hearsay testimony made under
stress, as the emotion shuts down the particular reasoning of prevarica-
tion. Finally, I concluded with some thoughts about the role of emotion
in something that runs across all of these practices: credibility determina-
tions. I argue that credibility assessments require theory of mind, which
in turn requires some form of empathy. Thus rather than seeking to re-
move empathy from juror decision-making, we might learn to recognize
its value in credibility assessments.
V. EMPIRICAL DATA FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCES OBLITERATES THE
FOLK ASSUMPTIONS UNDERNEATH MANY OF OUR EVIDENTIARY
PRACTICES
The notion that we can make choices with either our heart (emotion)
or head (reason) was first proposed in early philosophical writings,
and this distinction persists to this day in common language, legal
reasoning, as well as scientific investigations. A primary contention
of this dual selves approach is that emotion and reason compete with
one another when arriving at a decision.
... [T]here is clearly some intuitive appeal in viewing decision-
making this way. However, there are also numerous problems which
lead us to suggest that the model is simply too simplistic, as well as
unrealistic, to capture the role of emotion in decision-making. 243
The following section will address how the cognitive sciences can
inform this confusion over the proper role of emotion in evidence prac-
243. Platt et al., supra note 43, at 136.
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tice. Through peer-reviewed neuroscience and behavioral data, I will
demonstrate why the dichotomy between emotion and reason is empiri-
cally incorrect. Rather than always competing, the two processes are
often, though not always, structurally interconnected and functionally
interdependent in the brain. 244
A. What Are Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, and How Can They
Inform Evidence Laws?
This is where we turn to the fields of cognitive, affective, and social
neuroscience to see how the data contribute to this discussion. But first, I
will define each field. Cognitive neuroscience is the study of our process
of knowing, or cognition-stemming from awareness, perception, and
reasoning-married with neuroscience, which is the study of the brain
and its nervous system.2 45 This forty-year-old field has simultaneously
provided exciting support and trenchant critiques for the traditional psy-
chology and biology of how humans think. Overall, this has drastically
improved our theoretical framework and provided some ideas as to the
mechanisms underlying how humans learn, make complex observations
and decisions, and how we form memories. The complementary field of
affective neuroscience is the study of the neural mechanisms of emotion.
Depending on whom you ask, affective neuroscience is either a subpart
of cognitive science or a separate but related field.
Affective neuroscience combines the study of emotion, mood, and
personality to understand how these drive, and are driven by, higher or-
der cognitive functions. In the last few decades, many researchers have
dedicated their careers to uncovering the complexity of humans' emo-
tional processes and localizing these mental functions in the brain. To
disambiguate emotional processes from cognitive ones, at least in the
ways the terms have been used in the past, I will label tasks as "cogni-
tive" when they involve perceiving, attending, evaluating, reasoning, and
deciding, even though my thesis is that this term can also encompass
emotion. Taken together, researchers in these twin fields have obliterated
the folk psychological assumptions identified in the previous section.
244. Richard J. Davidson, Seven Sins in the Study of Emotion: Correctives from Affective
Neuroscience, 52 BRAIN & COGNITION 129, 129 (2003) ("This brief commentary highlights seven
sins in the study of emotion that are explicitly treated in contemporary affective neuroscience. These
sins are (1) affect and cognition are subserved by separate and independent neural circuits; (2) affect
is subcortical; (3) emotions are in the head; (4) emotions can be studied from a purely psychological
perspective; (5) emotions are similar in structure across age and species; (6) specific emotions are
instantiated in discrete locations in the brain; and (7) emotions are conscious feeling states. Each of
these is briefly discussed and evidence from affective neuroscience that bears on these sins is not-
ed.").
245. GAZZANIGA, IVRY & MANGUN, supra note 43, at xiii.
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B. Emotional and Rational Processes Can Neatly Be Divided, and by
Attending to Our Emotions, We Can-and Should-Use Our Cogni-
tive Faculties to Squash Them
First, cognitive science obliterates the notion that emotion and rea-
son writ large can be neatly divided. Based on how deeply embedded the
false dichotomy is in our popular culture, it should be no surprise that it
persevered in the brain sciences as well. 2 46 This is exhibited both in how
graduate programs are organized, and in how brain regions have been
studied. In the past, psychologists focused on the mechanisms of "ration-
al deliberation and the development of cognitive abilities" before recog-
nizing the role of emotions and intuitive impulses. 2 47 The preference in
psychology for top-down, executive rationalism might be because it is
easier to inspect and verify the verbal reasoning of subjects than it is to
inspect emotions and intuitions through self-report or proxies such as
pupil dilation, sweating, blood pressure, hormone levels, metabolites, or
heart rate.248
For many years cognitive science has thus preferred rational pro-
cesses, treating minds like computers. The field was "more interested in
how people . .. solve logical problems or play chess than in why we are
sometimes happy and sometimes sad." 2 4 9 As Alan Sanfey has noted,
"[c]lassical models of decision-making have largely ignored the influ-
ence of emotions on how decisions are made, but recent research has
begun to demonstrate the powerful effect these factors play." 25 0 Even
now that many of the cutting edge brain scientists are looking at social
and affective cognition, researchers still try to answer which would win
in a competition: emotion or reason.2 5 1 Put differently, many are still
asking which pathway is the dog and which is the tail.252 This debate
246. See LEDoux, supra note 18, at 11. To be sure, even neural substrates themselves that
were once thought to be dichotomous have recently been reported to not be. See, e.g., Amit Etkin,
Tobias Egner & Raffael Kalisch, Emotional Processing in Anterior Cingulate and Medial Prefron-
tal Cortex, 15 TRENDS COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 85, 85 (2011) ("[C]ontrary to the traditional
dichotomy, both subdivisions make key contributions to emotional processing. Specifically, dorsal-
caudal regions of the ACC and mPFC are involved in appraisal and expression of negative emotion,
whereas ventral-rostral portions of the ACC and mPFC have a regulatory role with respect to limbic
regions involved in generating emotional responses.").
247. Pizarro & Bloom, supra note 240, at 193; see also Antoine Bechara, The Role of Emotion
in Decision-Making: Evidence from Neurological Patients with Orbitofrontal Damage, 55 BRAIN &
COGNITION 30, 36 (2004) ("[W]e argue that impulsiveness, which usually means the lack of re-
sponse inhibition, is fundamentally different from decision-making, both cognitively and anatomi-
cally."); Darlow & Sloman, supra note 1, at 385 ("While affect may be an essential property or
heuristic of intuitive decision-making, there is little evidence of it at this point.").
248. Haidt, supra note 116, at 825.
249. LEDoux, supra note 18, at 20.
250. Sanfey, supra note 40, at 600.
251. See Luiz Pessoa, On the Relationship Between Emotion and Cognition, 9 NATURE REV.
NEUROSCIENCE, 148, 148 (2008).
252. See, e.g., Pizarro & Bloom, supra note 240, at 194.
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over whether cognition controls emotion or emotion triggers cognition
continues to thrive in the literature of moral judgment.25 3
The valuable role of emotion in moral judgment is reflected in Jona-
than Haidt's work. In his "social intuitionist" model, Haidt argues that
moral judgments are typically the products of effortless and automatic
intuitions, rather than on articulable, conscious reasons, which he argues
are post-hoc constructions. 2 54 To Haidt, some moral judgments do not
rely on reasoning. This is very interesting; because if he is right, then we
are fooling ourselves by thinking we can and should dampen emotion
during the heavily moralistic trial. Haidt analyzes social psychology data
to demonstrate that while there may be a weak link between moral rea-
soning and moral action, there is a strong link between moral emotions
and actions.25 5 A variant on this can be seen in "moral dumbfounding"
where we have strong gut responses to some behavior such as post-
fertility adult incest, but cannot articulate reasons why. Other scholars
have disagreed with this view, finding evidence that moral judgments
necessitate coterminous cognitive processing.
One study posited that according to the social intuition model where
emotions guide our impulses, "jurors who are affected by emotion ...
might fail to convince their fellow jurors, while jurors whose opinions
,,256
are based on rational evidence deliberation might be more persuasive.
However, this misunderstands the social intuitionist model, as we can
often construct rational bases for these emotions ex post that can be ra-
ther convincing (i.e., you do not know why you find same-sex marriage
to be so viscerally wrong, but you justify its prohibition by focusing on
other specious-to-some-rational-to-others harms to society). It is also the
case that emotional arguments, depending on the context, may be quite
convincing. The role of emotion is far too complicated and contextual to
253. See Jana Schaich Borg et al., Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral
Judgments: An fMRI Investigation, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 803, 803--04 (2006) ("Hume
(1888) and many utilitarian philosophers based morality on emotion or sentiment via what the for-
mer called 'sympathy' and what contemporary psychologists call 'empathy.' In their view, core
moral judgments arise from an immediate aversive reaction to perceived or imagined harms to
victims of actions that are judged as immoral only after and because of this emotional reaction. In
contrast, Kant (1959) insisted that his basic nonutilitarian moral principle (the categorical impera-
tive) could be justified by pure reason alone, and particular judgments could then be reached by
reasoning from his basic principle, all without any help from emotion. Although somewhat trans-
formed, this fundamental debate still rages among philosophers today... . Studies using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) surprisingly suggest that neither Kant nor Hume had the whole
truth, and that some moral judgments involve more emotion whereas others involve more reason-
ing.").
254. Haidt, supra note 116, at 822 ("However, if people have no access to the processes behind
their automatic initial evaluations then how do they go about providing justifications? They do so by
consulting their a priori moral theories.").
255. See id at 823-24.
256. Salemo & Bottoms, supra note 77, at 291.
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predict its impact in any given case. This is only magnified in social set-
257tings.25
So if we struggle to tease out emotion from cognition in behavior,
what does a functional scan of the brain tell us? A fascinating experi-
mental philosophy study used brain imaging to investigate whether dif-
ferent brain structures are recruited when subjects engaged in conven-
tional moral judgments.258 Specifically, the researchers discovered that
brain areas traditionally connected to emotion were preferentially re-
cruited when subjects were asked to judge intentional, as opposed to un-
intentional, harms to people. This has obvious implications for jury trials,
as determining whether a defendant had the requisite mens rea may au-
tomatically engage circuitry thought to be involved in emotional pro-
cessing. Of course, we do not need to cow-tow to biology, but the data
do provide strong accounts of emotion moderating important jury func-
tions.
In all likelihood, the answer to this debate over whether emotion
wags cognition's tail, or vice-versa, depends on the specific emotion and
context. But at the neuroanatomical level, it is difficult to even label
structures as either cognitive or emotional. In the next section, I will dis-
cuss how the structures traditionally thought of as "emotional" or "cogni-
tive" are in fact interconnected. I will then discuss how they are func-
tionally interdependent, and how this serves to shatter our folk psycho-
logical presumptions in the evidence practices I have outlined.
C Anatomical Interconnectedness Between Emotion and Reason
There are multiple connected brain structures that work together to
help us think and feel. Early neuroscientists thought that brain functions
were somewhat localized; we mostly performed our "cognitive" process-
es with our prefrontal cortex, and our emotional ones with our primal,
subcortical parts. This has been a sticky concept, tracking teleological
and evolutionary tropes. While there is some structural localization, the
structures do not work alone. Areas involved in emotional processing are
incredibly interconnected with those involved in classical cognitive
tasks.259
A structure that illustrates this beautifully is the amygdala.26 0 The
amygdala is almond-shaped. It is also bilateral, meaning that there are
257. See Adolphs, supra note 67, at 167 fig.1 ("[T]he flow of social information defies any
simple scheme for at least two reasons: it is multidirectional and it is recursive. . .. Processing routes
differ in terms of their automaticity, cognitive penetrability, detail of the representations they involve
and processing speed.").
258. Borg et al., supra note 253, at 803.
259. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN 175 (1994). Individuals with bilateral damage to these regions exhibit poor judgment and
decision-making in the social realm.
260. See graph below.
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two clusters on either side of the
brain. The amygdala is preferentially
activated when we hear blood-
curdling screams, anticipate painful
shocks, or see images of snakes. But
it is also involved in other positive
and negative emotional stimuli, such
as the detection of eye gaze, or the
perception of unfamiliar, happy, or
261sad faces2. It appears that the amyg-
dala may be more selectively engaged
262when moderating affective arousal, compared to other brain structures.
The rendering of the human brain below, illustrates other important brain
structures that are involved in emotional processing. Notably, each of the
brain structures discussed herein are neither cognitive nor emotional, but
rather both. Part of the reason for this is the neuronal connectedness of
these brain structures.
In an analysis by Young and colleagues, the amygdala was shown
to be connected to all but eight cortical areas.263 These structural links are
displayed in the graphic to the above left, with the amygdala appearing in
the center (labeled "Amyg," and all other labels indicating cortical areas,
with the exception of the subcortical Hippocampus). 64 As you can see,
the projections involve multiple clusters, suggesting that not only is the
amygdala extensively connected, but it may serve as a central connector
hub that links multiple provincial hubs. You might therefore think of the
amygdala as Atlanta's airport, with its projections looking somewhat like
the flight routes for Delta airlines. Because of its dense connectivity to
cortical areas (and subcortical areas) the amygdala is considered a strong
candidate for integrating information classically dubbed as emotional or
cognitive.
The amygdala's coordinating role between what we perceive, how
we evaluate decisions, and how we act is complicated. The amygdala
receives sensory information from the auditory, visual, olafactory, and
somatosensory cortices, as well as from polysensory brain areas.265 Be-
cause of this, the amygdala can influence the "neural systems underlying
261. See Mary L. Phillips et al., Neurobiology of Emotion Perception I: The Neural Basis of
Normal Emotion Perception, 54 SOC'Y BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 504, 505 (2003).
262. Gary G. Berntson et al., The Insula and Evaluative Processes, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80
(2011) (finding that, compared to the patients in the control-lesion group, individuals with insula
lesions exhibited progressively reduced arousal ratings for progressively more pleasant or unpleasant
pictures; results from this study also suggest that the amygdala is more responsive to, and may play a
more selective role in, affective arousal, particularly with regard to negative emotional stimuli).
263. Pessoa, supra note 251, at 151 (discussing M. P. Young et al., Analysis ofConnectivity:
Neural Systems in the Cerebral Cortex, 5 REV. NEUROSCIENCE 227 (1994)).
264. Both images taken from id. at 149, 152.
265. C. Daniel Salzman & Stefano Fusi, Emotion, Cognition, & Mental State Representation in
Amygdala andPrefrontal Cortex, 33 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 173, 177 (2010).
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cognitive and social behaviors, in response to emotional cues."266 The
amygdala is also involved in highly cognitive functions such as attention
and associative learning.267
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is part of the prefrontal cortex gen-
erally, and gets its name from its location immediately above and behind
the eye orbits, or sockets.268 It was originally viewed as critical for ex-
ecutive functions such as impulse control, but more and more research
identifies it as also integral in emotional processing. Researchers have
discovered that the OFC is implicated in assessing expected versus actual
reward value,269 which might explain why individual differences are per-
vasive as individuals place different values on decision-making out-
comes. Studies suggest that lesions in the OFC result in inabilities to
update our representations of value, such as when the triggering stimuli
switches from being aversive to pleasing.270 Based on such data, many
266. Elizabeth A. Phelps, Emotion and Cognition: Insights from Studies of the Human Amyg-
dala, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 27, 29 (2006); see also Adolphs, supra note 67, at 168 ("The amygda-
la is one structure that is anatomically positioned to participate in such post-perceptual processing, as
it receives highly processed visual information from the anterior temporal cortices, and stores codes
for subsequent processing of such perceptual information in other brain regions. In this way, it can
influence memory, attention, decision making and other cognitive functions on the basis of the social
significance of the stimuli that are being processed.").
267. Pessoa, supra note 251, at 149.
268. Morten L. Kringelbach, The Human Orbitofrontal Cortex: Linking Reward to Hedonic
Experience, 6 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 691, 693 (2005). Quite a bit of individual variability
has been found in this structure, meaning that activation patterns between individuals are often pretty
different in response to the same cues.
269. See, e.g., Edmund T. Rolls et al., Expected Value, Reward Outcome, and Temporal Dif-
ference Error Representations in a Probabilistic Decision Task, 18 CEREBRAL CORTEX 652, 656
(2007) (demonstrating that activations in the orbitofrontal cortex had a positive correlation with both
expected value and reward magnitude).
270. Salzman & Fusi, supra note 265, at 181. However, this was not confirmed in a recent
study of monkeys. Id. (citing Andy Kazama & Jocelyne Bachevalier, Selective Aspiration or Neuro-
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theorize that this is precisely the purpose of emotions-to help us attach
value to events and decisions. Thus, with its role in helping us evaluate
expected and actual rewards, it is no surprise that the OFC is so intimate-
ly involved in emotional and cognitive processes and has many connec-
tions to other similar structures.
The OFC is more and more active when subjects view increasingly
angry, but not sad, faces. This suggests that the OFC helps us explicitly
label emotional faces as angry. 271 The subjective feeling of enjoying a
good meal or appreciating a gambling victory also appears to be moder-
ated by the OFC. Interestingly, the OFC seems to be more involved in
the processing of cues that subjects are explicitly told to pay attention to,
such as angry voices, while the amygdala appears to respond more to
background stimuli to which we do not specifically attend. The two are
likely acting together to update the value of a reinforcing stimuli in con-
ditioned (Pavlovian) learning.272 One study found that damage to the
OFC impaired the ability to detect a social faux-pas by a confederate,
suggesting that this brain region may assist our understanding of other
people's motives by engaging the emotions and feelings that accompany
mimicked social interaction.27 3
In support of this idea, researchers discovered that "appreciation of
humor, social-norm transgression resulting in embarrassment, viewing of
erotic stimuli and elicitation of other moral emotions, all activate the
medial prefrontal cortex."274 The ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) is either part of the OFC, or adjacent to it, depending on whose
terminology you use. Like the previous brain structures, it is also critical
to both emotion and reason. The vmPFC sits at the midline of the brain.
It plays a key role in tying mental objects to bodily feedback to make
emotional connections for use in decision-making.
One theory submits that as the likely value of punishment or reward
has been evaluated, our bodies respond by providing a "somatic marker".
This leads to a feeling, which in turn becomes a relevant criterion in our
decision-making calculus. Put another way, the process of decision-
making depends in part on neural substrates that regulate emotion, feel-
ing, and our body's resting functions. Antonio Damasio and Antoine
Bechara have labeled this the "somatic marker theory." According to
toxic Lesions of Orbital Frontal Areas 11 and 13 Spared Monkeys' Performance on the Object
Discrimination Reversal Task, 29 J. NEUROSCIENCE 2794 (2009)).
271. See Megan L. Willis et al., Orbitofrontal Cortex Lesions Result in Abnormal Social Judg-
ments to Emotional Faces, 48 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 2182, 2183 (2010).
272. Salzman & Fusi, supra note 265, at 181.
273. Valerie E. Stone et al., Frontal Lobe Contributions to Theory of Mind, 10 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 640, 646 (1998).
274. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 172.
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their account, the vmPFC also has a hand in modulating emotions and
our reactions to them. 27 5
In 2004, a team studied the somatic marker theory using the Iowa
Gambling Task in patients with complete autonomic failure.2 76 These
patients have damaged peripheral autonomic nervous systems, meaning
that their bodies cannot provide feedback to the brain from the peripheral
nerves (everything outside of the brain and spinal cord-such as the
nerves in the stomach, feet, etc.). Contrary to the somatic marker theory,
apparently this population did not experience impairments in emotional
performance, face expression identification, ToM, or social cognition
tasks.277 While our body may provide feedback to inform our decisions,
the somatic marker thesis does not explain how emotion guides decision-
making in this population. 27 8 Perhaps some other body structures com-
pensated for the lost peripheral communication to the brain, the meas-
urement of emotion was different, or, most likely, the autonomic nervous
system is more complicated than we thought. Of course, this is just one
study questioning the somatic-market hypothesis in one population.
The anterior insula (Al) is another brain structure simultaneously
involved in both emotion and cognition. It is located in the deep folds
between the temporal lobe and the frontal lobe in what is known as the
lateral sulcus (also called the Sylvian fissure). The sulcus runs from your
temples toward the back of your head at about a 45 degree angle. It is a
highly recognizable feature of the human brain and develops by roughly
the fourteenth week in utero. Activation in the insular cortex is strongly
associated with certain feelings of disgust toward others.279 It is also cor-
related with our internal assessments of how much pain we are experi-
275. Bechara, supra note 247, at 30; see also Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio & Antonio R.
Damasio, Role of the Amygdala in Decision-Making, 985 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 356, 356-57
(2003).
276. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a common neuropsychological task that assesses sub-
jects' decision-making under ambiguity. It is meant to replicate real-world decision-making, as the
subjects select playing cards in order to win or lose money. The task allows researchers to study
subjects' risk aversion versus risk taking. The IGT was first conceived to study the real-world defi-
cits exhibited by patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC). Daniela Di
Giorgio Schneider et al., Iowa Gambling Task: Administration Effects in Older Adults, I DEMENTIA
& NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 66, 67 (2007).
277. H.C. Heims et al., Social and Motivational Functioning Is Not Critically Dependent on
Feedback ofAutonomic Responses: Neuropsychological Evidence from Patients with Pure Autonom-
ic Failure, 42 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1979, 1979 (2004).
278. See Platt et al., supra note 43, at 137 ("[S]imply changing the order or outcomes of the
possible options has been shown to lead to the opposite result; that is, a stronger physiological re-
sponse for the preferred option." (citation omitted)).
279. M.L. Phillips, Understanding the Neurobiology of Emotion Perception: Implications for
Psychiatry, 182 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 190, 190 (2003). Interestingly, the insula is a neural correlate
both for experiencing disgust directly, and for perceiving it in others. Bruno Wicker et al., Both of
Us Disgusted in My Insula: The Common Neural Basis of Seeing and Feeling Disgust, 40 NEURON
655, 655 (2003).
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encing,280 and when you think about others' pain or see images of activi-
ties that would hurt someone. 28 1 The insula is positioned to interact ex-
tensively with the brain networks underlying both affect and cognition,
and may play an important role in mixing affective and cognitive pro-
cesses.
Specifically, recent research suggests that the Al plays an important
role in social emotions, particularly the representation of current emo-
tional states and the prediction of future emotional states for ourselves
and others.2 82 Along these lines, damage to the insula has been associated
with impaired recognition of emotion from facial expressions.283 At a
more sophisticated social level, Alan Sanfey's research links the Al with
our sense of justice. He notes the Al's role in "a basic sense of fairness
and unfairness," which is "essential to many aspects of societal and per-
sonal decision-making and underlies notions as diverse as ethics, social
policy, legal practice, and personal morality."28 4 The Al may do this as it
is an "integral hub" in mediating interactions between brain networks
associated with externally oriented attention and internally-oriented
thinking. The insula thus helps us register that an event is emotionally
salient, marking particular events for additional processing later on.285
The anterior cingulate (ACC) is the final structure I will discuss. It
is located in the front of the cingulate cortex in the center of the brain. It
looks a little bit like a collar, framing the recognizable divide between
the right and left hemispheres. The ACC receives projections from the
OFC, amygdala and Al, implicating it broadly in emotional and cognitive
processing. In contrast to the extensive data on the structures above, the
data are a bit more scattered related to the ACC and processing the emo-
tions of disgust, sadness, and anger. Some studies indicate that ACC ac-
tivity levels may predict a subject's response to treatment in anxiety dis-
orders,2 86 and also suggest that the ACC assists with "error monitoring"
where we detect conflict between concurrently active, rival representa-
tions. The ACC may engage another area of the prefrontal cortex, name-
280. Irene Tracey & Patrick W. Mantyh, The Cerebral Signature for Pain Perception and Its
Modulation, 55 NEURON 377, 379 (2007) (citing A. Vania Apkarian et al., Human Brain Mecha-
nisms of Pain Perception and Regulation in Health and Disease, 9 EUR. J. PAIN 463 (2005)).
281. Kevin N. Ochsner et al., Your Pain or Mine? Common and Distinct Neural Systems Sup-
porting the Perception of Pain in Self and Other, 3 Soc. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE
144, 148 (2008).
282. Claus Lamm & Tania Singer, The Role ofAnterior Insular Cortex in Social Emotions, 214
BRAIN STRUCTURE & FUNCTION 579, 579 (2010).
283. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 173 fig.6.
284. Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum
Game, 300 SCI. 1755, 1757-58 (2003).
285. Vinod Menon & Lucina Q. Uddin, Saliency, Switching, Attention and Control: A Network
Model ofInsula Function, 214 BRAIN STRUCTURE FUNCTION 655, 656 (2010).
286. See, e.g., Jack Nitschke et al., Anticipatory Activation in the Amygdala and Anterior
Cingulate in Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Prediction of Treatment Response, 166 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 302, 309 (2009).
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ly the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) to resolve such conflict. 28 7
Some posit the ACC acts as a social alarm signal that reacts to breaches
in social norms.288 This structure may therefore assist us in our active
updating-that is, developing new behaviors needed for new environ-
ments.289
The brain structures discussed above do not work independently,
and do not represent all emotional processing in the brain. Instead, they
work together with other brain networks to help us respond appropriately
to old and new stimuli. They also rely on sensory networks, memory, and
language. For example, if we are presented with a visual representation,
such as watching someone, getting mugged, the above emotional net-
works will rely critically on input from sensory areas such as the visual
cortex.29 0 If the person is someone we know, then our memory networks
will be more active. If we are physically touched ourselves, or if we
smell something distinctive, very different sensory processes will in-
creasingly come out of our default resting state.29 1 We might also engage
in more "cognitive" processes related to feeling conflicted about whether
we ought to go help, call the police, or run.
Because most social decisions rely on each of these brain structures,
many of the regions sketched out above are implicated in both emotion
and cognition. The structural connectivity between these "emotional"
structures and the "cognitive" prefrontal cortex and OFC obliterates the
idea that the two functions are easily and neatly separated. At the neuro-
biological level, it becomes inaccurate and metaphorical to refer to one
mental state as "emotional" and the other as "cognitive." For example, is
the OFC a cognitive or an emotional structure? What about the vmPFC?
The answer is that they are neither one nor the other, but a combination
of the two. The very categories of emotion and reason fall apart when we
287. See Cameron S. Carter & Vincent van Veen, Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Conflict
Detection: An Update of Theory and Data, 7 COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 367,
367 (2007).
288. James K. Rilling & Alan G. Sanfey, The Neuroscience of Social Decision-Making, 62
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 23,40 (2011).
289. See Farshad A. Mansouri et al., Conflict-Induced Behavioural Adjustment: A Clue to the
Executive Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex, 10 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 141, 141
(2009).
290. The cortex plays a larger role in the processing of emotional visual stimuli than is typical-
ly acknowledged, and the amygdala's involvement may have more to do with processing salience,
significance, ambiguity, and unpredictability than in processing emotion per se. Luiz Pessoa &
Ralph Adolphs, Emotion Processing and the Amygdala: From a 'Low Road' to 'Many Roads' of
Evaluating Biological Significance, II NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 773, 780 (2010).
291. See Adolphs, supra note 67, at 168 box 2 ("Whereas touch is an important social commu-
nication channel in other mammals, in modem humans it is relatively restricted to those with whom
we have the most intimate relationships. A recently described distinct neural pathway of slow-
conducting, C-afferent fibres that convey information about pleasant, light touch to the insula could
underlie processing of social somatosensory signals, such as a caress. The sense of smell provides
powerful social signals in other mammals but, again, it seems to be less important in humans. Labor-
atory studies have found influences of odorants on human physiology, but the effects of odours on
social behaviour are less clear." (footnote omitted)).
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speak at this level of neurological detail. And if the distinctions are fuzzy
at this level of analysis, imagine how confused they are when we extrap-
olate out to the social decision-making of jurors! While social decision-
making does engage different brain processes than mere self-reflection, it
is impossible for our bodies to bypass our basic neural machinery at this
fundamental level.2 92 Although this taken in isolation perhaps only sug-
gests we refine what we mean by emotion in particular contexts, rather
than conflating it with reason.
This also does not mean is that there could never be a dichotomous
relationship between what we have traditionally called "emotion" and
what we call "reason." Given that some of the data focus on reductionist
processes, it is possible that once my thoughts, emotions, and the social
context are all mixed together, the ultimate "output" in terms of a simple
decision or moral judgment may track folk views of emotion and reason.
Some may find in this last statement the thread that unravels my entire
thesis. But this commits a logical fallacy. The problem with the false
dichotomy between emotion and reason is that it is not consistent with
many of our neurological and behavioral data. It assumes the two always
embody completely distinct categories, which they do not. But it would
be equally invalid to say that emotion and reason always overlap on cer-
tain features. In the Venn diagram of emotion and reason, my argument
is merely that in many social spaces, the two overlap considerably. Thus,
the false dichotomy that began in Western culture thousands of years
ago, and continues up until this day, may be remarkably empirically im-
precise.
Even so, it is not completely incoherent for society to superimpose
dichotomies on the output of these structures, as society can choose to
reclassify our brain output however it so chooses. (Say, for example, we
continue to separate out "mental harms" from "physical ones" in terms of
reimbursement or health insurance coverage mechanisms.) But if we
choose this false dichotomy, when we defend it we need to recognize
that this dichotomy is a social construct, and not a biological one. The
problem with deferring to the social construct of the false dichotomy by
superimposing it on behavior that is not dichotomous at the neural or
behavioral level is that it yields legal rules that are impossible for judges
and jurors to follow in many contexts. This practice engages the fiction
that the empire of cognition can rule over emotion if we try really hard.
292. See Norman, Cacioppo & Berntson, supra note 9, at 60 ("[C]onceptual breakthroughs of
the late 20th century began to suggest that biological and social levels of analysis are not antithet-
ical."); see also Platt et al., supra note 43, at 136-137 ("Another primary difficulty with the dual
selves model is that it suggests a unitary role for emotion in decision making. . . . [T]here are several
means by which different components of emotions can influence decisions, and no single characteri-
zation will suffice. . . . [T]he relation between emotion and reason in decision making is not simply
competitive."); Id. at 138 (noting that research up until now has been "imprecise in defining the
specific aspects of emotion that are important" and that emotions can create "opposite patterns,
depending on the specific emotional state").
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In the extreme cases, we can appreciate that something different is going
on when someone storms into our offices screaming, sweating, and bare-
ly able to breathe. We could classify this behavior as "emotional." And
yet, in less extreme cases, subtle emotional processes are guiding every
rational decision that we make. As it has been made quite clear, emotion
represents many things besides "rage" or "fear," and encompasses broad-
er social categories of empathy, pride, or shame.
Observing the anatomical interconnectedness and functional inter-
dependence of emotion and reason has been aided by neuroimaging such
as fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), EEG (electroenceph-
alography), and DTI (diffusion tensor imaging).2 93 Recent imaging data
obliterates old notions of modularity in the brain, or the exclusive dedica-
tion of certain neural substrates for either cognitive or affective func-
tions. As our knowledge of cognitive and affective neuroscience grows,
we have learned that the neural and behavioral networks of emotion and
cognition "interact from early perception to decision-making and reason-
ing," 29 4 and are "inextricably linked."295 As one legal scholar noted, the
process by which individuals interpret things-ascribe meaning and val-
ue to events-"actually melds emotions and reason to the point where,
within the interpretive schema, the two cannot be separated but, rather,
emerge as meaning upon which action is taken."29 6
From the very beginning of our unconscious visual, olfactory, or
audio perception, our emotions are working alongside our cognitive pro-
cesses. And we can now observe this relationship through visual repre-
sentations using EEG, fMRI and DTI. 297 While some of the component
parts to emotion and reason might be different, and their circuitry distin-
guishable in some tasks, there is considerably more overlap than previ-
ously imagined.29 8 In the next section, I will sketch out a few of the many
behavioral tasks that require emotion and cognition to be working along-
side each other.
293. For a brief summary of this technology, see Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a
Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental
States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1136-39 (2010).
294. Phelps, supra note 266, at 28.
295. Salzman & Fusi, supra note 265, at 175.
296. Peter Brandon Bayer, Not Interaction But Melding-The "Russian Dressing" Theory of
Emotions: An Explanation of the Phenomenology of Emotions and Rationality with Suggested Relat-
ed Maxims for Judges and Other Legal Decision Makers, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2001).
297. Thomas Ethofer et al., Differential Influences of Emotion, Task, and Novelty on Brain
Regions Underlying the Processing of Speech Melody, 21 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1255, 1255
(2009); Joseph LeDoux, Emotion: Clues from the Brain, 46 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 209, 210-211
(1995); Patrik Vuilleumier & Gilles Pourtois, Distributed and Interactive Brain Mechanisms During
Emotion Face Perception: Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging, 45 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 174,
174 (2007).
298. See Borg et al., supra note 253, at 803-04 ("[Elmotion and reasoning remain distinct
components in an overall process of decision making.").
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D. Functional Interconnectedness: The Role ofEmotion in Cognition
If I asked you to come up with as many words as you could in ten
seconds to describe "cognition," you would probably generate a list with
words like perception, attention, evaluation, reflection, regulation, con-
templation, knowledge, recollection, execution, etc. And these are tradi-
tionally the tasks that psychologists have referred to as "executive func-
tions," or "cognition." What I will show in this section is that while these
may be classically cognitive functions, they could not operate well, par-
ticularly in social situations, without the input of our emotions.
Elizabeth Phelps, a strong proponent of rejecting the false dichoto-
my or "dual process" model, has written that "[i]nvestigations into the
neural systems underlying human behavior demonstrate that the mecha-
nisms of emotion and cognition are intertwined from early perception to
reasoning." 29 9 A 2008 review suggested that much of this integration
may be moderated by the amygdala. As we saw from the previous sec-
tion, it is anatomically positioned to do so, as the amygdala receives
highly processed visual data from the temporal cortex, and saves tracers
of this for later processing in other brain areas. Studies show that the
amygdala "influence[s] memory, attention, decision making and other
cognitive functions on the basis of the social [and emotional] signifi-
cance of the stimuli that are being processed." 3
Now shifting to the other side of the dichotomy, I will briefly dis-
cuss how oft-labeled "cognitive" structures are actually quite involved in
our emotional processes. The parietal cortex and prefrontal cortex are
two regions thought to be primarily involved in cognition and reason.
However, we now know they also play a powerful role in affective pro-
cessing. Three sub-territories of the cortex-the anterior cingulated cor-
tex (ACC), the lateral prefrontal cortex (IPFC), and ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC)-factor prominently into some of the most re-
spected proposals for emotional circuitry. Despite being previously la-
beled "cognitive" regions, they are now considered to be extensively
involved in affective function, and there is growing evidence for "func-
tional integration of cognition and emotion in these regions." 301 Even our
ability to inhibit impulses, which is considered classically "cognitive"
and implicates the ACC, dlPFC, and inferior frontal cortex, may be mod-
ulated by emotional stimuli and processes.302
299. Phelps, supra note 266, at 27.
300. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 168.
301. Pessoa, supra note 251, at 151; see also ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT
HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 40-41 (1999).
302. See Jeremy R. Gray et al., Integration of Emotion and Cognition in the Lateral Prefrontal
Cortex, 99 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCi 4115, 4118-19 (2002); William M. Perlstein et al., Dissociation
in Human Prefrontal Cortex of Affective Influences on Working Memory-Related Activity, 99 PROC.
NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 1736, 1739-40 (2002).
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I will not be addressing each of the "cognitive" capacities listed
above. Instead, I will focus on perception and attention, with a brief
summary of the role of emotion on memory. Because attention and per-
ception are the derivative stages of stimulus processing, anything that
affects these will also affect later cognitive functions, although in itera-
tive ways that may complicate the ultimate outcome.303 Because we per-
ceive and attend almost without noticing it, the role of emotions in these
functions may not be seen; indeed, we are blind to it. First, I will discuss
the cognitive neuroscience of perception, and how emotion often inter-
acts with it to aid in our decisions.
1. The Neuroscience of Perception Obliterates the Assumption that
Emotion Always Disturbs Cognition
Rather than biasing our decision-making, emotions often play a crit-
ical role in our perception. And, as you can imagine, perception is crucial
to many aspects of trial, as the credibility of all parties (witnesses, judg-
es, jurors) depends in turn on how well each is perceived.304 Witnesses
share their stories about what was said between partners to a contract,
what graphs were shown during a board meeting, and whether they were
able to observe the make or model of the car zooming past them on the
freeway. Jurors then perceive the testimony based upon all of this: the
subtle shifts in posture, the failed eye-contact, the furrowed eyebrows
between the accused and his attorney. They then listen to conflicting
testimony to fold together their narrative "story" of what occurred.305
Without perception, there could be no oral or written testimony. Critical-
ly, there could also be no jury. This field of cognitive neuroscience there-
fore has widespread implications for both witness testimony as well as
jury deliberations and judicial reasoning. Here, I am focusing specifically
on the role of perception in juror decision-making. The empirical data,
which we will now turn to, illustrates that in some cases emotion can
actually assist jurors in perceiving events. I will begin with research on
visual perception.
To test the effect of emotion on visual perception, one team studied
contrast sensitivity. Contrast sensitivity is the ability to perceive differ-
303. See Elizabeth A. Phelps, Sam Ling & Marisa Carrasco, Emotion Facilitates Perception
and Potentiates the Perceptual Benefits ofAttention, 17 PSYCHOL. SCL 292, 292 (2006).
304. Witnesses recall what they perceived with their eyes and ears, and they relay these percep-
tions in court. Ironically, witnesses did not use to be able to draw inferences or conclusions, and
were just supposed to be the jury's eyes and ears. This was because it was felt that perception did not
require any inferential process. See THAYER, supra note 3, at 524.
305. Mariska Esther Kret & Beatrice de Gelder, Social Context Influences Recognition of
Bodily Expressions, 203 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 169, 169 (2010). ("[Data] show that observers
judging a facial expression (fear or anger) are strongly influenced by emotional body language; an
enhancement of the occipital Pl component as early as 115 ms after stimulus presentation onset
points to the existence of a rapid neural mechanism sensitive to the agreement between simultane-
ously presented facial and bodily emotional expressions. . . . Knowledge of the social situation, body
postures, voices, scenes, linguistic labels, or other emotional faces all influence emotion perception."
(citations omitted)).
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ences between an object and its background, such as detecting a bluebird
against a slightly darker blue sky. When there is very little contrast be-
tween the two objects, it can be difficult to determine the orientation of
the object in the scene. Researchers relied on this to ask fourteen under-
graduates to look at a display and determine whether the black box
against a gray background was upright, shifted to the left, or shifted to
the right. The research team found that the presentation of a fearful face
prior to the stimuli presentation and test led to more accurate assessments
of the orientation of the square. Put differently, the mere presence of a
fearful face before the task improved the sensitivity of their eyes! 3 06 In a
follow-up experiment, the researchers found that presenting fearful faces
in the periphery of our visual field, immediately before the orientation
task, increased contrast sensitivity even more. It was thought that flash-
ing the face peripherally was so unexpected, that it drew the subjects'
attention to the fearful face, improving the subject's visual perception for
a few moments. 30 7 Importantly, while this data suggests that emotion
improves our cognitive functioning during perception, it cannot be said
that this conclusively holds for all contexts or emotions. But it is at least
one example of where the emotion of fear may aid in perception.
Researchers have also used the technique of backward masking and
308
binocular rivalry to tease out emotion's effect on perception. Briefly,
backward masking involves presenting a target emotional face for a split
second (less than 30 ms), followed by a masking stimuli of a neutral face
for a longer period of time. If the time between the target and the mask-
ing stimuli is short enough, the subject is consciously unaware of the first
stimulus and can only report seeing the second neutral face. In a binocu-
lar rivalry task, different images are introduced within visual domains
specific to one or the other eye. As the eyes cannot focus on both, mo-
nocular channels in the primary visual cortex alternatively inhibit one
another, so that only one image dominates and is perceived. The subor-
dinate image does not reach awareness, even though it was registered
subconsciously.
Something unintuitive was discovered using neuroimaging and the-
se tasks. Namely, certain subcortical regions of the brain, such as the
amygdala, basal ganglia, pulvinar and superior colliculus, are actually
more active in response to emotional stimuli that are not consciously
perceived. As one might expect for both tasks, the regions of the cortex,
such as the frontal lobe, cingulate, and occipitotemporal lobe, were more
active during the processing of consciously perceived stimuli. This
means that there are certain regions of our brain, especially those that
appear to be heavily involved in emotional processing, that are more
306. Phelps, Ling & Carrasco, supra note 303, at 298.
307. Id. at 295.
308. Marco Tamietto & Beatrice de Gelder, Neural Bases of the Non-Conscious Perception of
Emotional Signals, 11 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 697, 699 box 2 (2010).
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involved in processing an emotional stimulus when we are not aware of
them.
We can be unaware of what we subconsciously perceive when the
stimulus is not strong enough or not presented for long enough time to
trigger a response in the cortex. However, weaker stimuli are often capa-
ble of activating the sub-cortical visual regions, such as the superior
colliculus, that ostensibly have a lower threshold for activation.3 09 Being
unaware of a stimulus due to lack of attention, on the other hand, results
not from a weak stimulus, but from when we are otherwise engaged and
lacking the mental bandwidth to process it. This thereby reduces cortical
responsiveness to the unattended event.31 0 Even so, recent data indicate
similar, though weaker, effects of non-conscious perception of happi-
ness, sadness, or disgust cues on these areas of the brain.
This likely occurs through the amygdala, which receives infor-
mation about the emotional salience of stimuli quickly and often prior to
awareness. 312 Relative increases in activation occur in the amygdala even
when the fearful faces are masked and subjects seem to be unaware that
they were very briefly flashed before them. Thus we see from this data
that in certain situations, emotion can help us perceive stimuli. This may
be especially true when the emotion is fear. Linking up with the previous
section, this suggests that in certain cases, when the jury experiences
some emotions, they might be more likely to perceive important features
of the trial, which may lead to better recall of facts.
As emotion can affect perception, it is also the case that cognition
affects perception, and our emotional response to this perception. 3 14 One
team presented subjects with isovaleric acid, which smelled a bit like
cheddar cheese. Subjects were placed in a scanner and given words to
describe the odor, with some reading "cheddar cheese" and others read-
ing "body odor."315 The word label altered brain activation in the second-
ary olfactory region of the orbitofrontal cortex. The label was also corre-
lated with subjects' ratings of pleasantness, with the body odor label be-
ing more likely labeled as unpleasant. There was greater olfactory cortex
activation when the scent was framed as cheese rather than body odor.3 16
309. Id. at 699.
310. Id. at 700.
311. Id
312. Paul J. Whalen et al., Masked Presentations of Emotional Facial Expressions Modulate
Amygdala Activity Without Explicit Knowledge, 18J. NEUROSCIENCE 411,415 (1998).
313. J. S. Morris et al., A Neuromodulatory Role for the Human Amygdala in Processing
Emotional Facial Expressions, 121 BRAIN 47, 49, 53 (1998).
314. Blair et al., supra note 86, at 437 (finding that goal-directed processing disrupted the
BOLD response, an indirect measure of brain activity, to emotional pictures).
315. Rolls, supra note 44, at 123-25.
316. Ivan E. de Araujo et al., Cognitive Modulation of Olfactory Processing, 46 NEURON 671,
674 (2005).
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Thus, the emotional response was moderated by cognitive framing. 17
This is just one example of many, and it has direct application to jury
instructions. While it suggests that we can moderate our emotional re-
sponse by framing and reappraisal, jurors are often not specifically being
asked to reappraise information, so much as ignore part of their apprais-
al. This often does not work without their being given a justification or
anchor for doing so.
2. The Neuroscience of Attention Obliterates the Assumption that
Emotion Always Disturbs Cognition
We now move to another prototypical cognitive function that is in-
timately related to perception: attention. Attention is considered one of
the most paradigmatic of cognitive functions, allowing us to filter out
many sensory sounds, visuals, and smells to focus only on the most criti-
cal inputs.3 ' Attention to a face or scene increases neuronal firing rates
in the visual and sensory cortex, and is believed to improve our behav-
ioral response by making us quicker and more agile to respond." 9 This
particular intersection of cognition and emotion helps us answer a com-
mon question: Given what I am hearing and seeing, and how I feel,
where should I direct my focus?
The importance of emotional salience and its impact on auditory at-
tention has been well established. A ubiquitous example of this is the
classic "cocktail party" effect, where an emotionally significant state-
ment, such as one's name or hometown, is heard from across the room
even when we are not dedicating our deliberate attention to the speak-
er.3 20 Subsequent research has confirmed that when our attention is di-
vided and stimuli are competing, emotional networks can facilitate
awareness for emotionally-salient stimuli.32 1 Some posit that the amygda-
la makes this possible; it is likely that various brain structures are in-
volved.
We know from imaging studies that both the amygdala and the or-
bitofrontal cortex (OFC) receive highly processed input from secondary
317. See Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the
Human Brain, 313 SC. 684, 684 (2006); see also M. Deppe, Evidence for a Neural Correlate of a
Framing Effect: Bias-Specic Activity in the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex During Credibility
Judgments, 67 BRAIN RES. BULL. 413, 419-20 (2005).
318. Jacqueline Gottlieb et al., Parietal Control ofAttentional Guidance: The Significance of
Sensory, Motivational and Motor Factors, 91 NEUROBIOLOGY LEARNING & MEMORY 121, 121
(2009) ("Because the brain is 'bombarded' with more sensory information than it can process in
depth, the argument goes, attention is needed to prioritize and limit the amount of information that
reaches higher processing stages at any one time.").
319. See Robert Desimone & John Duncan, Neural Mechanisms of Selective Visual Attention,
18 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 193, 194 (1995); Sabine Kastner & Leslie G. Ungerleider, Mecha-
nisms of Visual Attention in the Human Cortex, 23 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 315, 322-23 (2000).
320. E. Colin Cherry, Some Experiments on the Recognition of Speech, with One and with Two
Ears, 25 J. ACOUSTICAL Soc. AM. 975, 976 (1953).
321. Phelps, supra note 266, at 37.
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visual areas, making them ideally situated to adjust perceptual processing
based on our evaluation of the stimulus. 32 2 Thus, the emotional cue can
trigger amygdala-mediated attention and laser-like focus, helping us
sense whether we need to go chase a child down the theatre steps or keep
watching the ballet.323 A growing number of studies hint at a bivalent
role of attention, with positive emotional states expanding our scope of
attention and negative emotional states restricting it. 324 Once again, the
relationship between emotion and cognition is not black and white, but is
incredibly nuanced depending on the context.
It is generally thought that this quick response to fear by the amyg-
dala is critical in helping us modulate our attention toward dangerous
events. 325 As Robert Sapolsky has pointed out, we humans have the luxu-
ry of being relatively predator-free. This means that unlike our more
primitive ancestors, modern man is typically not in the position of run-
ning from an animal that seeks to eat him. Even so, the emotion of fear,
and the evolutionary-engrained behaviors associated with it, continue to
save us from even the most banal dangers. These defensive behaviors can
come in handy when we are responding to the rare drunk driver who
swerves into our lane or to a home-security alarm that goes off at 2:00
a.m.32 6 In each of these cases, our personal safety appears to be threat-
ened. And when our safety is threatened, responses in the brain prepare
us to react. Even though it seems to happen automatically, recent data
suggest that neural processing of stimuli with certain types of emotional
content often requires some degree of thought to attend to valence.3 27
This does not suggest that the amygdala only responds to attended to
stimuli or that we are unable to respond to threats outside of the focus of
our attention.
322. See David G. Amaral et al., Anatomical Organization of the Primate Amygdaloid Com-
plex, in THE AMYGDALA: NEUROBIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF EMOTION, MEMORY, AND MENTAL
DYSFUNCTION 1, 1 (John P. Aggleton ed., 1992); Jennifer L. Freese & David G. Amaral, The Or-
ganization of Projections from the Amygdala to Visual Cortical Areas TE and VI in the Macaque
Monkey, 486 J. COMP. NEUROLOGY 295, 315 (2005).
323. Luiz Pessoa, Emotion and Cognition and the Amygdala: From "What Is It?" to "What's
To Be Done? ", 48 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 3416, 3416-18, 3426 (2011).
324. Ronald S. Friedman & Jens Forster, Implicit Affective Cues and Attentional Tuning: An
Integrative Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 875, 875 (2010); see also Brendan P. Bradley et al.,
Attentional Biases for Negative Information in Induced & Naturally Occurring Dysphoria, 35
BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 911, 912 (1997); John D. Eastwood et al., Differential Attentional Guid-
ance by Unattended Faces Expressing Positive and Negative Emotion, 63 PERCEPTION &
PSYCHOPHYSiCS 1004, 1006-07 (2001).
325. Adam K. Anderson et al., Neural Correlates ofthe Automatic Processing of Threat Facial
Signals, 23 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5627, 5627 (2003); Patrik Vuilleumier et al., Effects ofAttention and
Emotion on Face-Processing in the Human Brain: An Event-Related JMRI Study, 30 NEURON 829,
837 (2001).
326. Sarina M. Rodrigues, Joseph E. LeDoux & Robert M. Sapolsky, The Influence of Stress
Hormones on Fear Circuitry, 32 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 289, 291 (2009).
327. Luiz Pessoa et al., Attentional Control of the Processing ofNeutral and Emotional Stimu-
li, 15 COGNITIVE BRAIN RES. 31, 40 (2002) (finding through the use of brain imaging that all "brain
regions responding differentially to emotional faces, including the amygdala, did so only when
sufficient attentional resources were available").
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Another set of tests revealed the impact of emotion on attention.
Here, researchers relied on something called the "attentional blink." In
this paradigm, stimuli are presented in rapid succession (about every 100
milliseconds or so). This is so quick that it is difficult for subjects to
identify any one stimulus. However, if subjects are told that they can
ignore most pictures and selectively attend to a few targets (such as those
that appear in pink) subjects are able to selectively perceive those targets
and later identify them. This ability is negatively affected the longer the
time between the two different targets. If a second pink target is present-
ed a few items after the first, in what is called the "early lag period,"
subjects will often miss it.32 8 Noticing and encoding the first target stimu-
lus results in a temporary refractory period, during which time it is diffi-
cult to notice and encode a second target.329 Using this paradigm, re-
searchers can examine what our brain perceives pre-awareness, when our
attention "blinks." Comparing emotional and neutral words as stimuli,
one team found that when the second word is emotionally arousing, the
blink is attenuated.33 o Put another way, emotionally arousing words en-
hanced subjects' ability to spot the second target during the refractory
period. This finding did not extend to patients with left amygdala dam-
age, as they still had a hard time seeing the second target, even if it was
an emotionally arousing word.
Together, these studies suggest that when demands are placed on
our attention, emotional arousing stimuli are more likely to reach percep-
tual awareness, and are more likely to be later identified. It also suggests
that the amygdala plays a necessary role in this facilitation of attention
with emotion.33 1 There are many other studies revealing that emotion
assists us in attending to stimuli.3 32 Applying these findings to courtroom
applications, it may be the case that we should not discourage emotional
testimony at trial, purely because it is arousing. Arousal may help jurors
328. Phelps, supra note 266, at 37.
329. Marvin M. Chun & Mary C. Potter, A Two-Stage Model for Multiple Target Detection in
Rapid Serial Visual Presentation, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 109, 109 (1995); Jane E. Ray-
mond et al., Temporary Suppression of Visual Processing in an RSVP Task: An Attentional Blink?,
18 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 849, 858 (1992).
330. Adam K. Anderson, Affective Influences on the A ttentional Dynamics Supporting Aware-
ness, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 258, 264 (2005).
331. Adam K. Anderson & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Lesions of the Human Amygdala Impair
Enhanced Perception ofEmotionally Salient Events, 411 NATURE 305, 305 (2001).
332. This is particularly true for threatening stimuli. Gilles Pourtois & Patrik Vuilleumier,
Dynamics of Emotional Effects on Spatial Attention in the Human Visual Cortex, 156 PROGRESS
BRAIN RES. 67, 67 (2006) ("These data confirm that threat may act as a powerful exogenous cue and
trigger reflexive shifts in spatial attention toward its location, through a rapid temporal sequence of
neural events in parietal and temporo-occipital areas, with dissociable neural substrates for engage-
ment benefits in attention affecting activity in extrastriate occipital areas and increased disengage-
ment costs affecting intraparietal cortex. These brain-imaging results reveal how emotional signals
related to threat can play an important role in modulating spatial attention to afford flexible percep-
tion and action.").
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filter through all of the social stimuli in the theater of trial, to help them
maintain their attention.333
While emotion can affect perception and attention, the inverse is al-
so true. Cognitive perception and attention control can also shape our
affect. Imaging work has investigated two types of control of emotion:
attentional control and cognitive change. A hypothetical continuum ex-
ists between the two methods.334
In its purest form, attentional control is the deliberate and selective
inattention to emotional stimuli. An analogy would be burying your head
in your jacket during the particularly gory parts of a horror film, or look-
ing away from a dead deer on the road. Moving along the spectrum we
then have the ability to engage in a distracting secondary task, which will
compete for attention with the emotional stimuli. Here we can think of
humming or reciting Yeats poems in your head while a dentist drills your
teeth. Next, one might attend to the stimulus and engage with it, closely
evaluating the attributes that are "emotional," against those that are "non-
emotional." Research in this area has yielded "strikingly discrepant" re-
sults, with some suggesting cognitive judgment reduces emotional-
amygdala response, and others suggesting the opposite. This likely de-
pends on the cognitive burden of the stimulus and task and the operating
335definitions of the critical terms3. Cognitive change begins to be em-
ployed when we anticipate emotion and prepare for processing it. This
may occur when we know we are about to get married, and we are think-
ing of ways not to cry during the ceremony. We might also attempt re-
versal learning, where we aim to retrain our brain not to associate the
sound of a particular alarm with getting up at 5:00 a.m. or to reverse an
emotional association to extinguish our learned response. To some ex-
tent, emotions can be modulated by any of these methods.336 But we may
333. Training can improve attentional focus by reducing the behavioral costs of distraction. See
Todd A. Kelley & Steven Yantis, Neural Correlates of Learning to Attend, 4 FRONTIERS HUM.
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 9 (2010).
334. Figure depicting continuum attributed to Kevin N. Ochsner & James J. Gross, The Cogni-
tive Control ofEmotion, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sct. 242, 243 (2005).
335. Id. at 244.
336. "Top-down" appraisal and reappraisal involves deliberately reinterpreting neutral images
in emotional ways to change our associations. This can be contrasted with the 'bottom-up' approach
where we respond to intrinsically emotional perceptual properties of the stimulus. One team looked
at this comparison, and observed amygdala activation in both. However, only in the top-down task
was the ACC (anterior cingulate cortex), the LPFC (lateral prefrontal cortex), and the MPFC (medial
prefrontal cortex) activated, which might represent the cognitively generated aversive appraisal. See
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not be able to employ these strategies effectively when the emotion is
subconscious. We therefore must continue to research individuals
through physiological cues rather than just conscious self reports. Emo-
tional stimuli that do not even pierce our conscious awareness can still
elicit physiological responses that suggest autonomic arousal, including
inducing us to make spontaneous and emotionally reflexive facial ex-
pressions.337
3. The Neuroscience of Memory Obliterates the Assumption that
Emotion Always Disturbs or Enhances Memory
Without delving too deeply into the enormous literature of memory
and emotion, I will sketch out some of the ways in which emotion im-
pacts memory formation and recall. Mounting data suggest that that emo-
tion generally assists memory by facilitating the specific steps of atten-
tion and encoding.338 Many studies confirm that emotional events can be
better encoded and remembered. 33 9 Further, through the role of emotion
in tagging events as pleasant or aversive, emotions play a vital in how we
learn. 340 Memories are enhanced for location and activity when we expe-
rience natural disasters, like earthquakes, or unnatural disasters, like car
accidents. 34 1 But for some details of so-called "flashbulb" memories, we
can be quite confident, and yet wrong, in our recall.
Kevin N. Ochsner & James J. Gross, Thinking Makes It So: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Ap-
proach to Emotion Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND
APPLICATIONS 240, 242-42 fig. 12.4 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2004). Studies of
cognitive change have had more consistent results than those for attentional control. Specifically,
data demonstrate that emotional appraisal systems can be modulated by the PFC (prefrontal cortex),
the OFC (orbitofrontal cortex) and cingulate control systems. These systems may be activated by
expectations or beliefs about interpretations of stimuli or by learning new associations between
stimuli and feelings. Interestingly, there is no data to suggest that we can regulate our emotions just
by being told to do so, without being given an explicit reason or way of replacing the emotional
reaction with something less emotional. Cf Kateri McRae et al., Bottom-Up and Top-Down Emotion
Generation: Implications for Emotion Regulation, SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE, 2
(Feb. 4, 2011), http://scan.oxfordjoumals.org/content/early/2011/02/04/scan.nsq 103.abstract (noting
that, in experimental settings, methods such as cognitive reappraisal, involving "the re-consideration
or re-framing of an event in less emotional terms," have been more reliable and effective in emo-
tional regulation studies than merely instructing participants to suppress their emotions).
337. Tamietto & de Gelder, supra note 308, at 698.
338. Kevin S. LaBar & Roberto Cabeza, Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotional Memory, 7
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 54, 55 (2006); see also Ueli Rutishauser et al., Activity of Human
Hippocampal and Amygdala Neurons During Retrieval of Declarative Memories, 105 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCi. 329, 329 (2008).
339. See, e.g., LaBar & Cabeza, supra note 338, at 54 ("Emotional events often attain a privi-
leged status in memory.").
340. Id. at 55 ("Emotional situations initiate complex interactions between adrenergic and
glucocorticoid systems that are coordinated by the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis at central and
peripheral sites of action. . . . Within the basolateral amygdala and hippocampus, noradrenaline
enhances glutamatergic synaptic plasticity, which is thought to underlie learning and memory func-
tions.").
341. Benno Roozendaal et al., Stress, Memory and the Amygdala, 10 NATURE REVIEWS
NEUROSCIENCE 423, 423 (2009). Roozendaal goes on to note that "[s]uch memory enhancement is
not limited to experiences that are unpleasant or aversive: pleasurable events also tend to be well
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The effect of emotion on memory depends on what the emotion is
and when it is experienced in the memory process. Encoding is the initial
stage of episodic memory, and it involves the processing of incoming
data that will be stored in the brain. It has two separate steps: acquisition
and consolidation. Acquisition refers to the registration and analysis of
an input in sensory buffers such as the auditory or visual cortex. Consol-
idation occurs when the memory creates a strong representation and ease
of recall over time. 3 4 2 Emotion can affect encoding through its modula-
tion of both processes, 343 and it likely plays out differently depending on
which point in the process it is involved.3 " The enhancing effects of
stress on consolidation may be balanced out by its impairing effects on
retrieval.345
A 2005 study found that patients with amygdala damage showed
deficits in recall for details of emotional scenes that were central to an
event, while keeping intact their memory for "unemotional" details that
were considered peripheral.34 6 This has been described as their remem-
bering the trees, but not the forest. It suggests an important role for the
amygdala in contextualizing memory.3 4 7 However, many studies to date
have not differentiated between the amygdala's influence on encoding
and on the consolidation process.
4. Social Decision-Making Studies Obliterate the Assumption that
Rational Actors Never Rely on Emotion
In this next part, the Article will apply findings from the cognitive
sciences to social models of decision-making. While processing differ-
ences often lead to behavioral differences, it is behavioral differences
remembered... . [S]tress hormones and stress-activated neurotransmitters enhance the consolidation
of memory for emotionally arousing experiences through actions involving the amygdala." Id.
342. GAZZANIGA, IVRY & MANGUN, supra note 43, at 248.
343. See J. A. Easterbrook, The Effect of Emotion on Cue Utilization and Organization of
Behavior, 66 PSYCHOL. REV. 183, 183 (1959).
344. The timing of stress is critical for recall. If stressful stimuli occur before learning, there is
impairment. If stressful event occurs after learning, there is enhanced recall. This effect was greater
in magnitude for emotional rather than neutral stimuli. Tom Smeets, Acute Stress Impairs Memory
Retrieval Independent of Time of Day, 36 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 495, 495, 499-500
(2011). In another study, retrieval of social information (biographical sketches including phone
numbers, names, part of life stories, birth dates, home towns) was impaired when stress occurred
after learning/encoding. Stress paradigm was the Trier Social Stress Test (being asked to give a
public speech on a topic of researchers' choosing). Researchers measured the level of stress induced
through cortisol levels and mood evaluations. There was no effect of sex for those having elevated
cortisol. Merz, Wolf & Hennig, supra note 170, at 291. Emotionality of the material can further
potentiate these effects. See Roozendaal et al., supra note 341, at 426.
345. Mathia Luethi, Beat Meier & Carmen Sandi., Stress Effects on Working Memory, Explicit
Memory, and Implicit Memory for Neutral and Emotional Stimuli in Healthy Men, 2 FRONTIERS
BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 1, 6 (2009).
346. Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel & Tony W. Buchanan, Amygdala Damage Impairs Emo-
tional Memory for Gist but Not Details of Complex Stimuli, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 512, 512, 515
(2005).
347. For an example of this impairment resulting from acute social stress, see Charles A.
Morgan, Ill et al., Stress-Induced Deficits in Working Memory and Visuo-Constructive Abilities in
Special Operations Soldiers, 60 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 722, 726 (2006).
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that are relevant to the law. We now then turn to social decision-making
models that integrate emotion, cognition, and behavior.
For some time, classical economics and legal models predicted that
human beings would make decisions in hyper-rational ways. 348 Even
non-economists thought that it was basic human nature to behave in a
way that maximized personal returns. Early psychology and neurosci-
ence researchers focused on the information-processing view of making
"optimal" decisions, a view that generally ignored emotion.349 To these
researchers, the prototypical question was, "Given a particular situation,
how should one go about selecting the best among competing alterna-
tives?" 350 But as cognitive and affective neuroscience developed, re-
searchers began to understand how an individual's "best choice" may be
classically "irrational." I place irrational in quotes, because it rests on a
particular definition of rationality that does not accommodate social and
affective goals. Many of our complex emotions, such as shame, empathy,
jealousy, and pride, depend on cognitive and social context.' Research-
ers have hypothesized that they developed later in our evolutionary histo-
ry than more primitive emotions like fear or sadness.352 These social
emotions serve to regulate group behaviors rather than promote individu-
al interests.
Despite our intuition, people frequently make decisions that do not
seem to yield net economic benefits to them. Humans are both more co-
operative and less selfish than social game theories would predict, choos-
ing sometimes to mutually benefit strangers in ways that once would
have been deemed irrational. And yet, this cooperation can be seen in
various research paradigms, with subjects of different ages and back-
grounds and despite the fact that the subjects may only play one anony-
mous game against each other. Of course, one must ask whether a finan-
cial investment or laboratory task can ever truly model other social losses
or gains (such as injury to our reputation). And to be sure, research on
348. See Thomas Raeburn White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect upon the
Competency of Witnesses, 51 AM. L. REG. 373, 373 (1903) ("Self-interest is perhaps the fundamental
fact in human nature. Every man naturally seeks to promote the welfare of himself and his family
before that of his neighbor.... [H]ewill, if necessary, tell a lie for that purpose.").
349. Phelps, supra note 266 at 27; see also Pizarro & Bloom, supra note 240, at 193 ("We
agree that psychology has suffered from an overreliance on reasoning at the expense of affective
processes." (citation omitted)).
350. Joseph G. Johnson & Jerome R. Busemeyer, Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertain-
ty, I WIRES COGNITIVE Sci. 736, 736 (2010) (emphasis added).
351. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 166; see also Yuko Akitsuki & Jean Decety, Social Context
and Perceived Agency Affects Empathy for Pain: An Event-Related fMRI Investigation, 47
NEUROIMAGE 722, 722 (2009) ("Our study demonstrates that the social context in which pain occurs
modulate the brain responses to others' pain. This modulation may reflect successful adaptation to
potential danger present in a social interaction.").
352. Adolphs, supra note 67, at 165-66.
353. Sanfey, supra note 40, at 599; see also Dominic J. Barraclough, Michelle L. Conroy &
Daeyeol Lee, Prefrontal Cortex and Decision Making in a Mixed-Strategy Game, 7 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 404, 404 (2004).
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mock jurors in deliberative settings must continue, so that we can learn
more about the way real-world jurors actually decide. But for now, we
have learned that human beings are not always rational in the classical
sense when they are working in groups. In fact, we are often "irrational"
in predictable ways that make sense once we acknowledge our social and
affective impulses. We will now turn to two theories that highlight this
phenomenon.
a. Prospect Theory
Prospect theory describes the behavior of individuals when making
various decisions about money and value. In laboratory settings, individ-
uals find the marginal utility of a constant change to be greater for losses
than for gains. 3 54 Put another way, if you lose money, this will be more
aversive to you than the same amount of monetary gain is pleasant. This
is known as loss aversion, and it is a feature of prospect theory. Teams
have demonstrated, many times over, that individuals will give more
money to keep an item than they initially paid to bring it home. This is
not predicted by pure rational decision-making, as it would seem that you
would not attach sentimental value to something so quickly, making
someone pay quite a bit above last week's sale price to take the object
from you.
Financial games such as this introduced many revolutionary things
to cognitive psychology. These tasks conveyed a less rational and more
emotion-centered view of social decision-making. 35 5 We also learned
something about the component parts to a complex social decision. Spe-
cifically, through prospect theory games, we now appreciate that there is
a pre-decisional editing stage, where the decision is framed, outcomes
ordered, and clearly inferior options are eliminated. Second, we have
learned that outcomes are compared to salient benchmarks and are not
weighed absolutely in the abstract. Instead, the value placed on outcomes
is influenced by our subjective emotions. Third, prospect theory has con-
firmed that outcomes could be evaluated differentially based on whether
they were posed as losses or gains. Finally, we have learned that sub-
optimal choices can be the result of loss aversion, where marginal utility
of a constant change is greater for losses than for gains. 3 56
Taken together, these findings paint a picture of decision-making
that is not centered on optimizing individual financial rewards. 357 This
may be due to sentimental value we place on the things we own, once we
own them. Taking into account our subjective evaluations, mediated
354. De Martino et al., supra note 317, at 684-86.
355. Johnson & Busemeyer, supra note 350, at 739.
356. Id.
357. The question has shifted from "What is rational?" to "Because humans often make
suboptimal' decisions, how can we describe and predict the choices that one will make in a particu-
lar situation?" Id. at 736.
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through emotional cues and memories, we can make better predictions as
to how people actually make social decisions. Up until recently, models
such as those adopted by the drafters of our evidentiary practices were
blind to the value of emotion in this decision-making.
b. Ultimatum Games
A task called the Ultimatum Game has uncovered other ways in
which humans make a different type of seemingly irrational decision.
The game essentially involves two subjects, the proposer and the re-
sponder. The proposer is given some amount of money by whoever is
controlling the experiment. Let's say she is given $10 dollars in ten one
dollar bills. Both subjects are told that the proposer gets to split the mon-
ey between the two of them in any way the proposer chooses. The pro-
poser then reveals to the responder how much money she wants to give.
If the responder accepts the proposal, they each get to keep the amount of
money suggested. But if the responder rejects the offer, neither person
gets anything. Under a purely rational view of human behavior, you
would expect that the proposer usually recommends giving the responder
the least amount possible, or $1. This seems rational because the re-
sponder should be happy to have a dollar more than he had before, and
the proposer, being in charge, could keep the maximum amount.
Shockingly, and not in keeping with cognitive rationalism, this is in
fact not what usually occurs. In many replicated studies, the proposer
does not keep $9 and, instead, typically divides the money equally be-
tween the two. And when she does not, and the allocation is thought of as
being too unequal (say, giving $1 to the responder) the responder will
reject the $1 outright, preferring to take no money at all.358 This effect is
observed regardless of whether the two subjects are anonymous
strangers, only play in one exchange, or whether they are repeat play-
ers-so long as the proposer is not given real-time feedback about
whether the responder has rejected her offers.359 Classical economists
mulled over why this might be the case; after all, why wouldn't someone
choose $1 over nothing? Ironically, the reason comes to us from emotion
and affective neuroscience.
Emotions such as frustration, disgust, or anger motivate the re-
sponder to punish the unfair offers, even when this punishment is only
revealed to the proposer at the end of the experiment. Receiving an un-
fair offer is associated with negatively-valenced emotions as well as acti-
vation of the Al and dlPFC.360 As you recall from earlier sections of the
358. See, e.g., Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick, Anonymity Versus Punishment in Ultimatum
Bargaining, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 95, 102 (1995).
359. See Shmuel Zamir, Rationality and Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining, 61 ANNALES
D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 1, 9, 19, 23 (2001).
360. Sanfey, supra note 40, at 600; Sanfey et al., supra note 284, at 1758 ("Therefore, not only
do our results provide direct empirical support for economic models that acknowledge the influence
125
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Article, the Al is implicated in feelings of disgust, which might help us
learn from, and then avoid, aversive experiences. The dlPFC may be
361involved with cognitive reappraisal and regulation of strong emotions.
Conversely, fair offers are associated with activation in brain areas
linked to reward leaning, including the ventral striatum.3 62 The striatum
receives positive dopamine boosts following successful actions, perhaps
instructing the network to respond in the same way when reactivated in
the future.363
Subjects are more likely to accept unfair offers when the dlPFC ac-
tivation is substantially greater than the insular activation. This has sug-
gested to some that difficult social decisions may rely on iterative com-
petitions between so-called cognitive processes and emotional ones, with
rejection resulting when the emotional process is not sufficiently checked
by the cognitive control. 3 64 This sort of data reinforces the false dichoto-
my and suggests that, in some cases, there might be competition between
structures. However, this competition likely does not fall on such clear
lines-with emotion at one end and reason at the other. Rather than the
dlPFC "checking" the insula activity, it is entirely possible that in those
cases where the offer was rejected, the person was just not feeling as
disgusted by similar unfair behavior.
Interestingly, unfair offers are also rejected when it is not the actual
responder who gets to keep the money, but instead some anonymous
third party beneficiary.6 One study tried to figure out whether the emo-
of emotional factors on decision-making behavior, but they also provide the first step toward the
development of quantitative measures that may be useful in constraining the social utility function in
economic models." (footnotes omitted)). Further, in related cooperative games involving trust:
Providing general personality profiles of partners before they play a [trust game] led to
reduced caudate activity when responding to partners described in either positive or nega-
tive terms, although responses to morally neutral players remained unchanged. This sug-
gests that prior beliefs can reduce the amount of trial-by-trial learning, which demon-
strates both top-down and bottom-up influences on the neural basis of social cooperation.
Sanfey, supra note 40, at 600 (footnotes omitted).
361. See James K. Rilling, Brooks King-Casas & Alan G. Sanfey, The Neurobiology ofSocial
Decision-Making, 18 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 159, 162 (2008).The top-down cognitive
override of bottom-up emotional responses has been found when subjects make utilitarian moral
decisions or delay gratification. See id.
362. Id at 161. This effect appears to hold even when the researchers control for the monetary
payoff. Id.
363. See Wolfram Schultz, Neural Coding of Basic Reward Terms ofAnimal Learning Theory,
Game Theory, Microeconomics and Behavioural Ecology, 14 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY
139, 141 (2004). The striatum is thought to be implicated in craving, reward anticipation and predic-
tion, and romantic love. Phillips et al., supra note 261, at 507.
364. See Sanfey et al., supra note 284, at 1757; cf M. R. Delgado, R. H. Frank & E. A. Phil-
lips, Perception of Moral Character Modulate the Neural Systems of Reward During the Trust
Game, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1611, 1616 (2005). See generally Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sig-
mund, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring, 393 NATURE 573 (1998); Claus
Wedekind & Manfred Milinski, Cooperation Through Image Scoring in Humans, 288 SC. 850
(2000).
365. Claudia Civai et al., Are Irrational Reactions to Unfairness Truly Emotionally-Driven?
Dissociated Behavioural and Emotional Responses in the Ultimatum Game Task, 114 COGNITION
89, 94 (2010).
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tional response is the same in the third-party or self-reward paradigms,
and found that while unfair offers were likewise rejected when the mon-
ey went to a stranger, there was less of an external response, as measured
by skin temperature and heart rate.366 A different team discovered that
the punishment signal (i.e., rejecting unfair offers) was attenuated when
the responder was given Citalopram, a seratonin reuptake inhibitor.
When seratonin was enhanced in the subjects, subjects were much less
likely to reject unfair offers from the proposer. Similarly, when sub-
jects were given oxytocin during the games, they were more likely to
trust others, perhaps by attenuating the fear or anxiety related to rejec-
tion. 368 Thus, in the Ultimatum Game, we also see how important emo-
tions such as disgust, anger, or fear are essential for social decision-
making.
There are many other examples where humans make decisions that
appear irrational at first blush, but in fact might make sense if we factor
in emotions such as anger, sadness, or empathy. Seemingly irrational
decisions make more sense because of the social nature of the decision,
and whether trust and cooperation are important. 369 Together, emotions
and social norms powerfully regulate our responses to others, in ways
appropriate for social cooperation. We must therefore begin to develop
legal decision-making rules that understand the important role of emo-
tion in social decisions such as credibility assessments and ultimately in
moral judgments such as sentencing. To be sure, a leading researcher in
this area, Alan Sanfey, put it this way in 2003: "Models of decision-
making cannot afford to ignore emotion as a vital and dynamic compo-
nent of our decisions and choices in the real world. 370
CONCLUSION: ELIMINATING THE FALSE DICHOTOMY AND REMOVING
OUR AFFECTIVE BLINDNESS
[Our] [r]eliance on a traditional two-system model, in which a
"cold," rational, far-sighted cognitive system battles against a "hot,"
366. Id. at 89 ("The 'irrational' rejections of unfair offers ... have traditionally been associated
with negative emotions, such as frustration, elicited by unfairness. We recorded skin conductance
responses as a measure of emotional activation while participants performed a modified version of
the UG, in which they were asked to play both for themselves and on behalf of a third-party. Our
findings show that even unfair offers are rejected when participants' payoff is not affected (third-
party condition); however, they show an increase in the emotional activation specifically when they
are rejecting offers directed towards themselves (myself condition). These results suggest that theo-
ries emphasizing negative emotions as the critical factor of 'irrational' rejections should be re-
discussed. Psychological mechanisms other than emotions might be better candidates for explaining
this behaviour." (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)).
367. Molly J. Crockett et al., Seratonin Selectively Influences Moral Judgment and Behavior
Through Effects on Harm Aversion, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCL 17433, 17433 (2010).
368. Michael Kosfeld et al., Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans, 435 NATURE 673, 673
(2005).
369. For example, reciprocal cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game is associated with
caudate nucleus activation and cooperative reciprocity in subsequent rounds. Rilling, King-Casas &
Sanfey, supra note 361, at 160.
370. Sanfey et al., supra note 284, at 1758.
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irrational, short-sighted emotional system is beginning to prove inad-
equate in light of contemporary psychological and neurobiological
data that favor multiples decision-systems. 371
When the law speaks of emotion, it often has intense, visibly arous-
ing states in mind. But subtle emotions guide almost everything we do-
from perceiving, attending, and remembering, to deciding to send some-
one to prison for life. The foregoing examples from cognitive science
have hopefully convinced you of the weak theoretical bases for some of
our evidence practices that fail to recognize the wide diversity in emo-
tional processes. Specifically, the idea that we can and should use infor-
mation only for its non-emotional content, that emotion equals bias, that
we can selectively recruit or bracket off our empathic impulses, that the
"heat of passion" suspends all reflection, and that we cannot lie when
stressed, are just a few of the ways that evidence law fails to reflect reali-
ty. As I have demonstrated through a painstaking survey of our complex
brains and legal rules, emotion and reason are often not at odds. Indeed,
functional interactions between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex me-
diate emotional influences on cognitive processes and vice versa. Even
individual neurons encode for both cognitive and emotional variables! 3 72
So why does any of this matter? The failure to appreciate the inevi-
table and often helpful role emotions can play in courtroom decision-
making results in rules and practices that are woefully out of step with
cognitive science data on emotion and reason.373 The monolithic view of
emotions as corrupting of reason results in affective blindness. We there-
fore ask jurors to perform mental gymnastics and emotional regulation
that may not be possible, and also might not be desirable, given that
emotions assist with perception, attention, memory, empathy, and social
decision-making.
Even the world of artificial intelligence appreciates that the false di-
chotomy does not make sense, as fully "rational" robots without emotion
would never fool anyone and would not quite fit in. Emotion certainly is
part of what makes us socially cooperative beings, and it may be the very
process by which we learn, by helping us attach labels for our life's
events, so we can classify the activity as enjoyable or not for future deci-
sion-making. It therefore should be better understood in its various mani-
festations before being formally rejected from the courtroom. Our work-
ing constructs of emotion in evidence practice need to be redefined and
made more precise. In fifty years, when we reflect on the clumsy way we
were referring to "emotion," we will realize that what we actually meant
was one thousand different things.
371. Seymour & Dolan, supra note 1, at 662 (citations omitted).
372. Salzman & Fusi, supra note 265, at 173.
373. See Lubell et al., supra note 1, at 417.
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For now, this Article calls for two things. First, I argue that eviden-
tiary practices emphasizing the biasing effect of emotion be revised to
reflect the mounting proof that (1) emotion is not always biasing and (2)
emotion and reason are structurally interconnected and functionally in-
terdependent. Second, I argue that social psychologists continue to con-
duct mock jury research on emotional processing. The hope is that a
growing body of research will discover alternatives to the current models
of the FRE that are crudely antagonistic to emotion.
Researchers have struggled to define the "emotional brain" in part
due to the complexity of function, but also due to conceptual difficulties
in reliably testing different emotions in social contexts. Given the com-
plexity of emotional states, it can be difficult to translate feelings such as
joy, sadness, disgust, empathy, disappointment, love, shame, guilt, or
fear, into suitable laboratory tasks. This is compounded by our reliance
on subjects' self-reports of experienced emotion. 3 74 And even if we by-
pass self-reports and look to changes in amygdala activity as proxies for
emotional arousal, we still need corroborating behavioral or physiologi-
cal measures (such as startle response, stress hormones, blood pressure
increase, heart-rate, temperature) to support the inference that emotional
responses have occurred.37 5 Further, in the real world, reduced amygdala
activation might mean we are reasoning through our emotions, challeng-
ing them, and yet still are guided by their implicit encoding. This is just
one more way that the study of emotions is incredibly context-specific.
Thus, we need more studies looking at context-specific variables and a
panoply of physiological and behavioral markers that a precise emotion
was experienced. Specifically, future studies should be geared at testing
the following:
* The role of emotional evidence and processing on attention, per-
ception, memory, and credibility assessments in mock jury settings. Spe-
cifically, this research needs to expand out from focusing on fearful
stimuli and should compare effects of other emotional processes such as
joy, surprise, anger, and shame;
* The degree to which mock jurors can consciously down-regulate
emotions such as empathy, and whether these judgments are externally
considered socially more fair, efficient, or stable;
* Whether instructions telling jurors to rely on emotional evidence
when hearing mitigation evidence, but not when hearing aggravating
evidence or determining civil damages awards, are understood and fol-
lowed;
374. Pessoa, supra note 251, at 149.
375. This is because the amygdala is preferentially activated in response to many things. See
Ochsner & Gross, supra note 41, at 244.
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* Whether the jury understands the difference between the require-
ment of specific intent and adequate provocation in the "heat of passion"
instructions, and whether emotions other than rage can be said to gener-
ate "adequate provocation" that makes "cool reflection" impossible;
* Whether jurors respond differently to limiting instructions related
to emotional testimony when controlling for the social power of the
speaker (i.e., judge, prosecution, defense, lay witness);
* The role of memory, as opposed to prevarication, on hearsay ex-
ceptions and the trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement; and
* Whether mock jury credibility assessments can be performed well
in individuals who suffer from deficits in empathy.
The breadth of our charge is overwhelming. But that does not mean
we should revert to the state of affairs in 1933, when Hutchins lamented
that there was no psychological data relevant to jury decision-making.
While modem cognitive science has not dealt with every point raised by
the laws of evidence, it has at least made actionable inroads. And with
studies using larger sample sizes, controlled protocol, physiological as-
sessments of emotion (such as heart rate, sweating, etc), we can begin to
understand averages that might approach normal emotional processing in
groups.376 However, much more care needs to be taken to model the real-
world social aspects of deliberation and trial as best as possible, without
allowing the perfect methodology to be the enemy of the good (or bet-
ter). The data from cognitive science have and will continue to help us
articulate more precise definitions for legal terms, and will help us make
sure our normative trial commitments, once set, track the reality of our
physiological constraints. Even after all of the best and ecologically valid
data is gathered, rulemakers may still decide to thumb their noses at cog-
nitive science. If this happens, we must revisit our normative commit-
ments to epistemological rationalism, judicial efficiency, repose, and
governmental legitimacy. A legal system purportedly aimed at any of
these (perhaps with the exception of judicial efficiency, taken alone) will
never be achieved if we continue to ignore the way human beings make
complex social decisions. As it is, we assume that jurors can divorce
their emotions from their reasons, behaving in many ways like a cal-
loused psychopath. Robert Maynard Hutchins remained hopeful that one
376. But even if we begin to see reliable activation patterns, or neural correlates, for certain
emotions, we must be mindful of the curse of the reverse inference. The reverse inference is a logical
fallacy that occurs when we infer that specific mental processes are engaged based on seeing pat-
terns of brain activation that are correlated with that mental process. The reason this is flawed is that
our brain structures do not have a 1:1 relationship with function. As just mentioned, neural networks
and structures perform many functions. Seeing activation in one area may mean multiple things.
Although there is not as much power in the reverse inference, it is not without some merit in terms of
drawing correlations. Further, newly developed methods from the field of machine learning may
strengthen them. See generally Russell A. Polldrack, The Role of fMRI in Cognitive Neuroscience:
Where Do We Stand?, 18 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 223 (2008).
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day we could strike some "mutual sparks" between evidence law, the
brain, and behavior. 3 77 My hope is that this Article will fan the fire with
more relevant data from the cognitive sciences, particularly social and
affective neuroscience.
377. See Daniel Blinka, supra note 7, at 417 (2010) (quoting Hutchins supra note 15, at 513).
131

